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SUMMARY
This thesis presents a comprehensive set of techniques for solving, simulating, 
analysing and controlling large scale, nonlinear, econometric models that contain 
rational expectations of future dated variables. These expectations are generally 
treated as model consistent, whereby the expectation is set to the deterministic 
projection of the model.
Solutions to such models are distinguished from those of conventional models 
by the fact that they are not recursive in time. The outcome for the current period 
depends on the expected outcome for future periods as well as past periods. This 
property means that all of the basic numerical procedures need to be altered.
We consider the following topics: solution algorithms for the two—point 
boundary value problem; terminal conditions, uniqueness and stability; 
experimental design and stochastic simulation; model forms, solution modes and 
historical tracking; control methods including optimal control. We find that 
suitable procedures allow us to undertake all of the experiments usually conducted 
with conventional models.
Each topic is illustrated by application to three large scale models of the 
United Kingdom economy which contain rational expectations terms. Only one of 
these models is constructed following the new-classical paradigm and hence their 
comparative properties revealed by our experiments are of some interest.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the last two decades, expectations formation has been at the 
heart of macroeconomic research. In particular, following the work of Muth (1961), 
attention has been concentrated on the concept of rational expectations i.e. that 
agents form expectations consistent with their knowledge of the underlying 
processes of the economic system and taking into account all available information. 
The rational expectations hypothesis has sufficiently penetrated all areas of 
macroeconomic theory and applied work to have caused a "revolution in 
macroeconomics" according to Begg (1982). Developments in macroeconomic 
theory are usually incorporated, sooner or later, into large-scale macroeconomic 
models. In the United Kingdom there are now three large, nonlinear, empirical, 
macroeconomic forecasting models which incorporate rational expectation terms as 
part of their basic structure.
The Liverpool model (LPL) is an annual model which has been based on 
rational expectations since its inception in 1979. It is new classical in structure with 
a set of long-run equilibrium equations determined only by the supply side. The 
London Business School (LBS) and National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research (NIESR) models are quarterly and used rational expectation models for 
their forecasts for the first time during 1985 (Economic Outlook, October; National 
Institute Economic Review, November). The LBS model has three expectation 
terms in its large financial sector. It is based around the income-expenditure 
framework and has a tradition as an international monetarist model. A more 
accurate description of current versions would be a sluggish price adjustment model. 
The NIESR model remained largely Keynesian despite the incorporation of the 
expectations of eleven variables with leads of up to four periods. The model is 
therefore a quantity adjustment model, being driven more by expenditures than 
relative prices.
2The actual processes by which agents form expectations are generally 
unknown and their precise expectations concerning future macroeconomic quantities 
are usually unobserved. The assumption of rational expectations in economic theory 
therefore leads to complications both in estimating equations which contain explicit 
expectation terms and in the numerical procedures which are designed to solve, 
simulate and analyse large-scale models which contain such terms. The 
econometric literature now suggests a range of statistical methods which allow the 
estimation of equations containing rational expectation terms (e.g. see Begg, 1982, 
Ch.5). This thesis concerns numerical methods which allow the use of such 
equations in large-scale models.
1.1 The objectives of the thesis
The primary objective of this thesis is to establish a set of numerical methods 
for the simulation, analysis and optimal control of large-scale, nonlinear, 
macroeconomic models that contain rational expectations of future-dated variables. 
These methods allow us to undertake on rational expectations models all of the 
experiments usually performed with conventional large-scale models such as 
forecasting, policy analysis or stochastic simulation.
Numerical methods are often designed for specific problems or for specific 
models. In this thesis we aim to establish a general set of techniques which can be 
applied to a variety of models and problems. Starting from these general methods 
we can then modify the procedures to suit the requirements of particular 
experiments.
The secondary objective of the thesis is to  use our procedures to investigate 
the properties of the three publicly available models of the U K. economy which 
incorporate rational expectations terms. As noted by Wallis (1987):
"In the United States the eventual adoption of the rational 
expectations hypothesis was associated in addition with the new 
classical equilibrium business cycle models and the policy 
ineffectiveness proposition."
In the U.K. this association has not been universally adopted and the properties of 
those models with rational expectations may not coincide with the new-classical 
model. The elucidation of the properties of these models is therefore of some 
interest.
In the three different U.K. models containing rational expectations, the only 
common expectations term is that of the sterling effective exchange rate. In a 
relatively small open economy, operating under a floating rate regime, fluctuations 
in the exchange rate  can be a particularly important transmission mechanism. 
Expectations of future exchange rates changes appear to play an important 
behavioural role in determining its current value (Isard, 1988) and these terms are 
therefore of fundamental importance to the properties of U.K. models (e.g. see 
Wallis et al., 1987, pp44-48). When explaining our results we pay particular 
attention to the behaviour of the exchange rate.
In Chapter 2 we present a wide-ranging literature survey covering all aspects 
of large-scale modelling but paying particular attention to the numerical methods 
used. The role of expectations is discussed and we consider the problems caused by 
including expectation terms of future-dated variables. We conclude that the issues 
raised have only partially been resolved by the existing literature. Some problems, 
such as terminal condition choice, do not appear to have been considered in depth 
and some existing numerical methods, such as those for the optimal control of 
nonlinear rational expectations models, do not appear to  be well understood.
In the third chapter of the thesis we consider the basic problem of solving a 
rational expectations model such that the expectations terms are consistent with the 
model’s solution. We develop a family of first-order iterative techniques which 
encompasses some specific solution algorithms suggested elsewhere in the literature. 
These methods are tested on three large-scale models to  derive the most efficient 
forms of solution algorithm. We contrast and compare our methods with two
4alternative approaches to solving nonlinear rational expectations models.
In Chapter 4 we address the issues of uniqueness and stability in the 
solutions of rational expectations models. Having established the conditions for a 
unique stable solution to exist, we are faced with the problem of locating that 
solution. This comes down to the choice of terminal values for the expectation 
terms in the final solution period. A number of possible terminal conditions are 
proposed and evaluated on both a small demonstration model and the three large- 
scale models. Particular attention is paid to the implications of different choices 
when there is not a unique stable solution.
The following chapter begins by examining the implications of different 
assumptions concerning input shocks. Such shocks may be introduced for the 
purpose of policy analysis or simply to evaluate the partial responses of the model. 
The shock can be treated as anticipated or unanticipated, temporary or permanent. 
The practical implications of such distinctions are evaluated for each of the three 
large-scale models.
The analysis of a sequence of temporary, unanticipated shocks leads us to a 
proposed method of stochastic simulation which differs from two methods proposed 
elsewhere in the literature. The differences are critically assessed and our preferred 
method is applied in an experiment to reveal the stochastic implications of 
alternative assumptions for the financing of the PSBR.
In Chapter 6 we present a general discussion of alternative model forms 
(structural form, reduced form, final form) and solution modes (single-equation, 
static, dynamic) extended to the rational expectations case. In particular we 
develop an appropriate method for the static simulation of rational expectations 
models. We argue that static rather than dynamic simulation is the correct 
procedure to be used in evaluating the historical tracking performance of models. A 
comprehensive historical tracking exercise is presented for six U.K. models, three 
containing rational expectations and three without.
In the seventh chapter we develop algorithms for the optimal control of 
nonlinear rational expectations models. Three algorithms are investigated which
5produce the optimal solutions corresponding to different formulations of the policy 
optimization problem. The differences in these solutions are discussed and critically 
assessed. One of the three algorithms is then used to derive optimal inflation- 
unemployment trade-offs for the three large-scale rational expectations models. 
Attention is paid both to the observed economic properties of the models and the 
costs of the optimization procedure. Finally, the implications are examined of 
alternative formulations of the problem.
The concluding Chapter 8 contains directions for future research and final 
remarks. The models used in this thesis are those made available by the ESRC 
Macroeconomic Modelling Bureau between Autumn 1985 and Autumn 1989. A 
precise list of the model vintages used in each chapter is given in an appendix. All 
the calculations have been made using software developed for the purpose and this 
software is attached to the macroeconomic model User service provided by the 
Bureau to U.K. academics over the Joint Academic Network.
Chapter 2
LARGE-SCALE MACROECONOMIC MODELS AND FORWARD 
EXPECTATIONS
In this chapter we begin by reviewing the nature and purpose of large-scale 
macroeconomic models. We then survey the development of the rational 
expectations literature and lead in to large-scale macroeconomic models with 
forward expectations. We consider the problems posed for conventional numerical 
methods in solving, simulating and analysing these models and the extent to which 
these problems are overcome by existing procedures.
2.1 Large-scale mods»» of the e w no ai
An economy is formed by a large number of agents (e.g. firms, consumers) 
engaging in economic activity: the production, distribution and consumption of 
goods and services. Each individual agent may have a unique behavioural pattern. 
Using economic theory, we can predict how representative agents will behave under 
given conditions — such as perfect competition in the product market. However, if 
we wish to model the behaviour of an entire economy, it would be a Herculean task 
to model the actions of each individual agent. Apart from the sheer size of the 
model, the realized decisions of any one actual agent may not conform to any known 
economic theory. In a macroeconomic model of a national economy, we therefore 
model the aggregate (or average as appropriate) behaviour of groups of agents. The 
size of any particular model is then dependent on the degree of aggregation chosen 
by the model builder or specified by the model user. In modelling the behaviour of 
economic agents, we are seeking to explain or predict the values of their decisions as 
realized in the economic data. These decisions are determined for each agent by 
their own behavioural pattern and by their conditioning information. That is to say 
the agents respond to the state of the world. In an aggregate or average 
representation of an economy, we are trying to explain (or predict) the movement of
7a set of macroeconomic aggregates such as consumption expenditure, the general 
price level or the exchange rate between domestic and foreign currency. We 
condition our model by choosing not to explain certain other aggregates on economic 
or statistical grounds. We may exclude certain policy variables (e.g. the rate of 
interest in some models); those which are determined outside the geographical 
economy of interest (e.g. world production if we are modelling the U.K.); or simply 
those variables which are within the system but which are not of interest to  the user 
of the model (e.g. some demographic factors such as the birth rate).
The relationships between the variables being explained by the model (the 
endogenous variables) and those not being explained (the exogenous variables) are 
modelled using algebraic representations. These models then consist of a system of 
simultaneous equations. These equations may be derived entirely from theoretical 
analysis or they may have functional forms and/or numerical parameters which are 
based on empirical exercises. Models based on empirical research, often 
distinguished by the term "macroeconometric models" will usually be based on time 
series data recorded over some historical period. This gives the model builder a 
choice of temporal aggregation, usually annual or quarterly although continuous 
time models have also been developed (e.g. Bergstrom, 1967; Gandolfo, 1981).
The first macroeconomic model was presented by Jan Tinbergen over fifty 
years ago (Tinbergen 1936). In the period since, there have been many models 
developed for a range of purposes. In particular we identify three main uses of a 
large-scale macroeconomic model: understanding the processes of the economy; 
predicting the future course of the economy (forecasting); analysing the effects on 
the economy of external shocks or changes in policy variables. For the U.K. some 
recent developments in these areas have been surveyed by Wallis (1988, 1989).
A wide variety of models have been constructed, with different emphasis on 
the use to which they are put, at different levels of temporal and sectoral 
aggregation. In each case however, the model is treated as a framework for analysis 
to provide quantifiable evidence when all the relevant relationships in the economy 
are taken into consideration. Given this framework, the results obtained from any
8individual model may still depend on the way in which it is used: the answer 
depends on how the question is asked. This aspect is discussed by Turner, Wallis 
and Whitley (1989). A classic example is that the effects of an increase in 
government expenditure depend on how it is financed: by printing money, issuing 
debt or raising taxes. This particular example has its roots in the seminal papers of 
Christ (1968) and Blinder and Solow (1973).
Macroeconomic models are built to give a detailed representation of the 
economy and may range from just one or two equations up to many thousands (the 
project LINK model of the world economy contains some 20000 equations: Petersen, 
1987). The definition of what size model comprises large-scale is somewhat 
arbitrary. The smallest model used in this thesis contains just 30 equations and the 
largest just over 1200. Large models are often multi-purpose, designed for all three 
of the activities noted above. The costs associated with building and maintaining a 
model increase with size and there is an obvious incentive to extract the maximum 
use value.
Each equation in a large model will be grounded to a greater or lesser extent 
in an economic analysis of a particular behavioural relationship. Typically the 
majority of equations in the model will be estimated. That is to say, they have 
functional forms, numerical coefficients and a choice of explanatory variables which 
are determined to some extent by the use of econometric methods. In this thesis we 
shall be largely treating the structure of models as given. The process of 
constructing models is covered in texts such as Fair (1984) and Holden, Peel and 
Thompson (1982).
The simplest representation of an economic system is a set of linear, static 
equations which we may write as:
B ^  +  C x j - U j ,  (2.1)
where y( is an (n«l) vector of observations on the endogenous variables at time t; xt 
is an (m «l) vector of observations on the exogenous variables and u( is an (n»l)
9vector of disturbance terms. The matrices B and C are (n«n) and (n*m) matrices of 
coefficient values respectively (derived or estimated). The n elements of ut (ujt , 
i= l,...,n ) are non-zero whenever equation i does not perfectly fit the observed data 
in period t. An equation j for which Ujt =  0 in every period t= l,...,T  is defined as 
an identity. A system for which B is diagonal is un-coupled or non-simultaneous. 
Off-diagonal elements in B represent the direct effect of the outcome of one decision 
on another.
In general, economic behaviour is dynamic in the sense that decisions made 
in period t depend on past decisions and conditioning information to rn  earlier 
periods as well as xt . A general dynamic model can be represented by use of the lag 
operator L which is defined such that Lyt =  yt_ j- We can then generalize equation 
(2.1) to:
where B(L), C(L) are now matrices of polynomials of order p, q repectively such
th»l B(L) r t  -  BQyt +  B j j ^ j  +  B2jrt_ j  +  ... +  B ^ j , ^  and C(L) i> Bmilarly
Equation (2.2) still presents the model in linear form whereas in practice, 
most large-scale models involve nonlinear relationships. Examples include 
log—linear equations in which the variables are first transformed by taking logs or 
ratio transformations such as taking the current account balance as a fraction of 
total output in forming an explanatory variable. A combination of linear identities, 
log-linear equations and multi—variable transformations together with the 
occasional extreme nonlinearity (such as raising to a power) will typically yield a 
system which cannot be expressed in the form of equation (2.2). We therefore adopt 
a more general notation:
B(L) y , +  C(L) x, =  u , (2 .2)
defined.
(2.3)
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The vector of general functions f( •) is restricted only in that it is a real—valued 
function of real variables. The vectors defined with capital letters and Yt_ j 
represent all observations up to the date indicated i.e. X ' =  { x ', x ' _ j , ... , x '_^} 
and Y '_ j=  { y '_ j, y ' _ .. . ,  y^_p} . The vector 6 represents all the parameters of 
f(•) and 0^  will represent the parameters of equation f  (•) . Although the vast 
majority of large-scale models are nonlinear, the linear forms (2.1) and (2.2) can 
still be useful as an analytical device for considering the behaviour of the nonlinear 
system (2.3). The linear system (2.2) could be considered as a first order 
approximation to the nonlinear system (2.3) in some local neighbourhood of its 
solution. The elements of B(L) and C(L) are then interpreted as partial derivatives 
of f(-). Hence in some parts of the exposition we continue to  use the linear form 
(2.2) and this has the benefit that linear systems are easily manipulated to give 
closed form expressions whereas general nonlinear systems are not.
The use of a model for understanding the processes of the economy is partly a 
matter of examining the specific relationships embodied in the system. However, 
there are also various experiments which we may wish to  conduct such as full 
system analysis, policy analysis or forecasting and these exercises require a set of 
numerical techniques for solving and simulating the model. The computational 
complexity of these techniques generally increases as we move from models of the 
form (2.1) through (2.2) to (2.3). Throughout this thesis, a detailed presentation of 
techniques will be made as we extend them to cover the forward expectations case. 
In this section we briefly summarize these procedures for models of the form so far 
considered.
The basic technique for using a large scale model is simulation. That is to 
say, the simultaneous equation system is solved for the endogenous variables (yt ) 
conditional on the form of the model, its coefficients and the values of the exogenous 
variables. The input may also include direct adjustments to  y( to account for 
off—model information. Hence solution of the nonlinear equation system (2.3) is an
11
essential requirement. Solution procedures are covered by many authors e.g. 
Hughes Hallett and Rees (1983).
The static linear system (2.1) can be used to solve for y( , t= l,...,T  for each t 
by obtaining the reduced form solution:
7t  -  - B - 1  C  X ,  +  B- 1  u,. (2.4a)
Hence the only numerical technique needed is the inversion of B which is required to 
be of full rank. In what follows, we assume that the disturbances (u( ) are set to 
zero for simplicity. For the dynamic model (2.2) we can solve for a static or 
dynamic sequence. In the static sequence the lagged values yt_ j,. -,yt_ p are set to 
observed historical values and the system is solved for y^. In the dynamic sequence, 
the solution value for y^ is calculated using observed historical values but the 
solution for y j  then depends on the solved value for y^. The solution for yt , t> p  
uses solution values for all the lags on y. These solutions can be expressed as:
U  ~  ~*0  I V t - l  +  +  V t - p  +  C0*t +  ••• +  V t —q] (J -4b)
y, -  -B o 1 I V t - I  +  -  +  Bpyt-p  +  c o*t +  -  +  c ,*t_q l (2 4c)
t = l .....T
yt - s “
for the static and dynamic solutions respectively. For dynamic as well as static 
systems the reduced form solution is obtained by matrix inversion. For large 
systems this inversion can be costly and the solution is usually obtained by solving 
the simultaneous equation system by direct methods which will be discussed below. 
In both cases we require BQ to have full rank. The dynamic system need not be 
stable but the stability condition requires that the determinantal polynomial | B(L) | 
has all its roots of modulus less than unity.
The nonlinear system (2.3) does not have a general solution with a
12
convenient expression. Instead we assume that the conditions of the implicit 
function theorem hold and we write the reduced form of equation (2.3) as:
y , =  s ( V r  x t ■ ut' «) (2-o>
In general there may be more than one solution to equation (2.3) which satisfies 
equation (2.5) but of all the large-scale models there has been only one case of 
multiple solutions arising from nonlinearities reported in the literature (Friedman, 
1971). Since the function g(-) is not usually obtainable analytically, we solve 
equation (2.3) directly by numerical methods. For some of the methods considered 
below we require that we can re-write equation (2.3) as:
y , =  M y,; x (i *). (2.6)
As in the linear case, we set ut =  0 for simplicity. In the nonlinear case however, 
this causes complications which we consider in the next section.
Solutions to the system (2.3) or (2.0) are typically generated either by 
derivative—based methods or first-order iterative methods. The commonest 
derivative—based technique is the Newton method. To obtain this numerical 
algorithm we consider an expansion of the i’th equation in system (2.3) around some 
trial solution y ^ :
y ) - j £ i [« i/«yj] | y(0).(yr yj(0)) -  o. (2.7)
Solving equation (2.7) for i= l,...,n  simultaneously yields the iteration:
y(') =  y( , - 1 )  -  F“ 1 y ,_ , ;  x ,_ i ;  l) (2.8)
where F is the matrix of partial derivatives evaluated at iteration
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First-order methods are based on solving equation (2.6). These methods will 
be considered in greater depth in Chapter 3 but the simplest form, the Jacobi 
method, can be obtained by simply writing equation (2.6) as:
j j 0  -  ‘■(Jt (,_1); X,; u( ; t) (2.8)
For both derivative-based and first-order methods, the solution yt is found when 
where r  is some chosen tolerance level.
In the two algorithms given above, the ordering of the equations i= l,...,n  is 
irrelevant. Gabay et aL (1980) and Don and Gallo (1987) have shown that the 
efficiency of the Newton solution procedure can be improved by exploiting any 
sparseness (zero entries) of the F matrix to reduce the dimensionality of the matrix 
inversion in equation (2.8). Hughes Hallett and Fisher (1987) have shown that any 
such observed sparseness can be used to re-order the equations to  improve the 
efficiency of general first-order methods.
The solution methods discussed in this section are the basic tool used in the 
simulation of macroeconomic models. They allow us to calculate the values of the 
endogenous variables yt conditional on alternative values for the exogenous 
variables x  ^ — which might be actual or forecast values; an hypothesized policy 
setting or simply a shock to the system . In addition we will consider two further 
types of simulation which require more complicated techniques: stochastic 
simulation and optimal control.
2.3 SiochMtic Bmalatiop
The solutions delivered by equations (2.4) and algorithms (2.8) and (2.9) are 
obtained by setting the disturbance terms to their expected values E(ut ) =  0 . That 
the observed disturbances (residuals) have mean zero over the estimation
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period is a property of most econometric estimators. If an equation is observed to 
have residuals with a non-zero mean (e.g. post-sample) then an estimate of the 
mean value is sometimes used rather than zero. In either case, these solutions are 
defined as deterministic because they offer a single point estimate of yt ignoring the 
stochastic nature of the system. A stochastic simulation is an (Monte Carlo) 
experiment undertaken with a model in order to approximate the distribution of y( .
It has been known, at least since Howrey and Kelejian (1971), that the 
deterministic solution to a nonlinear model is generally a biased estimate of its 
conditional expectation. This arises because the expectation of a nonlinear function 
of a  random variable is not generally equal to the same function of the expectation 
of tha t variable i.e.
E( g(Yt_ i; X,; u,; 0)) * g(Yt_ , ;  X(; Efu,); 0). (2.10)
Furthermore, the deterministic solution to equation (2.3) gives us no information on 
the distribution of yt  unlike the linear model (2.1) in which, for example, the 
conditional variance-covariance m atrix of yt can be obtained directly as Bq**^Bq* 
(where 4»t=E(utUj)) and hence estimated from the residuals ut=yt~yt (where yt 
denotes the fitted value of the estimated equation). Stochastic simulation can be 
used to obtain an unbiased estimate of the conditional expectation of g(-) and 
estimates of the higher order moments.
The stochastic simulation generates repeated solutions to the model for R 
successive draws of an (n»l) vector of pseudo-random disturbances sjr\  r=l,...,R . 
One vector of these shocks is then introduced in place of ut for each replication. 
The successive solutions generate an empirical distribution for yt from which we can 
estimate the parameters of interest. In order for the input to approximate the 
correct distribution of u^, various schemes have been suggested for calculating the 
pseudo-random shocks. The Nagar method (Nagar, 1969) suggests drawing 
deviates from the multivariate normal distribution using an estimate of the residual 
covariance matrix based on residuals over some historical period. For an (n«l)
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vector of pseudo—random standard normal deviates
T .  .
and for an estimated
variance—covariance matrix ♦  =  £ u .u r/T  we obtain a set of disturbances. t=1
s(r>' =  v j^ 'W  where W 'W  =  ♦  . This method is unfortunately not generally 
feasible because the required decomposition of the covariance matrix is only 
obtainable when that matrix (♦ ) is non-singular. We seldom have enough degrees 
of freedom to identify all the (n*(n+l))/2  parameters involved in the covariance 
matrix.
The McCarthy method (McCarthy, 1972) is the most commonly adopted 
residual generation technique for stochastic simulation of large systems. It 
overcomes the problem of the Nagar procedure by using the residuals directly 
instead of decomposing the variance-covariance m atrix to  generate the
pseudo-random shocks i.e. s |r ) =  T-  v ^  U where U is the (T«n) matrix of 
observed residuals and vjr) is now a (T*l) vector of pseudo—random standard 
normal deviates. This procedure generates disturbances with a covariance matrix 
which, for large R, tends to that of the residuals. This procedure can be extended to 
include the serial correlation properties of u^; details are given in Schink (1971). 
For estimating the bias of the deterministic solution we calculate the difference
between that value and the mean of the stochastic replications (which is our 
estimate of the conditional expectation). This estimates the extent of the inequality 
in equation (2.10). Calzolari (1979) has suggested a method of negative antithetic 
variates which helps to reduce the experimental variance in estimating the bias. 
Calzolari and Sterbenz (1989) have recently proposed a generalization of the 
McCarthy procedure which explicitly maintains the empirical third moment of the 
disribution of the residuals.
The methods of stochastic simulation noted above are all parametric in that 
they rely on an underlying assumption of normality in the disturbances with well 
defined moments. The method of Mariano and Brown (1984) uses a non—parametric 
procedure which does not require these assumptions to be made. In this approach a 
sample of the residuals is directly used as the set of input disturbances and the
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resulting distribution of the shocks is therefore identical to the historical 
distribution. By sampling randomly and repeatedly from the observed residuals, 
this procedure becomes a boot-strap type method (Mariano, 1985).
Fisher and Salmon (1986) present a survey of stochastic simulation 
experiments and examine the implications of changes in the experimental design for 
the measurement of the bias. This survey is reproduced and slightly extended in 
Hall and Henry (1987). Fisher, Wallis and Whitley (1985) use stochastic simulation 
to estimate second moments and their results are extended in this thesis.
2.4 Optimal control
Control theory is a subject area that covers a wide spectrum of techniques 
which, in the economics literature, is aimed primarily at policy optimization (e.g. 
Chow, 1975, 1981). In the context of large-scale, nonlinear macroeconomic models, 
optimal control is a term usually used to indicate a particular numerical technique 
for the analysis of policy which is optimal in some explicit sense. However, optimal 
control can also be viewed as a method of generating simulations or as an aid to full 
system analysis.
When forecasting with a model we are usually interested simply in obtaining 
a solution for yt , t= l,...,T  conditional on x^, t= l,...,T  . This solution will then be 
treated as a base or central forecast around which we conduct sensitivity or policy 
analysis. In the variant forecast or policy simulation of a model we then choose a 
subset of the elements (sometimes only one) of the vector of exogenous variables and 
perturb these elements by a particular value i.e. we replace xt by xt+$t • We then
obtain the solution for yt conditional on xt+£t , t= l .....T . This new solution will
then be compared to the base solution (in which ¿t=0). The design of may 
represent a particular policy proposal or it may be chosen simply to elicit a good 
estimate of the partial derivative Control of a model entails the design of
so as to achieve, as near as possible, some desired outcome say y( , t= l,...,T . In 
this case the input ¿t is calculated as part of the simulation process rather than 
pre-spedfied. As part of the problem we may also have specified a desired
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trajectory, ceteris paribus, for xt , t« l,...,T .
For linear models there is a substantial literature covering methods for the 
optimal and sub-optimal control of economic systems. These techniques were 
originally developed in the engineering literature and adapted for economic systems 
because of their mathematical similarity to physical systems (see e.g. Chow 1975, 
1981; Holly, Rustem and Zarrop (eds.) 1979). We therefore begin by summarizing 
the basic results of this literature.
We begin by re-writing the general dynamic model (2.2) as:
y, =  B y ,_ j +  C x, +  D 2,  +  u, (2.11)
where we have separated out a vector of policy variables zt from the other 
exogenous variables (x^). The dynamics in (2.2) are reduced to first-order terms 
only by defining new variables dated t for the longer lags. The y and x vectors in 
equation (2.11) are then no longer the same as those in equation (2.2). There is no 
unique way of reducing a general dynamic model to a first-order system but various 
state-space forms are popular (e.g. see Aolri, 1976).
In formulating a control problem, we set up a formal explicit objective 
function which specifies the desired trajectories for both endogenous variables 
(henceforth targets) and exogenous variables (henceforth instruments) as well as the 
costs associated with deviating from the desired paths. The most common approach 
is to use a quadratic function such as:
Jt = * J t i(y t-y t) 'w y t(y ry t) +( *t- i t ) ' w x ( 212>
where tilde (e.g. yt ) denotes a desired or target value and Wxt> W ^  are positive 
semi-definite and positive definite weighting matrices respectively. We then define
the optimal values of z^ as those which minimize the cost function J ( , t » l .....T
subject to the model (2.11). Strictly, we minimize the expectation of J^, t* l ,...,T
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since equation (2.11) has a stochastic disturbnance term. However, we ignore the 
stochastic component in what follows. The optimal values can be determined in the 
form of a linear control rule:
*t =  Kt  yt - l  +  *Y (213)
where K^, known as the feedback gain, and h( known as the tracking gain (or 
feedforward term) can be expressed in closed form as functions of the model 
parameters, the weighting matrices and the desired values (for all time periods) see 
e.g. Holly and Hughes Hallett (1989, pp41—42). The feedback rule is complicated 
and time—varying. The precise form of these expressions is therefore only of 
relevance in obtaining the optimal values.
In 1978 the Committee on Policy Optimization chaired by Professor R. J. 
Ball reported to  Parliament on the possible application of optimal control 
techniques to Her Majesty’s Treasury’ macroeconomic model (Cmnd. 7148, 1978). 
For such nonlinear models there are no closed form analytical solutions available. 
In the following presentation we therefore resort to a  linear model from which we 
can derive nonlinear methods.
We now write the economic model in stacked form as:
D Y  +  E X =  U, (2.14)
where D and E are the parameter matrices containing the system matrices (2.2) 
stacked over time and (Y, X) denote vectors of observations stacked over time such 
that: Y ' =  {y£, y£, ... ,y£) and y( and x( are now the same vectors as in equation 
(2.2). We also stack the objective function over time:
J =  * (Y -Y )'W y(Y-Y) 4- * (X -X)'W x(X -X ) . (2.15)
The tilde (e.g. Y) denotes a given target value. The weighting matrices Wy, Wx
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are (nT«nT) and (mT*mT) repectively and are chosen to be positive semi-definite 
and elements of y or x that are not targets or instruments have zero weights 
attached. The objective function J  is then minimized subject to the constraint 
imposed by the model (2.14). The optimal solution can be found by substituting the 
constraint (2.15) into the model (2.14) and differentiating the resulting function 
directly to  obtain optimal values (Y°, X°) from the first order conditions and hence:
x °  =  [ n -w yn  +  w j -1  [w xx  +  n - W y Y -n 'W y D ^ u ]  (2.16a)
Y ° =  -D _ 1 ( E X ° - 0 )  (2.16b)
where II =  —D— . For a nonlinear system, we obtain the minimum of the 
objective function J by numerical means as follows. Taking the function (2.15) and 
substituting in the model (2.14) we have a general nonlinear function. This can be 
minimized using derivative—based methods as for the basic solution problem in 
solving the nonlinear model (2.3). In practice the dimension of this resulting 
equation system is so huge (even for just a few instruments/targets) that more 
efficient approximations to Newton’s method are used. Rustem and Zarrop (1979, 
1981) propose various quasi—Newton algorithms for minimizing J subject to a 
general nonlinear model.
In general the equations given by (2.16) are simply another way of writing 
the feedback control rule. However, in the numerical approach there is no attempt 
to formulate the solution as a linear control rule -  the result is simply a set of 
optimal values for x( and hence y( . The other distinguishing feature is that (2.16) 
solves for all time periods simultaneously whereas (2.13) can solve for a single period 
(as a function of desired values and weights in all periods).
A recent example of the application of optimal control to economic models 
may be found in Ghosh, Gilbert and Hughes Hallett (1987) who looked at the 
problems of stabilizing the copper market. Applications to large-scale models have 
been relatively few. Henry et al (1982), Mdliss (1984) and Wallis et dL (1987) all
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use optimal control analysis to derive output—inflation trade-offs in the manner of 
Chow and Megdal (1978). This form of analysis is to be examined and extended in 
Chapter 7.
2.5 The role of expectations
The role of expectations in macroeconomic relationships has long been 
recognized. In Keynes’ General Theory (1936) the influence of expectations received 
much explicit attention. There is one chapter considering "Expectation as 
determining output and employment." and another on "The state of long-term 
expectation." . In his "General theory of the rate of interest.", Keynes offered a 
detailed example which is now used as a standard introductory explanation of 
investment behaviour. An investment project will be profitable if its discounted 
stream of net revenues is positive. This Net Present Value may be defined in terms 
of revenues R, costs C and discount factor d over the life of a project (T years) by 
the formula:
NPV ■ , l o  (Rt“ C«)/(1 + d t ) (J1T)
However, in an uncertain world the values of Rt , Ct and dt are not known in the 
initial period 0. Hence the NPV is evaluated using expectations of these variables. 
Therefore investment decisions must depend on expectations of the future.
The treatment of expectations in the economics literature initially developed 
slowly. An important early contribution was made by Grunberg and Modigliani 
(1954) who showed how forecasts could be self-fulfilling if one takes into account 
the reactions of agents to the forecasts. The modern literature on "rational" 
expectations is often assumed to  start with Muth (1961). It was Muth who coined 
the phrase and declared a rational expectation to be (p46):
N ... essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory. ".
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In the context of a system of algebraic equations subject to  a  random disturbance 
term, this is interpreted in mathematical terms as the appropriate conditional 
expectation.
The rational expectation of a variable yt formed in period s<t and based on 
a particular theory or model is distinguished from other mechanisms for generating 
expectations such as extrapolative forecasts. Adaptive expectations are a particular 
land of extrapolative forecast which are also considered by Muth. The adaptive 
expectation denoted y* may be expressed in the following manner:
y? =  y ,_ , +  A(yJ_, -  yt_ j)  (2.18)
for some parameter 1>A>0. Hence the adaptive expectation of yt is a function of its 
own past and is essentially an adjustment mechanism designed to use information 
on past errors to improve current forecasts.
The rational expectation of variable yt formed in period s<t will be denoted 
yt | g and defined as E(yt |n g): the conditional expectation of yt given the 
information set fig. The information set is assumed to contain all data on the 
variables of the model which are available at the end of period s and the relevant 
model (or theory). The information set could alternatively be defined for the 
beginning of a period and dated appropriately for the context. In Muth’s simple 
example the adaptive expectation and the rational expectation coincide but this is a 
very special case.
The expansion of economic research incorporating explicit expectations 
variables could be attributed to the introduction of the expectations augmented 
Phillips curve. This is, in turn, often attributed to work by Friedman (e.g. 1068) 
and was incorporated into an empirical model by Lucas and Rapping (1960). By 
allowing expectations of inflation to shift the relationship between output and 
inflation (the Phillips curve), Lucas and Rapping showed that it is possible to 
reconcile the observed existence of such a relationship with the  classical proposition
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that no such relationship exists. The long-run trade-off between output and 
inflation in Lucas and Rapping’s model becomes non-existent as inflation 
expectations match actual inflationary changes. This model then helped to explain 
the observed breakdown in the output-inflation relationship which occurred in the 
1960’s. Lucas and Rapping explicitly reject the assumption of rational expectations 
but the primary importance attached to the role of expectations opened the way for 
later developments.
During the 1970’s, the rational expectations hypothesis was adopted as an 
integral part of the new-classical economics. Particularly important contributions 
were made, inter alia, by Lucas (1972 a,b; 1973; 1975), Sargent (1973, 1976), 
Sargent and Wallace (1973, 1975, 1976), Barro (1976, 1977) and Kydland and 
Prescott (1977). These authors combined rational expectations with new—classical 
macroeconomics and the policy ineffectiveness proposition. An excellent survey and 
critique of this literature is given by Shiller (1978). Following the theoretical 
literature, rational expectations began to appear in small macroeconomic models 
(e.g. Sargent, 1976; Taylor, 1979).
The estimation of behavioural relationships which incorporate expectations is 
complicated by the fact that these expectations are not observable. Although some 
survey data exist these may not be a good proxy for actual economy—wide 
expectations (Mishkin, 1981). This complication led to a line of econometric 
research with important contributions by, inter alia, Nelson (1975); McCallum 
(1976 a,b) who proposed an errors—in variables (instrumental variables) approach; 
Hansen and Sargent (1980); Wallis (1980) who presented a summary of the 
econometric implications of the rational expectations hypothesis; Wickens (1982) 
who generalized McCallum’s errors—in—variables approach to sub-system FIML; 
Hansen (1982) proposed a class of generalized methods of moments estimators; Fair 
and Taylor (1983) offered the Full Information Maximum Likelihood method; and, 
more recently, Nijman and Palm (1989) examine generalized least squares methods. 
Pagan (1986) also gives a survey of estimation methods with constructed regressors 
which integrates much of this literature.
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As the explicit treatment of expectations became more common, an 
important distinction was made between different types of expectations variables. 
In particular we shall now consider forward expectations (e.g. yt+ 1 | t_ j)  and 
current expectations e.g. (yt |t_ i) -  Let us consider a wage equation in which 
nominal wages (W() depend on expectations of prices in the current period formed 
in the previous period so that we have Wt =w(pt | t_ j) .  We call this a current 
expectations term. As mentioned above, we may alternatively consider the current 
expectation to have been formed using information available at the start of period t 
and hence write Wt=w(pt | t ). This difference is simply a question of dating the 
information set according to the underlying economic theory. However, as discussed 
by Aoki and Canzoneri (1979), the forward expectation is different in kind. In this 
case we assume that wages are a function of the expectation of next period’s prices: 
Wt= w(pt+ 1 | t_ 1) (or Wt=w(pt+ 1 | t ) as appropriate). The information set can be 
the same in the forward expectations case as in the current expectation case but the 
implications for modelling are quite different.
Forward and current expectations are both used in the rational expectations 
literature, as appropriate to the underlying model. The models of Sargent and 
Taylor both used current expectations only. As shown by Aoki and Canzoneri 
(1979), and Anderson (1979) (and our simple example which follows) the use of 
current expectations is more tractable since the conditional expectations yt | t_ j  or 
yt  11 can usually be substituted out using the reduced form of the model and leaving 
the solution as a function of lagged values of exogenous variables only. If, on the 
other hand, we substitute out for yt+ j | t  or yt+ j  | t_ j ,  then we introduce forward 
dated terms in the exogenous variables. To obtain a solution as a function of lagged 
values only, we then need to specify separate processes for the expectations of the 
exogenous variables.
To illustrate this important distinction we consider the price equation from 
Muth’s (1961) paper which can be written as pt »  —or pt | ^ ^  +  ut , where p is the 
deviation of price from its equilibrium and u may be either a random error or known 
process. We can solve this equation for the expectation by conditioning both sides
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and collecting terms to give Pt | t_ !  =  (1+a)-1 We can then solve for pt if
we know ut i.e. pt =  - ( l+ a ) —1 a  +  \  Hence pt is a function of lagged and
current terms only. However, suppose the price equation had instead been 
Pt =  — o  Pt+ i | t _ i  +  ut - Now to obtain Pt+ 1 | t_ j  we lead this equation and 
condition both sides on t—1 but this leaves Pt+ 1 | t_ j  M a function of Pt+ 2 |t—1' 
Repeating the process of leading the equation successively yields a geometric 
expansion which solves as Pt + j | t_ i  =  E —a*-1  ut+ j | t_ j. Substituting this back 
into the price equation gives p^ as a function of expected u into the infinite future. 
This solution then requires us to specify a process for the expectations of ut or its 
known future values.
Estimation methods for the forward expectations case are included in the 
procedures of McCallum, Wickens and Fair and Taylor. The distinction between 
forward and contemporaneous expectations is particularly important in simulation 
since the presence of forward expectations introduces a dependency of the solution 
in period t on anticipated changes at future dates. This forward dependency 
requires changes to our numerical procedures which are the subject of this thesis.
Anderson (1079) uses a model with current expectations only and introduces 
a solution procedure for the forward expectations case which, at the time that paper 
was written, had never been implemented. The first model incorporating forward 
expectations is that of Fair (1979) who constructed a medium sized model (84 
equations) with rational expectations in the bond and stock markets. In the U.K., 
the first forward expectations model was that of P. Minford and known as the 
Liverpool (LPL) model. This model, based on annual data had its inception in 1979 
and is described in Minford et aL (1984). The LPL model has a new classical 
approach with a set of supply-side equations which are causally prior to the 
demand-side equations which depend on it.
Since the LPL model was introduced, rational expectations have been 
adopted as the standard operating mode for forecasting and policy analysis for two 
much larger models of the U.K. economy. Both the London Business School (LBS)
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and National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) models 
incorporated forward expectations during their forecasting rounds of 1985 
(Economic Outlook, October; National Institute Economic Review, November). 
The LBS model contains 3 forward expectations in its large financial sector. The 
NIESR model has a more pervasive influence from forward expectations of 11 
variables with leads of up to four periods ahead. Recent Australian models have 
also adopted forward expectations (Murphy, 1989) as have some European models 
(e.g. Lahti and Viren, 1989). In the U.S. large-scale modelling work with forward 
expectations seems to  have remained with variants of Fair’s model (Fair, 1984). 
Other groups have introduced forward expectations as a variant solution. The 
in-house version of the U.K. Treasury model (e.g. Westaway and Whittaker, 1986; 
Melliss et al, 1989) is solved for forward consistent expectations whereas the public 
release contains explicit, backward-looking expectations generation mechanisms.
The explicit treatment of expectations in large-scale models has several 
implications. Firstly it allows relationships to be incorporated which are more in 
accordance with the underlying economic theory — such as tha t underpinning the 
LBS and LPL models. Secondly forward expectations allow for a different type of 
dynamic response in models; in particular the dependence on the anticipated future 
course of the economy as noted above. Commenting on the NIESR model, Hall and 
Henry (1985 a,b) claim that the presence of forward expectations enables the model 
to track the U.K. recession of 1981 better than the earlier versions of the model — a 
claim repeated in the historical tracking exercise of Hall (1987).
A further aspect of these models is that they help to defuse the well-known 
Lucas critique of policy making with macroeconomic models (Lucas, 1976). Lucas 
argued that the behaviour of agents is conditioned on their expectations of economic 
policy variables and the rules that drive those policies. A model which ignores this 
dependence may nevertheless be adequate as long as policy does not change. 
However, any substantial change in policy would potentially invalidate the model’s 
structure. An example is the output-inflation relationship described in the article 
by Lucas and Rapping (1969). An observed trade-off between output and inflation
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may be conditioned on expectations of a government policy target of zero inflation. 
If the government tries to exploit the observed trade-off by generating higher 
inflation, the relationship may shift. Policy proposals based on a model which does 
not incorporate this shift could be seriously in error. The obvious riposte to this 
criticism is to treat expectations explicitly wherever they are theoretically 
appropriate. The current generation of U.K. models therefore has a defence to  the 
Lucas critique.
2.6 The tolotion of forward eipecUHool model«
We can express the simplest form of forward expectations model as:
*» =  A),t + i | t - i  +  B’,t - i  +  Cxt  +  ut  <21B>
Equation (2.19) is a simplified dynamic model of the form of equation (2.2), 
augmented by two features. We add the one—period-ahead expectation 
(an n*l vector) as an explanatory variable. In estimation we usually explicitly 
condition the expectation term on an information set dated at the end of period t—1. 
This information set ilt _ j  includes Yt_ j ,  Xt_ j ,  Ut_ j  , the model, its parameter 
matrices, and forecasts (or values known at t—1) of xf, uf r= t,...,T  as appropriate to 
the method. Hence, even in estimation, we can vary the degree of information 
which enters i1 The basic dynamic solution problem is that of obtaining the 
dynamic forecast sequence yt , t= s+l,...,T . In this case we keep the information set 
fixed at n g for all periods and thus actually obtain yt | g, t= s+ l,...,T  . The 
expectations terms could be generated by an adaptive expectations mechanism or 
other extrapolative forecast. In this case we could add the relevant equations to  the 
system and the expanded system would then be backward looking. Hence it could 
be be solved in a recursive, period-by-period manner as before.
The rational expectation yt+ j | s given by the conditional expectation of 
the model. For a linear system this is equivalent to the model’s own forecast yt+ 1- 
In setting yt _^_^  18= y^_|_i we obtain model consistent expectations. A distinction
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between model consistent and rational expectations occurs only if the model is 
nonlinear when, as we showed earlier, the deterministic forecast is generally a biased 
estimate of the conditional expectation. In generating model consistent 
expectations over a finite horizon, we require a terminal value for y<j>+1 which is 
outside our solution period. Choice of this value and its implications are discussed 
in Section 2.7 below.
In order to generate the sequence y( , t= s+ l,...,T , we can no longer use 
recursive, period—by-period procedures since the solution for each period depends 
on that for all future periods as well as lagged values. Instead we must obtain the 
entire sequence simultaneously. There are four generic methods of solution 
suggested in the literature. The first of these are methods for solving linear systems 
and we examine the best—known approach. Other methods, for nonlinear systems, 
are dealt with in depth in Chapter 3.
The Blanchard and Kahn solution (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980) gives a 
general solution to forward expectations models and considers the uniqueness and 
stability of the solution. This analytical approach requires us to write the model 
(2.11) as a first-order linear difference equation:
zt+ l  =  D +  B *,• (2 20)
Equation (2.11) can be written in this form by defining new variables for the lagged 
terms in y (or x) as in the classical optimal control problem examined in Section 
2.4. These new variables are added to the y vector to  give z and the matrix D 
equates the forward values of these variables to their current values. Disturbance 
terms may be incorporated in x. In order to generate the dynamic solution we 
condition on an information set fig and solve for consistent expectations. Blanchard 
and Kahn derive the solution to this first order difference equation (2.20) by using 
the Jordan canonical form of D:
D -  K-1  J  K (J.J1)
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where the diagonal elements of J  are the eigenvalues of D ordered by increasing 
absolute value. T he vector is partitioned into its predetermined and
non—predetermined components. The (m^* 1) predetermined part z^ will be the 
constructed variables and those endogenous variables whose expectations do not 
appear in the model; *2 t+ l  *8 ^ en (m2**) m2+ m 1=m. The matrix J is
partitioned such that th e  first Pj diagonal elements lie within the unit circle and the 
next p2 lie outside; p j+ p ^ m .  Hence D has P j eigenvalues within the unit circle. 
The matrices K and K—1 are then partitioned conformably with J.
Blanchard and Kahn then show that if p2 =  m2 i.e. the number of 
non—predetermined variables is equal to the number of eigenvalues of D outside the 
unit circle, then there exists a unique solution which is obtained by pre—multiplying 
(2.20) by K and using a partitioned inverse to obtain separate closed form 
expressions for zl t , z2t as a function of lagged and future values of x and elements of 
the canonical form of D. It can then be shown that if P2> n2> then there >8 no 
solution to the model which is non-explosive (i.e. stable). Blanchard and Kahn’s 
non-explosion condition rules out exponential growth in the endogenous variables, 
having been applied to  the exogenous variables by assumption. Finally they show 
that if P2<n2 then there exists an infinite number of non-explosive solutions.
To summarize, these results yield a closed form, analytical expression for the 
solution to a linear forward expectations model formulated in discrete time. Buiter 
(1984) gives the solution for continuous time models. Both Blanchard and Kahn, 
and Buiter give us the conditions for uniqueness and stability. A solution satisfying 
these conditions is generally called a saddlepoint path.
The solution forms given above require the calculation of eigenvalues and so 
can only be applied to  a  linear system. A linear model can usually be manipulated 
to give the required first-order difference equation form — Preston and Pagan 
(1982) suggest "shuffle" algorithms to obtain this form from a general structural 
model such as system (2.19). Computer based programs are available for obtaining 
both the continuous and discrete time solutions (Austin and Buiter, 1982). One
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approach would therefore be to linearize the large-scale nonlinear models and use 
one of these solution packages. Such an approach is used by Gaines et aL (1987).
In this thesis we are concerned with obtaining the direct solutions for 
nonlinear models for which the precise forms of these linear solutions are not 
directly relevant. However, the conditions for uniqueness and stability can still be 
useful since we have no simple equivalent for general nonlinear systems. Hence we 
may wish to examine these issues for a local linearization of the nonlinear system. 
This will be addressed briefly in the next section.
For solving the nonlinear system directly there are three general types of 
approach. These will all be examined in Chapter 3 and so we briefly summarize 
them here. Shooting methods are a general class of algorithms for solving 
two—point boundary value problems and have been known for some time in the 
numerical analysis literature (e.g. Keller, 1968; Roberts and Shipman, 1972). 
Lipton, Poterba, Sachs and Summers (1982) suggested their use in economic models 
in a form known as multiple shooting. This approach takes the model in a form 
similar to the first-order difference equation representation of Blanchard and Kahn 
but then solves numerically. Spencer (1985) has suggested an improvement to the 
basic technique to overcome some observed numerical instabilities. There appear to 
be no large-scale nonlinear models which actually use shooting algorithms on a 
regular basis.
There are a variety of first-order iterative techniques available based on the 
methods usually employed to solve large-scale models. The extension to forward 
expectations models was first noted by Anderson (1979), used by Fair (1979) and 
developed independently by Minford et al. (1979, 1980). The most comprehensive 
version of the algorithm is given by Fair and Taylor (1983). These methods are 
based on simple tw o-part iterations (i) solving a  model for fixed expectations and 
then (ii) updating those expectations to be consistent. This tw o-part iteration is 
repeated until expectations are consistent after step (i). Hall (1985) gives a 
variation which was based on stacking the tim e periods to generate one huge 
equation system. Fisher, Holly and Hughes Hallett (1985, 1986) develop a complete
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family of first-order methods which include the Fair—Taylor and Hall approaches as 
special cases.
Finally we have derivative-based algorithms which follow the tw o-part 
scheme of first-order iterations but which update the expectations at step (ii) using 
Newton’s method instead of a simple updating formula. This approach includes the 
penalty function method which adapts the optimal control problem, treating the 
consistent expectations condition as a target and the expectations variables as 
instruments. An explicit objective function is then minimized using approximations 
to Newton’s method. This approach was first proposed by Holly and Zarrop (1979, 
1983) and by Holly and Beenstock (1980). Holly and Zarrop used this solution 
method in conjunction with a policy optimization problem. That joint procedure 
will be examined in Section 2.9.
Beyond the basic dynamic solution problem, we also need methods for 
obtaining a static or one-step-ahead path which may be used, for example, in 
historical tracking. The problem in this context is of defining the unobserved 
expectation variables. This issue does not appear to have been directly addressed 
by the modelling literature although it is similar to the estimation problem in that 
an historical value is required for an unobserved variable. Historical tracking has 
been undertaken on forward expectations models by Hall (1987) using the NIESR 
model and Matthews and Minford (1987) using the LPL model. Hall uses a number 
of dynamic solutions starting in the first quarter of successive years and simply 
graphs all the solutions. Matthews and Minford similarly use dynamic solutions, 
one starting in each period of the horizon considered. Neither paper details the 
information assumptions being made.
The generation of a stochastic simulation has been addressed in practice by 
Hall and Henry (1985a,b) and in theory by Fair (1984, pp383-384). However 
neither of these authors gives a detailed discussion of the issues involved and 
conflicting procedures are suggested. This conflict is partly explained by the fact 
that the Hall and Henry procedure was not intended as a means of generating a  full 
distribution of the endogenous variables but as a way of obtaining rational rather
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than consistent expectations from the nonlinear model. As noted above the bias in 
deterministic solutions of nonlinear systems as estimates of conditional expectations 
creates a difference between consistent and rational expectations. Allowing for this 
distinction it remains unclear that either the Hall and Henry procedure or that of 
Fair generate the intended results. We attempt to resolve these issues in Chapter 5 
and suggest an alternative procedure.
2.7 Uniqueness, stability and terminal conditions
The Blanchard and Kahn solution shows tha t linear forward expectations 
models only have a unique stable solution if the state-space form (2.2) has as many 
unstable eigenvalues (modulus greater than unity) as there are non—predetermined 
(expectations) variables (proposition 1, pl308; proof, Appendix ppl310—11). Buiter 
(1984) derives the same result for the state—space form in continuous time. 
Gourieroux, Laffont and Montfort (1982) develop the same condition by examining 
all the solutions of a small theoretical example. Sargent (1979, Chapter 8) and 
Minford et al (1980) also obtain the condition by examining the general and specific 
solutions to systems of difference equations. Fisher, Holly and Hughes Hallett 
(1985, appendix) generate the condition by examining the sensitivity of the solution 
to the terminal condition when the number of tim e periods is large. All of these 
results apply to linear systems only. In a nonlinear system, the corresponding 
analysis can only be applied to a local linearization of the model. However, the 
same possibility of many stable solutions or none carries over to the nonlinear case.
The existence of multiple equilibria in rational expectations models has been 
recognized by many authors prior to Blanchard and Kahn. Black (1974), Taylor 
(1977), Calvo (1979), Burmeister (1980) and Gourieroux, Laffont and Montfort 
(1982) have all considered the implications of these multiple equilibria. Taylor’s 
(1977) stochastic model yielded multiple stable equilibria and he recommended 
selecting the path with minimum variance. Gourieroux et aL considered a complete 
set of solutions for a general difference equation. Burmeister considers some of the 
philosophical implications of multiple equilibria. A view emerged (see e.g. Begg,
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1982) that multiple solutions were not a problem as long as only one is stable. 
Economic systems will usually have such a saddlepoint property by construction and 
the economy will have an incentive to locate itself on the saddlepoint path. If this 
view is correct then the only problem for solving a large-scale model is to locate the 
saddlepoint solution. The problem is given a physical dimension by the choice of 
terminal condition. In solving the model for y(l t= s+ l,...,T  we need to specify a 
value for y>p+ 1 | 8 since it will not be provided by the model. Different choices for 
this terminal value will give different dynamic trajectories and thus we have 
multiple solutions. If the system has a saddlepoint path then the choice of terminal 
condition problem revolves around locating that path (or at least its first T -s  
periods).
The choice of terminal condition appears to have had little consideration in 
the literature. We can identify two general approaches. Minford et aL (1979) 
suggest using terminal conditions obtained from an equilibrium analysis of the 
model. Over a finite time period, these equilibrium conditions then act in a similar 
way to the transversality conditions in some models of optimizing behaviour in 
economic theory. Transversality conditions ensure that behaviour is optimal even 
at the boundary points. This approach is also taken by Beenstock and Holly (1980).
The second general approach is that of Fair and Taylor (1983). Their 
solution algorithm, called the "Extended Path" makes arbitrary choices of terminal 
condition for each dynamic solution and then re-calculates the solution successively 
over longer time periods. When the solution period of interest is insensitive to the 
terminal date the process stops. This view of terminal conditions is essentially that 
they do not matter as long as they do not affect the solution values.
Wallis et aL (1985, 1986) consider the sensitivity of several models to 
different types of terminal condition. They conclude that terminal conditions 
should be of a form that characterizes the unique stable path and that the choice of 
terminal condition can be tested against a longer solution horizon to see if the 
conditions correctly select that path. This approach is essentially a synthesis of the 
two views outlined above. There remain several issues to be resolved concerning the
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choice of terminal conditions, particularly in cases where there is no unique 
saddlepoint trajectory.
2.8 Time inconsistency
Before applying control techniques or conducting policy analysis with models
containing forward expectations, we first address the issue of time-inconsistency.
An "optimal" policy given by a series of decision variables xt , t= l,...,T , is
time-inconsistent if the value of xt+fl (say xt+ g) planned as optimal in period t for
*
execution in period t+s, is not the same as the optimal value x(+> calculated when 
re-optimizing in period t+ s—j, 8>j>0 for some t,j,s even when there is no 
uncertainty. That is to say the mere passage of time makes a previously "optimal" 
plan sub-optimal when viewed from a later date. The policy which is 
time—inconsistent contravenes Bellman’s (1957) principle of optimality:
"An optimal policy has the property that, whatever the initial state 
and the initial decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an 
optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first 
decision."
It is thus possible to argue that an optimal policy cannot be time-inconsistent. In 
what follows we define an optimal policy to be that set of policy values or policy 
rule which minimizes an explicit objective function under stated assumptions 
regardless of whether it generates potential time inconsistency.
To illustrate time-inconsistency we use a simple example which follows the 
presentation of several authors (e.g. Levine and Holly, 1987). Let us consider the 
simplest case T=2, 8=1, j=0. We need to define an optimality criterion and we use 
the general form of welfare function:
m ax S (x j, X j, j v  y2 ). (2 22)
X1 ,x2
The decision (policy) variable x is chosen for each period and we assume that the
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output variable y depends on its own lagged values and lagged, current and future 
policy variable values:
* i “  V J o ' lto ' I i>xi | i  ) • * i |a  ”  ■ (2.23a)
y2 | l  =  *211^0, } V *0> x l >x2 | l ) » (2.23b)
y2 =  V r 0, y V x0' xl ’ *2 ) ' (2.23c)
The usual formulation of this problem ignores yQ and Xq which are treated as 
known constants and we henceforth drop these terms. Expectation terms are 
denoted as e.g y2 | j and hence the second equation (2.23b) represents the outcome 
for period 2 forecast in period 1. We assume that the information set includes all 
lagged terms and current exogenous variables. We further assume that S(-) and 
f-( •) are differentiable, that S( •) is concave and that there exists a solution to each 
equation in the system (2.23) for arbitrary values of Xj and x^. We start by 
considering the optimal values of Xj, x2 planned at the beginning of period 1 and 
the first-order conditions are given by differentiating (2.22) given the model 
constituted by (2.23a) and (2.23b):
dS 0f2 ! l  dS df1 dS dS df2n
ay, ' «72 |1  ay,
as af2 |1  as at, ds ds « 2 |  1
^211  * 2 1 1  **211 ^ *2|I *1 ' ^ 2 | 1 ^ 1
The solutions to these equations will maximize the expected value of S with respect 
to Xj x^i j viewed from period 1. However if we now re—optimize our plan for 
period 2 at the beginning of period 2, then the values of Xp y 1 are in the 
information set and are fixed. We thus have the first order conditions when the 
model is (2.23c):
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as din as 
----------- ± +  —  =  o
ay2 fttj dx^
(2.25)
This change in the first order conditions reflects the fact that the last term in 
equation (2.24) is a function of derivatives taken with respect to y 1 which is now a 
fixed value and so that term drops out. These two first-order conditions will 
generally lead to different solutions for Xj when optimizing from periods 1 and 2 and 
hence time—inconsistency. Sufficient conditions for consistency are either that
The first of these conditions implies that the outcome in period one is independent 
of what happens in period 2 i.e. the model is not forward-looking. The second 
condition requires that the direct effects of y^ on S are offset by its indirect effect 
through y2 and hence y^ does not affect S. The second of these conditions is 
unlikely to hold either by design or chance and is generally neglected.
The potential existence of time—inconsistency in economic optimization has 
been recognized at least since Strotz (1956). It is important to stress that 
tim e—inconsistency can arise even when there are no random shocks and there is no 
uncertainty about the model and the initial policy is carried out as planned. Strotz 
suggested that there were three possible responses to a potentially time-inconsistent 
situation. First, agents may, and often do, engage in time-inconsistent behaviour. 
Strotz argues that this is irrational because the incentive to change plans can be 
forecast and hence agents are acting in period 1 as if they expect themselves to act 
in period 2 in a way in which they can predict they will not i.e. their expectations 
are predictably incorrect. If such behaviour is realized then (as pointed out by 
Levine and Holly) it will actually be the globally optimal solution yielding a 
maximum of the welfare function. Secondly, agents may pre-commit themselves to 
avoid changing plans at a later date. This solution will generally be the optimal
(2.26)
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policy amongst all rational policies and so there is an incentive for rational agents to 
undertake contracts of this kind. Finally, the agents may recognize the existence of 
time-inconsistency and re-optimize taking this into account i.e. optimize over the 
set of those time-consistent strategies which do not involve contracting. This is 
done using dynamic programming in the following manner for our example. First 
we find the optimal value for period 2 viewed from period 2. Conditioning on this 
value we then find the optimal value for Xj. This description is only applicable to 
models which are not state dependent e.g. linear systems. In general nonlinear 
systems, the optimal values must be found simultaneously but with each period 
satisfying the appropriate first-order conditions.
Kydland and Prescott (1977) use the concept of time-inconsistency to 
challenge the use of control theory for dynamic economic planning when 
expectations are rational. In particular, they proposed a classic macroeconomic 
example which we shall find useful in explaining some model properties and which 
ties in our earlier discussion of the expectations augmented Phillips curve.
The Kydiand-Prescott model is presented in a single period context and so is 
not strictly consistent with the two-period general formulation given above (which 
they also use). However, by treating period t as the second period of a two—period 
model and concentrating on the second period we can use the same first-order 
conditions. The endogenous variable y is unemployment. The policy variable x is 
the inflation rate, assuming tha t this can be chosen using monetary policy. The 
function f( •) is a supply curve (or Phillips curve) which for period t can be written 
u :
r t  ”  *  -  xt | t _ i )  +  y  (2-27)
where ÿ is the natural rate of unemployment and xt | is expected inflation. The 
coefficient ii is positive so tha t unemployment is inversely related to inflationary 
surprises. In the new-classical model this relationship arises because the real wage 
is unexpectedly reduced when inflation surprises occur and so more workers are
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employed.
Kydland and Prescott then define an objective function which is separable 
over time St =  s(xt , yt ) and we illustrate by choosing:
S, -  -1 /2  [xj +  (j-y ,)] ■ (2.28)
If inflation announced in period t—1 for period t is anticipated, then the optimal 
inflation rate viewed from period t—1 for period t is aero and so we start by 
assuming that this is the announced policy and that the announced policy is carried 
out. In this case our optimization yields a "no-loss" outcome:
(i) "no-loss" policy
* t ■ = 0 ■ ■ y • s t =  °- (J -29)
However if we re-optimize in period t  treating expectations as fixed then we find 
the optimal value of inflation is no longer zero hence solution (i) is 
time-inconsistent. Since this new solution involves going back on the announced 
policy it is called the cheating or reneging solution:
(ii) Optimal cheating solution
*t - * / 2 ; x t | t_ , - 0 ; i r t - F +  y?/2 ; S, -  ^ / 8 .  (2.30)
However this solution is irrational because agents, who understand how the 
policy-maker optimizes, can predict that their forecasts will be wrong. If the plan 
was achieved it would yield positive gains of i? /4  on unemployment against losses 
of 1? /8 on inflation — an unambiguous gain of i? /8. Note tha t this precise result is 
dependent on the particular form of model and objective function chosen.
This plan is optimal only from the policy-maker’s view. If agents suffer any 
loss from the irrationality of expectations then they will react to the government’s 
plan. At this stage we are introducing a two-player game but, following Kydland
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and Prescott we do not specify the agent’s objective function and simply assume 
that expectations become rational.
We now assume that agents set the expected inflation rate and the policy 
maker the actual inflation rate simultaneously. If agents predict that the optimal 
inflation rate in  period t is then the solution is:
(iii) Rational, time-consistent solution
-  xt  | t - i  -  * l2 • ^1 =  f ; s t =  -# !* ■  (*•»>
This strategy is time-consistent since the optimal strategy for period t viewed from 
period t—1 is now V»/2 and that is also the optimal strategy as viewed from period t. 
The solution is also rational because expected inflation is a correct forecast. 
However this policy has no unemployment gains just inflation losses of 1?/8 . A 
better policy would be that obtained by implementing the no-loss strategy (2.29). 
Since the incentive to cheat on strategy (2.29) is predictable it can be argued that it 
can never be achieved. If a government tries to play (2.29) but agents expect 
cheating to occur then we have a fourth solution:
(iv) Expected cheating solution
- 0 *• xt | t - i  =  w • =  y +  ^ / 2 ; s  =  - ^ / 4- (2-32)
This strategy actually yields unemployment losses of $ /4  and is clearly 
sub-optimal compared with the time-consistent rational strategy (2.31). Hence 
there is an incentive for the government to play (2.31) to avoid (2.32) whilst (2.29) 
and (2.30) are unobtainable. If we assume that (2.28) represents the agents welfare 
function as well as the governments then we have outlined a  standard prisoners 
dilemma problem. Both agents and government would prefer the outcome under 
(2.29) but the actual outcome is (2.31).
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There is now an extensive branch of the literature examining conditions 
under which the no-doss solution can in  fact be achieved and evaluation of the losses 
involved for the various solutions using different specifications. Barro and Gordon 
(1983a,b) extended the time—horizon of the Kydland—Prescott model and used a 
multi-period loss function. They then investigated the possibility of a 
policy-maker establishing credibility or reputation so that agents believed 
announcements of "no-loss" strategies. This approach to gaining credibility 
requires the specification of a learning mechanism and implies losses whilst agents 
are learning as hinted by solution (2.34). Barro and Gordon also consider the 
temptation to cheat and suggest punishment strategies to ensure that cheating is 
too costly (e.g agents revert to non—zero inflationary expectations). Development of 
these approaches has led to substantial consideration of how agents form 
expectations of policy variables. This is a  different problem from that of forward 
expectations addressed earlier since we now have, in general, no specific model to 
generate the expectations terms. Since there may be more than one possible scheme 
for setting policy we are in effect introducing uncertainty about the model form.
To analyse the various scenarios that might be of interest, the economics 
literature has drawn from and contributed to the theory of games (a comprehensive 
treatment of game theory is given, inter alia, by Basar and Olsder (1982)). The 
general solutions for dynamic games in linear, forward expectation, continuous time 
models are given by Miller and Salmon (1985) and Cohen and Michel (1988). 
Particular games have been proposed and solved by other authors. Backus and 
Driffill (1985a,b) introduce a loss function explicitly for the private sector and two 
possible types of government with attendant probabilities and this constitutes a 
game to be played between agents and governments. The optimal solution to this 
game can then be obtained as a function of those probabilities. Barro (1986) 
considers games in which the private sector is atomistic and hence cannot form a 
particular joint view. Only the government can then set strategies. Barro goes on 
to show that reputational forces in this case can sustain the no-doss policy at least 
for a while. The ability to sustain the no-doss policy is the main conclusion from
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the Barro/ Backus and Driffill papers.
Canzoneri (1985) analyzes the case of asymmetric information so that only 
governments know if they have cheated and shows that this can lead to periodic 
bouts of inflation. Vickers (1986) generalizes this approach to  different types of 
government by varying their objective functions. Vickers argues tha t reputational 
forces sustaining the Barro (and Backus and Driffill) solutions may not be present 
for certain possible types of government. Driffill (1987) re-establishes the 
proposition by allowing many types of government and allowing exogenous noise. 
Levine and Holly (1987) survey these various models and give extensions to the 
general stochastic, dynamic model. Other aspects of the tim e inconsistency 
literature have been surveyed by Blackburn (1987).
2.9 Optimal Control and Policy Analysis
In considering the optimal control and possible time—inconsistency of a 
large-scale nonlinear model, the literature is considerably thinner. One approach 
suggested has been that of linearizing the model so that optimization techniques can 
be implemented on a reduced version (e.g. Gaines et aL 1987). This enables one to 
apply all the analytical solutions obtained for linear systems. Alternatively, we 
need to consider direct optimization of the nonlinear system under consistent and 
non-consistent expectations assumptions. Not only do we need numerical 
algorithms but these must be carefully constructed so as to  give us the particular 
form of solution required. Holly and Zarrop (1983) propose a  penalty function 
approach for optimizing an objective function subject to  a nonlinear forward 
expectations model (also described in Levine and Holly, 1987, and Holly and Hughes 
Hallett, 1989). This paper has recently been criticized by W ohltmann and Krdmer 
(1989) on the grounds that the definitions of time-consistency and tim e- 
inconsistency used by Holly and Zarrop are contrary to those used by Kydland and 
Prescott. Hall (1984, 1986) has suggested a method of obtaining a  time-consistent 
expectations- consistent strategy which he applied to a special version of the 
NIESR model. These two approaches will be examined in depth in Chapter 7 and
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will be compared to the procedures used by Wallis et aL (1987, Ch.3) and that 
suggested by Fair (1984, pp385-386). The solutions produced by some of these 
algorithms do not appear to have been well understood.
Finally, the analysis provided by the time-inconsistency literature focuses 
attention on the expectations of the "exogenous" variables in the model. The 
implications for standard simulations have been addressed by Wallis et aL (1986, 
Ch.2) and by Cooper (1987). The issues are resolved by examining the sensitivity of 
the simulation results to different assumptions and the approach of Wallis et aL is 
extended in Chapter 5.
2.10 Summary and  gQnclqgipng
In this chapter we have surveyed a wide range of literature covering large- 
scale macroeconomic models, simulation, optimal control, and forward expectations. 
The presence of forward expectations in models is seen to complicate all of the 
procedures for the use and analysis of large-scale models. For linear models, the 
literature generally contains methods for resolving the problems introduced by 
forward-expectations. For nonlinear models, the literature contains something of a 
thin patchwork of partial solutions to the various problems. In some cases, such as 
terminal conditions, the literature does not appear to be complete. In other cases, 
such as optimal control or stochastic simulation, there are doubts as to whether the 
available procedures generate the appropriate results.
Chapter 3
SOLUTION METHODS FOR NONUNEAR FORWARD 
EXPECTATIONS MODELS
In Chapter 2 we briefly considered four solution algorithms for solving forward 
expectations models. The analysis of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) depends on 
solving an eigenvalue problem for a system of linear difference equations, and exact 
analytical results can be obtained. For a nonlinear model the eigenvalue problem is 
not defined, hence we could only apply this approach to a linearization of the 
nonlinear system. However, the linearization itself will only be an approximation to 
the system of interest and so the solution is ultimately not exact. Furthermore, the 
linearization is only valid in the neighbourhood of some base trajectory around 
which the model is linearized (Kuh, Neese and Hollinger, 1985) and this imposes 
limits on the use of the linearized form.
In this chapter, we examine the feasibility and relative efficiency of the other 
three algorithms considered in Chapter 2, all of which can be used to solve the 
nonlinear model directly. We begin by presenting a detailed analysis of solving 
equation systems by first-order iterative methods, which can be used as a basic tool 
in each of the three approaches. The first approach for solving forward expectations 
models is then a generalization of first-order iterative methods applied 
simultaneously to all time periods in the solution. The generalization allows us to 
take advantage of the dynamic structure of systems which contain forward 
expectations. This approach is developed from that of Fisher, Holly and 
Hughes Hallett (1985, 1986) and Fisher and Hughes Hallett (1988a). A family of 
algorithms are presented which encompass those of Fair and Taylor (1983) and Hall 
(1985). Versions of these algorithms are then tested on three large-scale nonlinear 
macroeconometric models of the U.K. economy.
As a  second approach we examine the penalty function methods of Holly and 
Zarrop (1983). This method can be viewed as a derivative-based Newton's method
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version of the first-order methods. We apply the penalty function technique to the 
same three models and the relative costs of the two algorithms are compared.
Finally we consider the shooting methods proposed for economic models by 
Lipton et aL (1982) and Spencer (1985). A generalization of these methods is 
proposed for a wider class of models including those with forward expectations of 
more than one period ahead. Despite these generalizations, shooting methods do not 
appear to be appropriate for solving the models since they involve solving the model 
in an inherently dynamically unstable form. Some comparative analysis is given 
based on the implied equation orderings of the different algorithms.
3.1 First Qrder iterative gQlqtipn techniques
In this section we consider general first-order iterative techniques for solving 
equation systems. We begin with a linear representation and then generalize to the 
nonlinear computational forms. Consider the linear equation system
where B is a known real matrix of order n with nonvanishing diagonal elements; y 
and b are real vectors containing the unknown and predetermined parts of each 
equation respectively. Stationary first-order iterative techniques are derived by 
various decompositions of B in the form P—Q where P is non-singular. We can 
then develop first—order iterations by writing:
By =  b, (3.1)
(P-Q )y = b ,
P i  - « J  +  b,
y =  P-1  Q j  +  P_ l  b. (3.2)
This last equality allows us to obtain the following iteration:
y(,+ 1 ) -  GyW +  c «-0,1,2, ... (3.3)
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with an arbitrary start y(®), where G =P-1 Q and c=P—1b define the iteration 
matrix and forcing function respectively (Young, 1971). A solution to (3.3) is 
defined as convergence in the sequence y^8^  such that |(y [8+ 1^-y(8b/y(*^l <  T for 
each element y^  where r  is some given tolerance level. These methods are routinely 
used to  construct the numerical solution to (3.1) (Hageman and Young (1981), 
Varga (1962)). They are computationally efficient if B is a large, sparse or 
ill-conditioned matrix. They are also widely used for solving nonlinear equation 
systems, in which case B represents the system’s Jacobian matrix.
Different decompositions of B into P—Q give different first order methods. 
The most widely used decompositions are those which produce the Jacobi, 
Gauss—Seidel and Successive Over—relaxation (SOR) iterative methods; respectively
P  =  I ; P = (I—L) and P =  i  (I-oL), (3.4)
where B is normalized to have a unit main diagonal and L is a matrix of order n 
containing the lower triangle of B (below the main diagonal) and zeros elsewhere, 
and a  is a  relaxation parameter to be chosen. We also define U=B—I—L to be the 
upper triangle.
The rate of convergence in (3.3) is often significantly increased by the one 
parameter extrapolation
y(* + l) „  <y(Gy(8)+c) +  (l-* |)yW  = Hy^8) +  7c. (3.5)
Two particular versions of (3.5) are routinely used; the Jacobi over—relaxation 
(JOR) method with G =(I—B), and the Fast Gauss—Seidel (FGS) method based on 
G =(I-aL )- 1(oU +[l-a]I).
It is well known that (3.3) converges if and only if p(G )<l, where p(-) denotes 
spectral radius (defined as the modulus of the largest eigenvalue). Proof: Young 
(1971), Theorem 5.1. Similarly (3.5) converges for some 7 > 0  if the real parts of the
45
eigenvalues of G are all less than unity. Proof: Hughes Hallett (1981).
If p(H)<l, the number of steps to convergence in (3.5) is approximately 
log r/log />(H). The corresponding speed of convergence can be measured either as
norm. We therefore aim to minimize p(H) to ensure convergence as well as to 
minimize the number of steps. Optimal values for 7  have been derived and 
generalizations of (3.5) to second order methods and multi—parameter 
extrapolations have also been made. These extensions will not be needed here and 
are surveyed in Fisher and Hughes Hallett (1988b).
There are few general results on convergence conditions for SOR iterations and 
the only general result is that a> 0  exists such that SOR is convergent if (I-B ) has 
all its roots less than unity in real part. Proof: Hughes Hallett (1986). Other 
results require special conditions on (3.1) (e.g. symmetric, positive definite) which 
are not appropriate for an econometric model whose only restrictions are that (I—B) 
is real and (usually) non-singular. Hence FGS has proved to be a more helpful 
device for accelerating convergence (Fisher and Hughes Hallett, 1987). SOR tends 
to  be used only when other methods fail.
3.2 Nonlinear models
We now consider the nonlinear model
where z is a vector of predetermined elements (exogenous and lagged endogenous 
variables) and gj(>) is a general, real—valued, nonlinear function. The JOR and 
SOR iterations for solving (3.6) are now
an asymptotic rate (-log p(H)) or as an average rate (l/s)(log 1 1 1 1 )  for some
7j *  §j(y. *). j - i . •••»» (3.6)
(3.7a)
and
J$‘+1) -  °«jOr[,+ 1 ).....(STb)
46
Meanwhile the FGS method extrapolates the SOR iterates, i.e.
y(,+ 1 )  =  .....+
with
yj‘+ 1 ) =  v \‘+i) +  (1_7)tj,) ■ (3-8)
These methods give us the nonstationary iteration:
y(« + l)  _  q C1) /* )  +  k (3.0a)
y(« + l)  =  +  Tk (3.0b)
respectively for equations (3.7) and (3.8) where k is a separable constant dependent 
only on pre-determined values and G^8^ , are the iteration matrices defined at 
iteration s. The convergence results now apply locally to G^8 ,^ H^8  ^as appropriate.
3.3 Forward gxpecUtioM U d d l
Consider a model with forward (rational) expectations terms:
V t  " BiJrt - i  + V t + i | t - i  +  , t (31°)
where yt + j | g =  E(yt+ j |  n g), for j>0, is the expectation of yt+ j conditional on the 
information available at the end of period s denoted Qg; and where u( represents all 
exogenous variables and random disturbances. For consistent expectations we 
require the forward expectation terms yt+ 1 | t_ j  to be the same as the next period’s 
forecast value obtained by solving the model conditional on the same information 
set. Hence the solutions are linked forward in time and to  solve the system (3.10) 
for each yt conditional on some start period 0 requires each yt _^_j | q, for 
j= l,2 ,...,T —t; and a terminal condition y<r+i|0’ Stacking this system up over time 
implies, for a  consistent expectations solution:
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tT+1 (»  11)
where ut is taken from flg. The information set therefore contains either projections 
or known values for all exogenous variables and disturbance terms. This block 
triangular form is similar to the band matrices used for optimization by Theil 
(1964). The solution to equation system (3.11) is given by
Y -  B-1 b (3.12)
where B is the block tridiagonal matrix on the left of equation (3.11); Y is the 
stacked vector of endogenous variables conditioned on 0 q; and b is the stacked 
vector of terms on the right of (3.11). A necessary condition for the existence of a 
solution to equation (3.12) is tha t B-1  exists. This in turn requires that neither BQ 
nor B j B ^ A j Bq have unit roots.
The solution of a dynamic rational expectations model therefore has exactly 
the same form as that for a conventional equation system. Any of the standard 
methods for solving equation systems can be applied to equation (3.11) including 
derivative—based (e.g. Newton—Raphson) or first-order iterative methods. The 
differences are only that:
(i) the unknowns of different tim e periods have to be determined simultaneously 
rather than recursively and hence:
(ii) the matrix B has been replaced by the block tridiagonal matrix B;
(iii) the variables in b are augmented by the terminal conditions
Therefore we can continue to use simple first order iterative techniques as a cheap 
way of constructing numerical solutions to rational expectations models.
The ordering of the elements in yt generally has no special significance, but
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the equations in equation (3.11) are ordered by time periods. In conventional 
models, multi-period solutions are generated sequentially forwards because that 
exploits the block recursive structure of equation (3.11) when A j= 0 . Consequently 
the only relevant decompositions of the system are those defined for Bq and we 
solve for each time period as a sub-system. But when Aj^O tha t block recursive 
structure is lost and to generate first-order methods for solving equation (3.12) we 
consider decompositions of B over the whole of the time horizon.
The aim of these methods is to see if we can split out of B a small number of 
terms, leaving behind a structure which is relatively simple to  solve. A two-part 
iteration between those variables split out and the remainder may then speed up 
convergence. For conventional equation systems this type of splitting is usually 
found to be highly beneficial (see e.g. Don and Gallo, 1987; Hughes Hallett and 
Fisher, 1987). The two main possibilities for solving (3.11) are:
(a) Decompositions of B without regard to its block structure i.e. we could treat 
(3.11) as one large equation system and use the decompositions given at (3.4) 
defined for B rather than BQ. These decompositions define a  family of simple 
first-order iterations on the stacked system (3.11). Hence any first-order solution 
technique can be applied in the form of those for non-forward-expectations models. 
This method is most suitable when there are a large number of expectations terms 
and lagged terms and hence no efficient splittings.
(b) A decomposition of B into those blocks above the main block diagonal i.e. the 
expectation terms, and those on or below the block diagonal. T he lower triangle can 
then be solved as an ordinary dynamic solution, holding expectations fixed. 
Different decompositions of BQ then generate JOR, SOR and FGS iterations as in 
the conventional case. The upper block triangle is then solved by equating the 
expectation terms to the solution from the lower block triangle. These two 
decompositions then define a tw o-part iterative scheme: an inner iteration loop 
which solves for the current and lagged variables of each period sequentially, and an
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outer iteration loop which updates the forward expectations terms. Convergence on 
the outer loop determines that a consistent expectations solution has been found. 
This scheme is likely to be efficient when there are relatively few expectations 
terms.
Other decompositions are also possible. One could separate out both the 
upper triangle and the lower triangle into the outer loop. Thus the inner loop would 
solve only for the current dated terms holding lagged values and expectations fixed. 
The outer loop then updates both lead and lagged terms. This approach would be 
suitable for multi—processor computers which could evaluate all the time—periods 
simultaneously. Alternatively one could split off the lower block triangle into the 
outer loop on its own i.e. type (a) applied to the transverse of B. In this case the 
inner loop would solve backwards through time solving for current dated and 
expectations terms. The outer loop would then set lag values by the updating 
scheme. This scheme would work well if the upper block triangle was relatively 
dense compared with the lower block triangle. Finally, one could mix up the 
decompositions so as to make multi—part iterations passing through different 
sub—block combinations in different sequences.
In most large-scale models there are far more lag terms than forward 
expectations. Furthermore the initial conditions (yQ in 3.11) are usually known 
whereas terminal values (y-p+i) are °ften generated by the iterative process (see 
Chapter 4). These considerations usually mean that only the first two types of 
decomposition are relevant. However it is possible to generate further algorithms 
based on these decompositions. We define a third approach as follows.
(c) Type (b) splittings in which the inner iterations are not taken to full 
convergence at each step. This can be achieved by setting a substantially weaker 
convergence criterion on the inner loop. Computational savings are made because 
effort is not wasted in getting a full conditional inner loop solution which is then 
going to be changed again by the values generated in the next outer loop step.
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Apart from the introduction of this family of methods by Fisher, Holly and 
Hughes Hallett (1985, 1986), two special cases of these schemes have already 
appeared in the literature. The Fair-Taylor method (Fair and Taylor, 1983) is a 
type (b) scheme and the inner loop here corresponds to their Type I iterations and 
the outer loop to  their Type II iterations. The method suggested by Hall (1985) is a 
type (a) scheme i.e. a single inner loop pass on the whole equation system. These 
two methods can also be viewed as extreme type (c) methods for a relatively strong 
or weak inner loop convergence criterion respectively.
In Section 3.6 we note that the penalty function method (Holly and Zarrop, 
1983) is a type (b) with the outer loop step solved by a derivative-based method. 
The multiple shooting method (Lipton et al., 1982) will be written as a re-ordered 
version of a type (b) scheme. All of these schemes may use first-order methods (or 
Newton’s method) for solving the inner loop. The outer loop steps may also be 
extrapolated in the same way as equation (3.5). Only type (b) and (c) methods 
allow different extrapolations for the inner and outer loop steps.
3.4 The Hgratiyg fch gaa
In this section we give the computational forms for each of the three general 
schemes suggested above. We begin by using a linear analysis which enables us to 
comment on the convergence conditions. In practice the models of interest are 
nonlinear and we evaluate convergence properties by testing on a selection of 
models.
First-order methods applied to the stacked system (3.11) require the 
decomposition B =P-Q  and hence an iteration matrix G =P- 1Q, and forcing 
function c= P —lb. In order to  accommodate the two part iterations, types (b) and 
(c), it will be necessary to define decompositions of B separately across equations 
within a time period and across time blocks. Let BQ= I-L -U  where L and U are the 
lower and upper triangles defined for Bq as for B in Section 3.2. The blockwise 
decomposition of B is given by B=D —L —U where D =I^,*BQ and U and L are
51
upper and lower block triangles:
0 0 OCj 0*
L = B1 •.
0 BjO
and U* = ' • : c i
0 o
Finally we need the corresponding decomposition B=D—L—U where
L =
L 0
V . and Û =
U C j 0
■ ; c i
0 Bj  L o u  .
and D=Iq,j,. Now in line with our schemes of section 3.3 we have:
(i) Type (a) iterative methods
This family of system wide iterations is based on the last of these 
decompositions: B=D—L—U. Thus the basic Jacobi, Gauss—Seidel and SOR
methods applied throughout the system have iteration matrices:
G =  L+U, (I—L)—1U, or (I—aL)—*(aU +[l—a]I) respectively. (313)
The JOR or FGS extrapolations imply iteration matrices H=7qG+(1—70)I-
The computational forms of Jacobi and SOR iterations are given by stacking 
up respectively:
j {,+ 1) =  [ B j j £ !  +  (L + U )y«  +  A j j t ' j  +  u , ] (3.14»)
y(,+ 1 > -  a [  B1y<‘+ 1) + Ly(,+ l > +  Uyj‘> +  Aty< * } +  n, ] +  (l-a )yW .
(3.14b)
over the solution period t= l,...,T . But in order to take full advantage of the
sparseness of B (blockwise and within its sub-matrices), the iterations would 
actually be performed equation by equation in the model’s (possibly nonlinear) 
structural form. For example, the SOR iteration for the linear model would be 
(with summations over j):
for i= l,...,n  and each t= l,...,T  in turn for each iteration. Convergence depends on 
p (G )< l, where G is the final matrix in equation (3.13) (p(H )<l for JOR, FGS ).
(ii) Type (b) iterative methods
This family of two part iterations can use several different decompositions. 
The inner loop is based on solving the system for each period based on Bq=I—L—U 
and obtaining exactly the same iterations as used in Section 3.1 i.e.:
4 k) =  Gy(k- ‘ ) +  P " 1 [ +  C,y<'  } +  » , ] (3.16.)
for k=l,2,... for a particular period t. Matrices G and P are any matching pair 
generated by the decomposition of Bq and y |_ | is the value obtained as the previous 
period’s solution. Equation (3.16a) gives the Type I iterations of Fair and Taylor. 
Alternatively the inner loop iterations might be system wide:
y(k) =  Gy[k_1) +  P " 1 [ B iy (k |  +  Ajy{ •  } +  u t  ] (3.16b)
for t a l .....T  and then k= l,... . Another version would replace y ^ j  by yjk^  in
(3.16b). In all these versions y [+ j represents the value of the expectations variables 
a t the last outer loop step and it is held fixed during the inner loop steps. Given the
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dynamic structure of most models which have a large number of lag terms, it seems 
sensible to use the first of these options (3.16a) unless we have vector processing 
available on the computer in which case these alternative forms may be more 
efficient since they would allow the same calculation to be made simultaneously for 
all time periods.
Stacking over t= l , . . . ,T  the inner loop iteration matrices for the system as a 
whole are given by G ^= Ir j.» G  (G applied in each period) for (3.16a); and
G(2)=(InT“{IT*p -1 )L*)(IT * ^ ) or ®(3)= IT #^i+ (IT*P" ^ * or the tw0 ver8ions 
of (3.16b) respectively. Inner loop convergence depends in all three cases on p(G )<l 
since p(G^.j)=p(G) for i=  1,2,3.
After inner loop convergence in all periods, we obtain the next outer loop step 
(the Type II iteration of Fair and Taylor) by inserting the converged inner loop 
values throughout the system e.g.:
y( ,+ 1)  -  (InT- G (3)r l ( I . p - 1 )(U*y(, ) + U) (3.17)
which implies an outer loop iteration matrix of G=(I^.*Bq—L ) ~ b a s e d  on a 
blockwise decomposition of B. Once again JOR or FGS extrapolations can be 
applied to the inner or the  outer loop iterations, or to both. Taking (3.16a) for 
simplicity, G will then be replaced by H = 7 qG + (1—7q)I and G by H = tG+(1—7)1 
where 7q#7 is entirely possible. Convergence therefore requires both G and G 
(respectively H and H) to  have spectral radii less than unity. Finally the efficient 
computational form for FGS based on (3.16a) would be
Then given y(^+  we set y ^ + 1^=7oyt^+  ^ + ( 1 —7q)j ^  *or t *ie current *nner
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(*)loop value. Finally, when the inner loop has converged for all t  to  yv the 
computational form of the outer loop step is
X(,+ 1) -  +  (l-7)y(*>. (3.1#)
(iii) Type (c) methods, incomplete inner iterations
If the inner iterations of a type (b) method are terminated after p steps, then 
equation (3.16a) becomes
y<P) =  Q fyW  +  +  u,)] (3.20)
Setting y(*+ l)=y(P), for t= l,...,T ; implies an outer loop iteration matrix of 
G=[InT- ( IT* ^ GiP_ 1)L * r1(IT*GP+(IT* f  ° ip_1)U*]- Convergence obviously 
requires p(G )<l, and FGS extrapolations can easily be introduced both into (3.20) 
and by redefining y(8+ 1)=<yy(P)+(i_«)r)y(8). Note however that setting p = l in this 
G automatically recreates the iteration matrices given at equation (3.13) for the 
corresponding definition of the inner loop matrix G since G=P-1 Q and Bq=P-Q. 
Similarly setting p=», when p(G )<l also holds, reproduces the iteration matrix of 
(3.17) since (I-G )- 1P- 1=B0 Thus both type (a) iterations and type (b) iterations 
(e.g. Fair and Taylor, 1983) may be treated as special cases of the more general type 
(c) method. The increasing level of generality is reflected in wider opportunities for 
convergence, and the faster convergence speeds offered by the extra parameters 
which control these iterations. That is to say the m ost efficient type (c) methods 
cannot be slower since they incorporate type (a) and type (b) methods as extreme 
parameter choices. For a given model and tolerance level r, only two parameters, a 
and 7 q, can be set in type (a) methods. In type (b) methods three parameters, a, 
7q and 7  can be chosen, whilst type (c) methods exploit four: a, 7q, 7  and p (or 
equivalently, a weaker inner loop convergence test).
Convergence conditions for these iterative techniques depend on G for type (a)
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methods, G and G for type (b) methods and on G following (3.20) for type (c) 
methods. If a type (a) or a  type (b) method satisfies this test, then a corresponding 
type (c) method is automatically convergent for some choice of p. Thus 
convergence is always possible by one parameter extrapolations if G (and G if 
complete inner iterations are required) is chosen to have roots with real parts less 
than unity. Since JOR extrapolations take G =(I-B Q) and FGS extrapolations 
G =(I-aL )- 1(U + (l-a)I); 0<a<2; type (a) methods will be convergent provided 
(D —B) has roots with real parts less than unity (D —1B has all its roots in  th e  left 
half—plane). Similarly type (b) methods will be convergent provided D—1B and 
(I»B—1)B both have their roots in the left half—plane. Finally, the optimal FGS 
extrapolation parameters 7q and 7  , can be computed for each G and/or G matrix.
Unfortunately these convergence conditions are not of great use for nonlinear 
models other than to demonstrate the possibility of convergence. In a linear system 
one might be willing to calculate the eigenvalues of the relevant iteration matrices. 
In a nonlinear system the (non-stationary) iteration matrices are not usually 
computed and their eigenvalues would anyway be dependent on the iteration path. 
Convergence properties must therefore be evaluated by numerical simulation. The 
results given in the following section show that robust and efficient schemes can be 
implemented for all three models considered.
3.5 Empirical results
A type (b) method (Fair and Taylor iterations) and our preferred type (c) 
solution technique have been tested on three nonlinear econometric models of the 
United Kingdom economy which contain rational expectations terms: the LPL 
model, LBS model and the NIESR model. The models differ in the number of 
expectational terms and in overall model size: 40 forward expectations terms in  the 
NIESR model (which has 199 endogenous variables), 6 in LPL (34 endogenous 
variables) and 3 in LBS (1258 endogenous variables) and hence each represents a 
quite different test for the algorithms. Furthermore, the expectation terms 
represent different lead lengths. The LBS terms are one quarter ahead, NIESR up
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to 4 quarters and LPL up to  5 years ahead. In each case we assume that only one 
stable feasible solution exists. This property is then examined by assessing the 
model’s sensitivity to its terminal conditions in Chapter 4.
The iteration processes then depend on five parameters: the inner and outer 
loop convergence criteria; the internal SOR acceleration parameter (c*q); the inner 
loop extrapolation parameter (7q); and the expectations (or outer loop) 
extrapolation parameter (7 j) . For each model we examine the solution cost for a 
calculation of a standard government expenditure multiplier.
It is an observed feature of first-order iterative methods applied to an 
arbitrary equation system that different variables converge at different speeds. It is 
quite common to find that model convergence depends on one or two particularly 
slow variables. These are typically flow variables or identities such as the current 
account balance or the PSBR. Methods for restricting the convergence of the inner 
loop can take advantage of this feature. It is especially convenient if the variables 
of which expectations are formed are amongst the first to  solve. This means that 
restricting the inner loop will not lead to a substantially larger number of outer loop 
iterations, guaranteeing a more efficient solution. In such cases the best way to 
limit the inner loop is to  limit the convergence test to just those variables of which 
expectations are formed. If appropriate, this approach means that we do not 
necessarily need to search for either the most efficient number of p (the maximum 
number of iterations allowed) or Tj (the most efficient weak inner loop convergence 
criterion) although an optimal setting of Tj will still be of interest. In all methods, 
once expectations have converged, a further round with a comprehensive tight 
convergence criterion is used to confirm that the model has converged to the 
required global tolerance.
(i) The Liverpool model
In the Liverpool model, the variables for which expectations are formed 
converge relatively quickly in each time period. Applying the inner loop 
convergence criterion to these variables alone is the most effective method of
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reducing the number of iterations on the inner loop. Our fastest search method 
starts by locating an efficient pairing of a  and 7q using a fixed initial value for the 
expectations and the limited convergence test on the inner loop. Fisher and 
Hughes Hallett (1987) showed that optimal values for a  and 7q are related and the 
optimal pairing can usually be found by a grid search in less than six steps. Having 
obtained these values, we then search for the optimal outer loop extrapolation 
parameter and check the resulting combination for efficiency with respect to  each 
parameter, to  find the fastest possible solution. A complete set of results is 
displayed in Table 3.1.
A Fair—Taylor type (b) solution, with iteration parameters optimized at 
olq=0.65, 7q=1.0, 7j=0.6 and full convergence criterion Tj=.0002 (.02%), solves in a 
total of 1324 iterations for the 14 periods when subjected to a government 
expenditure shock. Incomplete inner iterations (controlled by a convergence test of 
7j=.005 (0.5%) on those variables having forward expectations in the model) 
reduces that total to just 827 iterations with the same parameter values. Finally, 
optimizing all parameters together yields ((Xq,7q,7 j )= (0.7 ,0.85,0.55) and reduces the 
total number of iterations to 776; that is less than half the Fair—Taylor algorithm in 
its original form and only three times more expensive than the cost of solving the 
model with fixed expectations.
(ii) The London Business School model
The LBS is a much larger quarterly model and is solved here over 36 periods -  
hence it is much more costly to  solve than the LPL model. The same search 
procedure was used as for the LPL case. The Fair—Taylor type (b) solution has 
optimal parameter values of unity. With no extrapolations and complete inner 
iterations, this method then requires 10999 steps. On the other hand, using 
incomplete iterations, also without any extrapolations, only 4934 iterations are 
required; that is just 42% of the standard case. This is a greater gain than that 
reported in Fisher et al (1986) because the overall convergence criteria have been 
tightened to Tj=.0002 (.02%). The harder the model is to solve, the greater the
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TABLE 3.1: Surrey of empirical results : first order methods
Liverpool 
Annual model 
14 periods
LBS
Quarterly model 
36 periods
NIESR
Quarterly model 
23 periods
Strategy
1 2 
0^ ,70 ,71;Itn ’s W i ; “ " ’» o0,70 ,71;Ito,>
F-T,
SOR
0.65,1.0,0.6; 1324 1.0,1.0,1.0; 10999 1.0,1.0,0.9;5262
F-T,
FGS
0.65,0.95,0.6; 1300 1.0,1.0,1.0;10999 1.0,1.0,0.9;5262
I.I.I.
SOR
0.65,1.0,0.6;827 1.0,1.0,1.0;4934 1.0,1.0,0.9;1915
I.I.I.
FGS
0.7,0.85,0.55;776 1.0,0.9,0.95;4615 1.0,0.95,0.9;1875
F.E. 0.7,0.85,-;283 1.0.0.9,—;999 1.0,1.0,-.215
Notes
1 Oq SOR damping parameter
7q inner loop FGS extrapolation parameter 
7 j  outer loop extrapolation parameter
2 Total number of iterations across all time periods
3 F -T  =  Fair-Taylor
III =  Incomplete Inner Iteration
FE =  Fixed Expectations
SOR =  Successive-Over-Relaxation
FGS =  Fast—Gauss—Seidel
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gains usually found from these methods. The FGS extrapolations which have no 
efficiency gain in the Fair—Taylor solution, do improve the incomplete iteration 
solution to the final figure of 4615. Finally it should be noted that the cost of 
solving the model for consistent expectations is only some 4.5 times that for the 
fixed expectation case.
(iii) The National Institute Model (Comparison with Hall method)
The NIESR model has certain features which distinguish its convergence 
properties from the other models. In particular, the exchange rate equation 
contains a unit root in the dynamics of its structural form and the variable is, in 
itself, one of the last to converge in the iterative process. This unit root (which is 
an imposed condition on the lag and expectation terms) leads to a near—unit system 
root and causes the model to be heavily intertemporally dependent in both 
directions. The practical impact of this is that a large number of outer expectation 
loops are required in order to solve the model. The Fair—Taylor type (b) solution 
needs a total of 5262 iterations and FGS yields no improvement although optimizing 
the outer loop parameter A =  0.9 is highly beneficial.
Because the exchange rate is one of the last variables to converge, an 
incomplete iteration scheme based on a restricted convergence test is not effective. 
This version of the model originally used the Hall (1985) type (a) method whereby 
only a single iteration is performed each period. For our incomplete iteration 
scheme we optimized with respect to a fixed number of inner loop iterations (such as 
the method used by Fisher et al., 1986, for the LBS model). In this case we found 
the ideal number to be 2 inner loop iterations combined with one complete 
preliminary solution and the customary complete solution once expectations have 
converged. Whereas the Hall method required a total of 3795 iterations, our most 
efficient scheme needed a total of only 1875. As in the LBS case, FGS 
extrapolations yielded some improvement with the incomplete iterations that was 
not possible with either the Fair-Taylor case or the single iteration scheme.
As a result of this exercise some conclusions can be made with respect to the
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Hall type (a) method. Firstly, the fixed small number of iterations ought to be 
efficient in the face of either a large number of expectational terms or near—unit 
roots. However, it is clear that a single iteration is unlikely to be the most efficient 
choice. Secondly, the single iteration case requires a convergence test between 
successive passes on the entire stacked system, and there is no separate outer loop 
updating expectations, just the usual Jacobi or FGS acceleration. Hence the 
convergence test on the expectations becomes coincident with the test for the 
endogenous variables. The single iteration case therefore requires expectations to 
converge simultaneously to the same tolerance as the underlying variables. In the 
tw o-part iterations, the outer loop is a single iteration updating the expectations 
and the outer convergence test is therefore a test for consistency of expectations. 
The tolerance level for the outer test is usually set to be weaker than the inner loop 
tolerance level. The single iteration case does not allow such a distinction and thus 
removes a degree of freedom in controlling the algorithm. Finally, the one iteration 
case has in practice proven much more susceptible to problems of invalid arithmetic 
and the SOR parameter <>q needs to be reduced to 0.85 in order to generate a 
solution. Since Oq is an inefficient form of damping but no other is available, this 
contributes to the higher costs.
3.6 Penalty function method» (Newton'» method)
Penalty function methods were originally suggested for rational expectations 
models in the context of simultaneous optimal control and consistent expectations 
solutions by Holly and Zarrop (1979, 1983). That context is examined in Chapter 7. 
In this section we concentrate on the use of the penalty function to solve for 
consistent expectations. We show that the penalty function method can be 
interpreted as a type (b), two-part iterative scheme. The inner loop solves the 
model conditional on fixed expectation values as before, but the outer loop, which 
updates expectations, is then replaced by a derivative—based method for calculating 
the ("optimal") expectations values. In this approach it is convenient to distinguish 
clearly between the iteration values of the model variables (yt+ j)  &nd the
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expectation terms, denoted (y®+1) we delete any references to the conditioning 
information to simplify notation. Both terms are expectations conditional on the 
same information set b u t they are only coincident at the final solution. In order to 
obtain the outer loop values, we set up a cost function to be minimized. For a 
simple quadratic example, we have the cost function evaluated at iteration s:
j ( , )  -  j ,  +,1  ji 1v 4 U H i : i l ) >i -
(3.21)
where the w ^ and are weights to be chosen for the n inconsistency terms and 
the n expectations term s respectively. These latter terms can be used as a form of 
damping factor but th e  w ^  weights are normally set to be very small so that there 
is no cost attributed to  these terms at the final solution. More general functions 
than (3.21) allow the  weights to vary across time periods and to place a cost on 
cross-product terms.
The cost function (3.21) can be submitted to any standard optimal control or 
function minimization package. In the United Kingdom a common algorithm used 
is the quasi—Newton scheme of Rustem and Zarrop (1979, 1981) and that is used in 
this thesis. However, in minimizing a scalar—valued function the convergence test 
needs careful attention. If consistent expectations is intended to be a binding 
constraint on the solution of the macroeconomic model, then the function J  has an 
attainable minimum value of zero. Convergence based on the (absolute or 
percentage) change in  J  is not sufficient to attain  consistent expectations, 
period—by—period. W e therefore re-introduce the standard convergence test for 
consistent expectations i.e.
< r o-y *'
The function J  is minimized by calculating an "optimal" set of values for the
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expectations. Holding expectations fixed, we calculate the partial derivative matrix 
N with elements d(yj t+ j—y® t+ j) /  5(y® g) from the econometric model. The outer 
loop then calculates approximately optimal values by assuming the model is a linear 
relation between (Y—Ye)=N.Ye and solving th e  first order conditions for minimizing 
the cost function (3.21) subject to this linear model. The inner loop then re-solves 
the model using these approximately optimal values of the expectations. If the 
model is linear and the weights on the expectation terms (w ^) are small, the 
resulting solution will be consistent. If not, th e  optimization is repeated until no 
improvement is achieved. The process can therefore be viewed as a type (b) 
iterative scheme in which the outer loop step is a  derivative—based iteration. The 
penalty function is not exactly equivalent to  Newton’s method but for zero 
instrument costs (w^) and constant target costs (wjy) the first order conditions for 
the minimization coincide with the Newton algorithm. Writing the inconsistency 
terms as a function of the expectation terms only we have g(y®+ j )= 0  (substituting 
out all the other endogenous terms) and by stacking up the system over time we 
obtain G(Ye)=0. From equation (2.8) we can obtain Newton’s method iteration s: 
Ye(s+ l)=Y e(8)—H- 1G(Y€(8)) where H is the matrix of partial derivatives of G 
with respect to Y®. This iteration is consistent with the differential of the stacked 
objective function i.e. A J= —WyH.AY®. For diagonal weighting matrices and 
weights of unity we can obtain AYe= -H —JA J which is equivalent to the Newton 
iteration. (Hence one can also see how the  weights may act as a step length 
parameter in the Newton iteration.)
Furthermore we can interpret the penalty function approach to forward 
expectations models as analogous to a sparse—system Newton method applied to the 
stacked system (3.11). In these latter applications (e.g. Don and Gallo, 1987) above 
diagonal elements in the simultaneous block (B in 3.11) are called feedback or loop 
variables. These feedback variables are identified and solved separately using a 
Newton algorithm. In this case the system is sparse in its block structure and the 
above diagonal blocks contain only expectation terms. However, one could set up 
the algorithm to include the feedback variables from Bq as well as the expectation
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terms.
Given th a t the penalty function is analogous to Newton’s method, we would 
expect it to require fewer, but more expensive, outer loop steps than the  first order 
iteration. For conventional models such comparisons usually favour the latter 
(Hughes Hallett and Fisher, 1987) but the sparse system nature of the algorithm 
may make it competitive if the number of expectation terms is small.
The penalty function method has fixed costs arising from one base solution 
and n derivative evaluations (n dynamic simulations with fixed expectations). 
However, the derivatives could be approximated and/or saved for use in repeated 
solutions. One possible approximation is that implied by the first order iteration: 
a(yj  t + 1-y ?  , + 1)/^r? S +1 =  - 1, j= i,t=s; 0 otherwise.
Storage of the derivative and Hessian matrices (if required) can also be a 
problem when a large number of expectation terms exist. In the results presented 
below we ignore storage costs and the costs of obtaining the optimal solutions 
(which are of an order of magnitude less than the iteration costs). We calculate the 
derivatives numerically but we distinguish separately between the fixed costs and 
those of the repeated solutions during the descent path.
Finally, the choice of weights can, in principle, affect the speed of convergence 
since the optimal values at each step depend on those weights (see Hughes Hallett 
and Rees, 1983, Ch.7 for a formal summary of results using quadratic optimization 
procedures). In practice the weights are set to  ensure that consistency is achieved 
and the convergence speed can not be improved by altering those weights. This 
arises because the w ^ are set very small so that at the optimum there is zero weight 
attached to the instruments. The targets are therefore all simultaneously perfectly 
obtainable and there is no implied trade-off either between targets and instruments 
or between targets. However, the weights can affect whether a particular set of 
optimal values produce a decrease or an increase in J ex post. This is a  possibility 
because of the nonlinearities involved. In these circumstances a step factor is used 
to try and find a descent path (equivalent to increasing all the instrument weights 
by a scale factor) and the relative weights within the targets are then important. A
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combination of sensible weights and suitable damping factors is usually sufficient to 
eliminate any non-convergence.
The algorithms used here are those of Rustem and Zarrop (1979, 1981) with 
amendments to the convergence test as indicated above. The weights (q.^) are 
chosen to be neutral between variables, reflecting only their scale and deviation 
from consistency. The weights (w ^) are similarly set but with a scale factor of 
0.01: thus they have negligible impact on J.
3.7 CoffigMftiiYe a l l  of  the penalty finctifla method
The results are shown in Table 3.2 for the same three models and input shocks 
used in Section 3.5. Considering the fixed costs first, these reflect the result that for 
a model of fixed size they would increase linearly with the number of expectation 
terms. These costs might be predicted by taking (n+1) times the fixed expectation 
costs shown in Table 3.1. In fact the actual costs lie between 65—73% of that figure. 
This is because the impulse shocks associated with the derivative evaluations have 
less impact than the step change in government expenditure for which we wish to 
solve the model. The NIESR model has fixed costs which exceed those of an 
unoptimized Fair—Taylor solution (6401 >5262). The LPL model has fixed costs 
similar to an optimized Fair—Taylor solution (1300). The LBS model has fixed 
costs which are substantially less than the fastest iterative solution (2777<4615). 
Only on this model would one therefore contemplate penalty function methods 
which evaluate the derivatives every repeated solution.
Considering the iteration costs alone, it is clear that penalty function methods 
are not efficient in achieving a solution which satisfies the period—by—period 
convergence criterion. Each of the models has iteration costs substantially in excess 
of the Fair—Taylor scheme, which is the least efficient first-order method. The loss 
increases with the number of expectation terms. This is in contrast to the usual 
result that first-order schemes become relatively less efficient as the system 
becomes more dense but is entirely consistent with sparse system results which 
require a relatively low number of feedback variables for Newton to  be more
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TABLE 3.2: Penalty fonction costs
Model Number of 
derivative 
evaluations
Derivative
costs
Number of 
optimisations
o
It’ions Total
costs
NIESR 
(23 quarters)
40 6401 82 24220 30621
LPL
(14 years)
6 1293 8 2002 3295
LBS
(36 quarters)
3 2777 16 15978 18755
Notes
* Derivative costs entail one base solution and one derivative 
evaluation for each expectation term.
2 The iteration count does not include the cost of calculating the new 
optimal instrument values, only the costs of re—solving the 
model.
3 Model solutions use optimal values for 7q.
efficient (Hughes Hallett and Fisher, 1987). That is to say, since the Newton 
scheme is not being applied to every variable both the penalty function and 
first-order methods become more costly as the number of expectations terms 
increases. Extrapolating these results, it is possible that a model with just one 
expectation term would be more efficiently solved by a penalty function approach 
and this is supported by the conclusions of Westaway and Whittaker (1986).
This empirical result also reflects the nonlinearity of the models and the 
approximations of the algorithm. Newton algorithms for solving a general nonlinear 
problem are known to possess at least quadratic convergence rates under fairly weak 
conditions (see Hughes Hallett and Fisher, 1987) whereas first order methods possess 
only linear convergence rates. However the convergence rate of the Newton 
algorithm relies on the derivatives being re-calculated or re—approximated at every 
iteration. If the derivatives are calculated less frequently the convergence speed 
tends back to a linear rate (Ortega and Rheinboldt, 1979, p316). Furthermore the 
quasi-Newton algorithm used here involves approximations to the derivative and 
Hessian matrices and the loss arising from these approximations may be large when 
the model is nonlinear. The derivatives used in our calculations, are not 
re—evaluated between iterations and the assumption is made that derivatives 
calculated for the first period can be used to approximate the derivatives in later 
periods. The combination of these approximations is clearly reducing the 
convergence rate of the algorithm. More frequent derivative calculations cannot be 
contemplated because of the costs involved.
For the LBS and LPL models the descent trajectory was quite unproblematic. 
For the NIESR model an intermediate iteration produces an increase in J  before 
consistent expectations has been achieved. In this model, global convergence 
depends almost entirely on convergence of the exchange rate and so a very high 
weight on that expectation term combined with a damping factor of 0.5 on the outer 
loop steps is sufficient for a  solution to be found.
Sensitivity tests support the proposition that convergence speed is generally 
neutral with respect to the weights. It is therefore difficult to find techniques for
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speeding up the penalty function method. However, one can use extrapolation 
parameters on the outer loop and incomplete iterations for the inner loop just as 
with the first order methods. Indeed these could be adapted for any numerical 
optimization problem. These suggestions have not yet been examined, but even if 
they produced the same proportionate gains as for first order methods, penalty 
function methods would still be relatively inefficient.
The shooting technique is a general procedure for solving nonlinear difference 
equations (see. e.g. Keller, 1968 or Roberts and Shipman, 1972). The basic 
technique, described below, is known as single shooting since it solves the whole 
solution period with one iterative scheme. Multiple shooting is a generalization of 
this basic method which breaks the sample period into smaller sub-periods. This 
has been proposed by Lipton, Poterba, Sachs and Summers (1982) as a solution 
procedure for nonlinear economic models operating under forward consistent 
expectations. The methods can be interpreted as a finite—time, nonlinear model 
equivalent to  the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) solutions for a linear model. In this 
section we extend the presentation of Lipton et al. to cover some particular 
formulations which are more representative of practical forecasting models. We 
then go on to extend the expectational framework to cover models with more than 
one lead and we propose extensions to the different types of terminal condition that 
can be used. Shooting techniques may not be feasible or practical on all models and 
conditions under which either of these situations arise are discussed in Section 3.9. 
In Section 3.10 we then present an ad hoc comparison of shooting methods with 
first-order iterative techniques.
(i) The method
The basic shooting method requires the system to be specified in the following 
nonlinear state space form:
M*«+l =  Fl(xV *<>’ (3.22)
where, following the notation of Lipton et al., x( is an n«l vector of endogenous 
variables, zt is a k«l vector of forcing (exogenous) variables and is a real-valued 
vector of functions. The vector x( is partitioned as
and we define boundary conditions v,p_j_j =  v, =  w (note that the initial period 
here is chosen to  be period 1 rather than 0 as used by Lipton et aL: this is consistent 
with our presentation of other algorithms). This partition separates out the (m) 
’jump’ or forward-looking variables (v^) from the (n—m) backward-looking terms 
(wt ). This dichotomy allows us to include lag terms in the model by constructing 
elements of w( and equating their leads to current dated variables in v(. The 
shooting algorithm requires the user to form an initial guess for v^ and to integrate 
F forward until T + l is reached. If x^,+ 1  satisfies the terminal condition the 
solution is found. If not then a Newton algorithm is used to update the initial 
condition Vj as a function of the terminal condition error, iterating until the 
terminal conditions are satisfied.
By successive application of F( , we can write the terminal values as a function 
of the initial condition:
to the two-point boundary value problem. To generate the Newton algorithm we 
define the function Hm which maps the arguments of H into the m terminal values 
i.e. v =  Hm(vpW,Z). Since w and Z are given, we take a first-order Taylor series
(3.23)
w,rt
where v^ is to  be found. Each value of vx which solves equation (3.24) is a solution
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approximation around the solution v ÿ
Hm(v1) a H” ^ )  + (3.25)
where the matrix of numerical derivatives is evaluated at v^. Taking Vj as the
the model is nonlinear we can use the approximation to generate the following 
Newton iteration:
where the derivative matrix is evaluated at {v^s-^l), w, Z}.
Multiple shooting is a generalization of the basic (single) shooting algorithm 
which breaks up the solution period into smaller sub-periods. In applications of 
single shooting, it was found (Lipton et al. pl33) that:
" ... simple Newton search typically fails in economic applications. 
Incorrect guesses of Vq are magnified through time so that huge errors 
are recorded in Vj."
solution Vj and noting that Hm(vj)= v, we can write
(3.26)
Finally, if the inverse of the derivative matrix exists, we can solve for v^:
(3.27)
If Hm is linear, the approximation is exact and equation (3.27) will solve for Vj. If
»if*) =  » it» -1)
i - i
(vT + i (ti (‘- 1) ) - ’ )' (3.28)
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In such circumstances, Lipton et aL report that the Newton iterations simply break 
down, either due to a poor approximation of the first-order Taylor approximation, 
an ill-conditioned derivative m atrix or the mapping F becoming impossible to 
evaluate at some time period. The theoretical explanation of this empirical finding 
does not appear to have been previously stated. A stable linear system solved in the 
form of equation (3.22) automatically becomes unstable in solution. The Blanchard 
and Kahn conditions for a unique stable path require that there be as many unstable 
roots as there are non-predetermined (i.e. expectational) variables. Hence solving a 
rational expectations model by expressing it in backward mode only, must generate 
a system which is inherently unstable. For example, consider the simple system:
xt l t - l  =  0-8 xt + l l t - l  +  a z (3.29a)
or
* t+ i i t - i  -  L2S <xt i t - i  +  a z )' (3.29b)
This equation is stable as a function of the terminal condition x ^ _ p  i.e. it has a 
root larger than unity. However if  we try to solve this system in the form of 
(3.29b), each iteration trajectory will be dynamically unstable since the lag 
coefficient is greater than unity. The algorithm is, in fact, searching over a space in 
which there is one stable solution and an infinite number of unstable solutions. 
Hence, interim solutions during the  iterations are necessarily unstable. Other 
algorithms solve the predetermined part of- the model conditional on the 
expectations variables. Usually the predetermined part delivers only stable roots 
and the problem of instability does not then arise in either the first-order or penalty 
function algorithms given the existence of a saddlepoint.
To overcome this problem w ith the shooting algorithm we sub-divide and 
stack the time period T to produce multiple shooting. By reducing the time 
interval to smaller periods the numerical problems become less inhibiting. The 
presentation given above generalizes so that the vectors of initial conditions for each
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sub—period are stacked over time, and the initial conditions of all but the first 
sub—period are used to generate the target terminal conditions of the previous 
sub—period. Hence the sub-periods overlap by one period. T he derivative matrices 
are defined linking the terminal condition of each sub-period to  its initial condition 
and are similarly stacked (Lipton et cU. pl332). The whole system is then solved 
simultaneously. An example of the precise formulation of a multiple shoot for the 
two sub-period case is given in Section 3.10. A method has been suggested by 
Spencer (1985) to make the formation of the sub—periods dependent on the observed 
terminal condition error but that "bounded shooting" procedure is not considered 
here.
(ii) Generalizing to a wider class of models
Lipton et al suggest the following generalization to cover a wider class of 
models:
* ,+ l  =  * ,(* ,. 7 ,.* ,) , (3.30a)
0 -  (3.30b)
where G represents part of the structural form of an econometric model, F the 
remainder and the (j«l) vector y represents variables whose expectations do not 
appear in the model.
If the conditions for the implicit function theorem hold then (3.30b) can be 
rewritten to  give
S + l  “  B»(*t' * t)' * t) ' (3.31»)
7 , -  B ,(x ,, . , ) .  (3.31b)
In general the partition involved in (3.30) and the implied sub—block forms in 
(3.30a) and (3.31) are not analytically available for nonlinear macroeconomic 
systems and we solve the two parts of the structural form by numerical methods
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simultaneously.
Returning to our own notation, consider the nonlinear structural econometric 
model
^ yl , t ' y2 ,t ,y 2, t+ l |« - l ’ *t’ ^  ~  ut '  *3 32)
where f is an n*l vector of general nonlinear functions; y ^  is an n^«l vector of 
endogenous variables; y2 t , y2 t + l | t —1 “ * vectors of the remaining
endogenous variables and their one period ahead expectations; z( is a k*l vector of 
predetermined variables and 0 is a vector of parameters; ut  is a n*l vector of 
structural disturbance terms.
In order to obtain explicitly the form required for the shooting technique we 
require the following partition and normalization to exist (conditioning on period 0 
and dropping the conditioning information notation for simplicity):
y2 ,t+ l =  V yl , t  y2,t y2 ,t+ l ' *»’ (3.33»)
yl ,t  “  V yl , t  y2,t y2,t+l* *t; (3.33b)
Each period is then solved conditional on y2 t  and zt (y2 t is fed through from the 
previous period). The block recursive feature of (3.31) has now been lost and the 
two equations of (3.33) are solved simultaneously by numerical methods such as 
Gauss—Seidel or Newton. Conditions in which the functions (3.33) are not explicitly 
available are dealt with in Section 3.0.
(iii) Generalizing the expectational framework
Consider the case where all expectations are of m periods ahead, m > l. The 
system will solve as before, but now m sets of initial and terminal conditions are 
required and the sub-periods of the multiple shoot will each overlap by m periods. 
Each period uses y2 t  generated in period t-m  and in turn generates y2 t+ m -
If expectations are of mixed leads or use several leads for each variable we take
73
the longest lead on each variable and then set up the system for period t as follows 
where each vector yj+ 1  defines the vector of variables with a maximum lead of
i:
ym +l,t+m  =  fm +l(y l,t y2,t y3 ,t+ l y3,t y3,t+l y3,t+2 ym + l,t+ m 'Y ^ ’ 
ym ,t+ m -l =  fm <yl,t y2,t y2,t+l y3,t y3,t+l y3,t+2 -  ym +l,t+m 1‘ t:^>
(3.34)
y2 ,t+ l =  *2 (y l , t y2,t • • ym +l,t+ m 'zl ; i )’
y l,t =  fl  (yl , t y2,t -  ym + l,t+ m 'V ^ ’
so that there are (m + 1) sub-vectors yj, j= l,m + l and each sub-vector has 
maximum lead }-l. Each equation in each sub—vector has its maximum lead term 
as the dependent (or output) variable.
This system can now be solved numerically for period t (the dating is nominal) 
with all endogenous terms not dependent variables in (3.34) held constant. The 
interim future values not generated as expectations in period t are generated in 
previous time periods t—m to t—1. A mixture of initial values are thus required, 
each of which will be updated by a corresponding error in a terminal condition.
(iv) Generalizing the terminal conditions
Lipton et al. give a set of terminal conditions as fixed values:
yT + i “  yT + r  <3 35)
They suggest that more general schemes can be treated by variable transformations. 
Such a transformation V(>) can be expressed as
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of those supplied (e.g. y^,+ j 2 yT  or y^.+ j =  yT +  j ^ T  “  y*r-l))- The terminal
conditions for a sub-period k which has interval y ^ j , ... >yT+i(k) are given by:
so that the final value of sub—period k equals the initial value of sub-period k+ 1  
which, since the sub-periods overlap, is equivalent to ensuring that expectations are 
consistent across the sub—periods.
3.9 The feasibility of ghwtipg techniques
(i) The non-existence of a solution
The problem of possible non-existence of a feasible solution can be 
demonstrated for the linear case. Consider the linear system without expectations
A necessary condition in order to obtain a reduced form solution for the model is 
that B is nonsingular so that its inverse exists. By construction, the system is 
usually normalized so that B has unit elements down the main diagonal and it is 
highly unlikely that B will be singular since this requires very particular 
cross-equation restrictions. Now consider the linear system with expectations:
The matrix A is usually singular since only a subset of the possible 
expectations terms are used. Let us assume that we can partition A into
where Aj is non-singular. Then for shooting we can solve equation (3.40) as:
(3.37)
Byt «  C*t +  ut . (3.39)
By, =  C ., +  Ayt+ 1 |t_ j (3.40)
Tt
A l y 2 , t + 1  ~  C 2 * t B l l y 2 t  B 1 2 y l t  +  “ 2 1 
B 2 2 y l t  =  C l “ t  +  B 2 1 y 2 t  +  " i f
(3.41)
However, (3.40) will not generally partition into this form simply by re-arranging. 
This can be demonstrated with a trivial example. Take the following two-equation 
system:
The system (3.42) can easily be solved by leading (3.42b) and substituting into 
equation (3.42a). A first-order type (b) iteration could solve (3.42) in one outer 
loop. However, as it stands, the system cannot be solved by the shooting technique. 
It is impossible to re-arrange this system so that y ^  and J ^ t+ l &re l ^e dependent 
variables. To overcome this problem we could manipulate the system by 
substituting out (3.42b). Alternatively we can lead equation (3.42b) so that we 
then have two equations with y^( and y j t+ l  as dependent variables. This 
procedure is proposed by Preston and Pagan (1982, Section 10.4) who consider such 
lead transformations in a "shuffle algorithm" designed to reduce the entire system 
to a first order difference equation. These procedures are not useful to us in this 
context because this kind of manipulation is generally intractable on nonlinear 
systems. If the shuffle algorithm terminates after the first iteration (i.e. before use 
of the lead operator) it simply produces a system of the form (3.41). Such a system 
would be "regular" by Preston and Pagan’s Definition 10.2 and Theorem 10.4. 
Regularity is sufficient but not necessary for the system to be "solvable" (Preston 
and Pagan Definition 10.1).
There is no inherent property of linear rational expectation models which 
ensures that they can be written in the form of (3.41). Since the linear model is a 
particular case of the general nonlinear model, the same conclusion can be drawn. 
This result can be expressed in graph theoretic concepts by the fact that we have no
y l t  “  a l y 2 t + l  +  c l * l t  
y 2 t  =  C2 z 2 t
(3.42a)
(3.42b)
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a priori restriction to ensure that t , y2 t+ 1  form a feasible output set (Steward, 
1962) for (3.40) or (3.41) whereas, y j t y2 t  will normally form such a set for reasons 
given above (i.e. B—1 exists). Even if we obtain (3.41) we cannot then be sure that 
is invertible for all models.
(ii) Reformulating the nonlinear system
In a large nonlinear econometric model the equations are usually formulated in 
a way which reflects their estimated structural form. Expectational terms will 
invariably appear as explanatory variables not dependent variables. Hence, finding 
the implicit functions (3.33) may not be an analytically tractable problem even 
when a linearized form of the model does not suffer from the problems noted above. 
This problem can be overcome by re-writing (3.33a) in its original structural form
°  =  v ^ i . t  *2,i *>■ <3-38)
and solving (3.38) and (3.33b) numerically for yl t  and y2
Unfortunately this precludes the use of single parameter Gauss—Seidel 
iterative methods since no simple updating relation is available between the error in 
an equation of (3.38) and any variable in y2 t + ^. Newton-based methods which 
calculate descent directions can solve equation (3.38) given sensible start values. 
The preclusion of Gauss-Seidel would imply substantial cost increases in most large, 
sparse systems even if one were able to patch together a Gauss—Seidel system for 
solving (3.33b) with a Newton method for solving (3.38).
(iii) An example of a model for which shooting is infeasible
One model which appears not to be suitable for this technique is the Liverpool 
model as published in Minford et al. (1984). If one takes the 27 equations there 
defined, plus two missing identities, then there is a sub-block of eight equations 
containing nine current dated endogenous variables. For first-order iterative
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techniques or penalty function methods this sub—system forms part of the whole 
without any problems since the output set of the equation system in each time 
period (i.e. the variables for which it solves) are simply the current dated 
endogenous terms. However, if we attempt to re—arrange the system so that the 
expect&tional terms (the longest leads on four variables) are in the output set (i.e. 
are solved for) and their corresponding current dated terms are not, then this sub— 
block of eight equations now contains only seven output variables. Any system 
which contains such a sub—block is unable to produce a  solution, even as part of a 
larger system, unless there is a redundant equation in the sub—block and a 
redundant variable elsewhere (Steward, 1962). Thus it would appear that this 
version of the Liverpool model cannot be solved by these shooting techniques 
without some degree of prior manipulation.
3.10 Comparative analysis of the shooting method
In  the shooting procedure each pass through the equations produces consistent 
expectations but the terminal conditions do not hold until solution is achieved. In 
first-order iterative algorithms the model is solved for fixed expectations which are 
then updated in proportion to their inconsistency. Thus the terminal conditions 
always hold but expectations are not consistent until convergence is achieved.
Although the same set of structural equations are being solved there is an 
im portant numerical difference in the approach. The shooting method also has an 
inner and outer loop but the outer loop is the terminal condition/initial value 
relation and the inner loop solves for a different nominated output set each period. 
In the first-order iterative (FOI) algorithm a distinction is made between the 
expectations terms (denoted y®+1) and the current iteration value yt + j- A linear 
relation between the two is used for the outer loop at iteration (s):
y f+ 1(*) -  ( i -7 )y t+ 1(»-i) + iy ,+ 1(* -i). ( s « )
for some damping factor 7 .
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In the shooting technique the Newton algorithm yields the following relation 
between y ; and (yT + 1- y T + l) :
fSH  1-1  ,
=  y ^ a - i)  -  (yT + i - y T + i) ' (3.44)
where H is the implicit function which generates y<j>+ 1  a® a function of the initial 
conditions and exogenous variables. We can re—write equation (3.44) as the 
non-stationary iteration:
yj(«) =  y1( * - i ) - v ( « ) ( y T + i - y T+1). (3.45)
The need to evaluate and then invert is a considerable drawback since
partial derivatives must be calculated numerically and matrix inversion is costly if 
large numbers of expectational terms are involved. In the multiple shoot we have 
(3.45) stacked over time for sub-intervals. This means calculating up to  T matrices 
and then inverting each, which is an enormous numerical burden which exists 
because of the need to map from y -j+ ^k ) into ^ ( k )  for each “ub-P®™*1 k-
To gain further insight in comparison of this technique we can examine linear 
systems and look at the equation orderings implied. For simplicity suppose the 
model takes the form BQyt = A yt+ j+ B jy t_ j+ C «t + u t . The lag terms do not 
normally appear explicitly in the shooting algorithm, but they can be incorporated 
without undue complexity.
(i) Single shooting
At iteration (s) for the single shoot we have the outer loop:
y^«) =  y1( * - i ) - v ( i ) ( y |+ 1- y x + I ) or
W(Oy! -  - V ( . ) y |+ 1+ V (.)y ’ +1, (3.48.)
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The inner loop system, stacked over time is given by:
(3.46b)
- A O  . . .  0 V o - V i * » - 1) C *1 U1
BQ -A 0 . .  . 0 B1y1( i_ 1 ) c , 2
~ B 1 B0 ' A 0
+ +
0
. Bq —A 0 yT
0 . . .  0 -Bl  B0 -A yT + l 0 C*T “T
At each outer loop iteration yq is given but we must calculate y^ and then solve 
(3.40b) in the order shown.
(ii) First-order iterative techniques
The FOI algorithm has the following outer loop steps (e.g. type (b) or Fair 
and Taylor, 1983):
W >  -  »«+!• <3-47*>
and the following inner loop system stacked over time:
(3.47b)
(iii) Multiple shooting, two sub-periods
Let us assume that the interval is broken at point 1<K<T so that K + l is the 
terminal date of the first sub-period and the initial date of the second. The 
iteration updating the initial values of the two sub—periods is
J iW  - y i ( * - i ) - v i(»XyK+ i- ) r K + i) “
w1(.)y1 -  - v i (*)t k + i  + v i(‘)y i+ i  (3 48»>
and similarly
^2^0yK + l =  “ ^2^®^yT + l +  ^ 2 ^ yT + r  (3.48b)
Hence the terminal conditions for the first sub—period are generated by the initial 
value for the second, thus implicitly linking the very first initial condition (y1) right 
through to the final terminal value (yi«+i)- The inner loop system stacked over 
time is then:
- A O  . . .  0 y 2
B0 -A y J
-B i  B0 -A
0 -B j  Bq -A yK+l
-Bj 0 -A yK+2
o 03 o •
>
©
 
•
yK+3
0 . . .  -B j  Bq -A yT + l
Bi yo Vit® -1) 
B! y! ( *~1)
0
C*ll
C*2
"l
0 + +
—B0yK+l^8-1^  
BlyK+l^8-1^
0 C*T “t
In the second sub—period, y^ + 2 ** dependent on the initial condition y ^ + j 
generated as a function of the terminal condition error at period T + l not on the 
terminal value of the first period. That value of y^^ .j i> u*®d to estimate the 
terminal condition error for the first sub-period and thereby to update yj.
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(iv) Comparisons
In the stacked forms for the inner loop given above we have effectively split 
out the variables which are determined on the outer loop and placed them on the 
right-hand side. Hence, in each case we are left with a block recursive system 
which can be solved in a number of ways. In particular, the three schemes proposed 
for type (b) algorithms in Section 3.4 can equally be applied to the shooting 
systems. Furthermore, a Newton method could alternatively be used on each of 
these three schemes. The presentation of iteration matrices given in Section 3.4 
applies equally well here, the only difference being that the decompositions for 
shooting matrices are based on a re-ordered system.
In order to maximize convergence speed we wish to minimize the spectral 
radius of the iteration matrices for the inner and outer loops. Given that the 
decompositions are different the iteration matrices will not coincide. For example, 
using the block recursive scheme to solve system (3.40) period—by-period gives an 
iteration matrix applied to each period based on a decomposition of A, whereas in 
the FOI method it is based on a decomposition of Bq. We have no way of 
comparing these matrices for a general system. The same is true for the outer loop 
iteration matrices.
The only comparison that can be drawn is based on the results of ordering 
algorithms. In Gabay et ai (1980), and Don and Gallo (1987) it is proposed that 
the most efficient way to order a model’s equations for solution is based on 
identifying a feedback set. The feedback variables are those which, when removed 
from the system allow the rest to be ordered in lower triangular form. The minimal 
feedback set is the smallest set of variables which meets this criterion. A minimal 
set may not be unique and locating a minimal set is computationally expensive; 
algorithms for this purpose are given, inter alia, by Don and Gallo. Having located 
a feedback set we place these variables at the end of the ordering and order the rest 
of the system to be lower triangular.
In the context of consistent expectations models we are proposing to solve the 
system by splitting out those elements which leave the rest as block lower
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triangular. Those variables which are solved on the outer loop are the feedback 
elements in each scheme. Ordering schemes normally aim to minimize the number 
of feedback variables but there is no guarantee that such orderings are actually more 
efficient, since efficiency can only be gained by reducing the spectral radius of the 
iteration matrix. On the basis of published results (e.g. Don and Gallo (1987); 
Gabay et al (1980)), efficiency gains do seem to be achieved by this approach. In 
comparing the FOI and shooting algorithms, we note that the latter has a feedback 
set defined by the initial condition (a maximum n variables) and invokes 
dependencies on the feedback set in line with the number of non-zero entries in BQ 
and B j. The FOI algorithm tears out Ay^+ j every period and hence has a 
maximum nT variables in the feedback set. Since 1<T, a single shooting algorithm, 
if feasible, may produce a more efficient ordering than an FOI. However, the 
number of non-zero entries in A is usually quite small relative to the number of 
non-zero entries in Bq and B j and so the result is unclear. If multiple shooting is 
used the number of torn elements in the shooting algorithm goes up towards a 
maximum of nT variables. Hence multiple shooting implies a clear reduction in 
efficiency relative to single shooting and where A is substantially less dense than Bq 
and B j, relative to FOI as well.
In a comparison of outer loop iteration costs the shooting algorithm is a clear 
loser. The FOI methods simply update the expectation terms to  be consistent 
through a series of identities — a relatively costless exercise given the usual small 
number of expectation terms. However, the shooting algorithm needs to generate 
the derivative matrix dH/dy^ and invert that matrix at each outer loop iteration. 
For multiple shooting the costs are an order of n larger (the precise formulation of 
the derivative matrix in this case is given by Lipton et al. pl332). The costs of this 
outer loop and the inherent numerical instability problems considered above make it 
unlikely that the shooting algorithm will be more efficient unless the number of 
expectations! terms is very small.
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3.11 £ Timm arv
In this Chapter we have considered three methods for solving nonlinear 
forward consistent expectations models. First, a variety of first-order iterative 
techniques have been proposed and particular schemes applied. It has been found 
that differing models may benefit from different versions of these schemes. Second, 
penalty function methods have been evaluated but have been found to be less 
efficient than first-order methods for solving the same problem. It has been shown 
that the penalty function approach can be interpreted as Newton’s method applied 
to a sparse system. Given this interpretation, the results appear to be well founded. 
Third, shooting techniques have been surveyed and some extensions given. Shooting 
methods are shown to be fundamentally unreliable for models that satisfy the usual 
stability conditions and difficult to apply to the general, nonlinear dynamic 
structures found in macroeconometric models.
Chapter 4
TERMINAL CONDITIONS, UNIQUENESS AND STABILITY
In this chapter we aim to establish the appropriate choice of terminal 
conditions in nonlinear forward-consistent expectations models and the conditions 
under which alternative choices are appropriate. In the process we attempt to 
clarify the understanding and use of such conditions and establish the link between 
terminal conditions and the stability and uniqueness conditions.
In Section 4.1 we derive the general saddlepoint conditions for a  unique stable 
solution from a simple presentation of the model in its structural form. In Section
4.2 we then examine the need for terminal conditions to select the saddlepoint path 
in a finite horizon solution. We propose various choices of terminal condition and 
assess their implications for accuracy in approximating the saddlepoint solution. 
This analysis is carried out using a combination of linear model analysis and 
numerical simulation of demonstration examples.
In Section 4.3 we examine the consequences for the convergence of iterative 
solution algorithms of alternative choices of terminal condition. We pay particular 
attention to  models which do not satisfy the saddlepoint criteria. In Section 4.4 we 
then test alternative terminal conditions by their application to three large-scale 
nonlinear models. For the quarterly models we propose adjustments to the terminal 
conditions to account for the observed seasonality in the solution path. Section 4.5 
contains a summary of our results and conclusions.
4.1 Uniqueness and MaMMix condition
In the following discussion we derive the stability and uniqueness conditions 
for a linear rational expectations model. The presentation has the benefit of 
examining a general linear model in its structural form. We begin by reviewing the 
stability conditions for non-expectations models. Consider the structural form of
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the general, dynamic linear model presented in Chapter 2 (equation 2.2):
B(L)y, =  -C(L)*t +  (41)
We recall that B(L) and C(L) are matrices of polynomials in the lag operator such 
that
B(L) =  B„ +  BjL +  ... +  BpLp (4.2a)
C(L) -  C„ +  CjL +  ... +  C L1*. (4.2b)
In this chapter we examine the stability and uniqueness of the dynamic solution to 
systems of equations such as (4.1) leaving a discussion of alternative model forms 
and solution modes to Chapter 6. The dynamic reduced form solution to equation 
(4.1) is given by:
y , =  -B(L)_1C(L)xt  +  B(L)_1ut . (4.3)
Equation (4.3) is referred to by Salmon and Wallis (1982) as the final form and this 
can be re—expressed as:
b(L)
|B(L)|
C(L)*, +
I B(L) | '
(44)
where b(L) is the adjoint matrix comprising finite-degree lag polynomials and 
| B(L) | is the determinantal polynomial. The basic dynamic solution is obtained by 
solving equation (4.1) conditional on x  ^ and ut , t —1,...,T and a set of initial values 
y,> s= l—p,...,0; xg, s= l-q ,...,0 . For the system to produce a stable (stationary) 
solution for yt , the matrix B(L) must be invertible such as to produce a distributed 
lag on x^ in equation (4.4) which is non-explosive. Hence, the stability condition is 
that the determinantal polynomial | B(L)|, must have roots inside the unit circle.
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This stability condition can be derived by noting that: 
n p  np
1/|B (0I = l /l .M l-A jf l]  -  EJAj/il-AjOl. (4-8)
where A., i= l,...,np; are the roots of |B (£)| and (  is an arbitrary argument. If 
| Aj | d .O  V i, then geometric expansion of each term on the right-hand side of 
equation (4.5) yields a  polynomial of infinite length with a declining series of lag 
coefficients on xt , i.e.
1/(1-A{) = (1 +  A{ + A2«2 + ... ). (4.6*)
Each component of the  solution for yt is then a finite-valued function of lagged 
values of xt and hence the complete solution for yt  is non-explosive.
If all the roots of the polynomial |B (£)| lie outside the unit circle, the 
geometric expansions used above generate polynomials with series of increasing lag 
coefficients on xt . As these would become infinite in value, the solution for yt 
becomes explosive and the expansions are not properly defined. However an 
alternative expansion can be obtained by writing
1/ ( 1—a o  -  - A - 1r , / ( i - * - * r 1)
-  - l ( l / A ) r l +  (1 /A )V S +  (l/A j’ r 3 +  4  (4.6b)
In this case we have a  series of infinite distributed leads (since at this stage, before 
we consider expectations formation, we define L_1xt=xt+ 1 ) with declining 
coefficients, and a finite—valued solution for yt can only be defined conditional on 
the future path of x( . Such a model solution does not coincide with conventional 
notions of stability (or causality) since attempting to solve (4.1) (in its original 
structural form, but with roots all greater than unity) given initial conditions for yB, 
s= l-p ,...,0 , would yield an explosive trajectory for yt>
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We now consider the following forward expectations model:
V »  -  - Ai<Ff r t + l | t - l  -  V t  +  *»■ <47)
where, as before, yt+ i | t - l =E(yt + l l n t - l ) is the “ P“ *41'0“ of yt+ i  formed u8in8 
the information set containing information available at the end of period t—1 
(including projections or known values of exogenous variables for periods after t—1). 
Equation (4.7) is a generalization of equation (2.19) where we now allow for lead 
terms of up to k periods ahead. The m atrix polynomial A j(F ) in the forward 
operator generally implies the particular definition that ^ t + l l t —l =yt+ 2 |t—1’ 
F2yt+ 1 | t_ 1=yt+ 3 | t_ 1, etc. as in Sargan (1983). In the consistent expectations 
dynamic solution we solve for yg+ic|8_ i= y 8+ |t where yfl+k is the model solution in 
period s+k.
The consistent expectations solution to  equation (4.7) can then be expressed
A(F)jr, -  - C j i ,  +  u,
|A (F)|jr, -  —•(FJCqX, +  »(FJu, (4.8)
where A(F)=B0+Aj(F); a(F) is its adjoint m atrix and |A (F)| its determinantal 
polynomial. Under consistent expectations we define the forward operator applied 
to  a solution value to be equivalent to the inverse of the lag operator (F—L—1, hence 
Fyt =  yt+ 1)- W the roots of | A(F)| lie within the unit circle, we can define a stable 
infinite distributed lead on xt . If the roots are outside the unit circle, we can define 
an infinite distributed lag as noted above. In order to get a unique stable solution to 
equation (4.7) we will need the former to hold for the following reasons. If we solve 
equation (4.7) over a finite sample period, t= l,...,T , we require values for the 
expectations of y<j>^ .j, i= l,...,k. These values are for periods outside the solution 
interval and thus must be supplied as a vector of terminal conditions. Different 
choices of terminal values will lead to different solution paths. In our discussion of
solution algorithms in Chapter 3, these terminal conditions were treated as fixed 
values. If the stable solution is defined as a function of lagged xt , then the y,j,+ . 
may be freely chosen without altering the stability of the solution path. There is 
then an infinite number of stable solution trajectories. If the stable solution is 
defined as a function of future xt , knowledge of the future path of xt  after period T 
can be used to tie down a unique value of y>p+ j (example in Section 4.2), and hence 
a unique stable solution. We therefore require | A(F) | to have all its roots within 
the unit circle in order to generate a unique stable solution.
The general model is the mixed case with both leads and lags
B(L)yt =  -C ( l)x , -  A ,(F)yt+ 1 . t_ l  +  a , (4.9a)
D(L,F)y, .  -C (L)x, +  u, (4.9b)
|D (L ,F)|y t  =  -d(L,F)C(L)x, +  d(L,F)tt, (4.9c)
where D(L,F)=B(L)+Aj(F) with adjoint matrix d(L,F) and determinantal 
polynomial |D (L,F)|.
To derive the system roots we factorise the matrix polynomial D(L,F). 
Assuming that there are no zero roots, we can generally write D(£,£—1) as
D f f . r 1) -  Dj({) W D j t r 1) (4.10)
where Dj(£) is the same order as B({); D2(£_1) is the same order as A j(£—*); D1Q, 
Djq are identity matrices and W is a non-singular matrix. Now the roots of the 
determinantal polynomial |D ((,£~*)| are given by the roots of |D ^ (() | and 
I D ^ r 1)!- We 0411 rewrite the latter as | * D 2(£)| where |D 2( - ) | ha8 the same 
coefficients as |D 2( -) | but in reverse order. Expanding the inverse of each of these 
polynomials separately we can see that we require the roots of |D ^(()| and |D 2(()| 
to lie within the unit circle to avoid explosive solutions. If the roots of | D2(£)| are 
within the unit circle then the roots of |D 2((—^l )| must lie outside since the roots of 
one are the inverses of the roots of the other. We therefore require tha t there be as 
many roots of |D ({,(” *)| outside the unit circle as there are forward expectation
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terms and the remainder to be inside the unit circle. This condition then defines 
both infinite distributed lead and lag polynomials on xt which tie down the right 
number of terminal conditions yet preserve the stability of the solution. This is the 
same saddlepoint condition derived, inter alia, by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and 
discussed in Section 2.6.
Note that to obtain a saddlepoint condition it is sufficient and necessary to 
show that the roots of |D j(£)| are inside the unit circle and those of |D j( i  *)| are 
outside. However this does not automatically generate any such conditions on 
| B(L) | or | Aj(L) | . However it will often be the case that a model is constructed so 
that its backward looking part B(L) is stable and that its forward looking part 
introduces the unstable roots. This is particularly likely to be true when forward 
expectations are grafted on to an existing model. In the United Kingdom, the 
NIESR, LBS and Her Majesty’s Treasury model have all developed forward 
expectations models from backward-looking models (see e.g. Hall and Henry 1985a). 
As a counter-example, the LPL model was conceived, designed and built to 
specifically incorporate forward expectations (Minford et aL, 1984).
The derivation of the saddlepoint conditions is given by several other authors 
as discussed in Chapter 2. The exposition developed here has two purposes. We 
have examined the problem from the viewpoint of obtaining a dynamic solution to 
the structural form without appealing to any particular solution algorithm or 
transforming to any special model form. In a nonlinear system we cannot calculate 
eigenvalues or roots to assess uniqueness and stability. However our analysis shows 
how it is that the terminal conditions select the solution path in the finite horizon 
case and that the appropriate choice is that which yields a unique stable solution. 
This result carries over to the nonlinear system. Secondly, by laying out the model 
in a general structural form, we can follow directly on to the alternative model 
forms and solution modes discussed in Chapter 6. Before moving on to examine 
terminal conditions choice we note two further points.
When dealing with a system of linear equations we can calculate single 
equation roots to determine the properties of single-equation solutions and the roots
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of the characteristic polynomial to determine the properties of the system. In 
general, one cannot use the roots of individual equations to infer the properties of 
the dynamic system, nor could one attribute system roots to individual equations. 
However, in principle, the system sets of roots are functions of the coefficients of the 
system. One can estimate the sensitivity of roots due to  changes in coefficient 
values or the elimination of particular lags. It is often found that individual roots 
can in practice be associated with particular coefficients (Kuh, Neese and Hollinger, 
1983, develop such sensitivity analysis using conventional models).
In a nonlinear system the roots are not defined, except for a linearization 
which is, in general, state dependent. By considering a linearization we may obtain 
information regarding local stability from a first order approximation to  the system. 
However, this form of analysis has an inherent weakness. It is conventional to 
linearize around a stable base trajectory. If this is not done, it is possible for the 
base itself to be responsible for generating unstable roots (see the example in Kuh et 
aL). If a stable trajectory can be obtained for the linearization procedure then the 
model must have at least one stable solution! It can therefore be difficult to 
untangle the stability properties of a system using the linearization approach. 
Hence the (in)stability of a model is usually assessed first by numerical simulation.
4.2 Terminal conditions in the linear model
To investigate possible ways of setting terminal conditions we return to the 
example of a price equation as used in Muth’s (1961) paper but using forward 
expectations:
f t  -  “ P t+ i l t - i  +  v  <411>
The forcing variable ut may represent a known process or a disturbance term. This 
equation can also be derived from an inverted money demand equation in the 
new-classical macro—model and, as such, is used by Gourieroux et aL (1982) as their 
example equation. We assume throughout that | a |< l  and hence a unique stable
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solution exists since the implied root satisfies the s&ddlepoint conditions. We recall 
from Chapter 2 that the solution of equation (4.11) (ignoring conditioning notation) 
is given by:
Now, we assume that u( achieves a steady state equilibrium value of u in period T. 
The solution for period T  and after is then:
Equation (4.13) can provide a terminal value for solving the model numerically over 
periods 1,...,T . We can write equation (4.14) as:
with the analytical solution given by equation (4.14).
Similar analysis has led some authors to a treatment of the consistent 
expectations solution as a two—point boundary value problem in which the initial 
and terminal values are treated as transversality conditions (see for example, Holly 
and Been8tock, 1980; Minford et al., 1979, 1980). They suggest the imposition of 
terminal conditions which characterize the equilibrium properties of the model. For 
the nonlinear model used by Minford et ai such conditions are obtained by the
(4.12)
PT =  ( l - a )  V  =  PT + i. i>0- (4.13)
For periods prior to  T  we have the solution:
(4.14)
(4.15)
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analysis of a small linear system on which the nonlinear model is based.
An alternative procedure is to set the terminal value by some kind of 
automatic rule. We shall consider three choices of terminal condition, each of which 
may potentially select a different solution. Let pt denote the solution of the model 
when a terminal condition is imposed.
(i) Fixed value pT =  pT
Here p^. is set from off-model analysis. For example, if pt  is measured as the 
difference of price from some fundamental equilibrium, pT may be set to zero. This 
choice of terminal value may then lead to a difference in the value of p^, from the 
analytical solution. This error is given by the relation:
If, and only if, p^, is chosen to be the equilibrium value then et =0.0 for all t. 
Otherwise, in earlier periods we obtain an error of:
This relation between et and erp holds for all choices of terminal value in this model. 
Hence the effect of an error in the terminal condition on the solution of interest 
should go to zero as T  increases if | a | <1.0 and does not explode at a rate faster 
than l/a .
(4.16)
a'T—t+1 (4.17)
(il) Constant level PT+1 =  PT 
This condition implie«:
P j  «  a  pT  +  ilj. -  ( l-o )  l uT . (4.18)
Therefore if u ^= u  there is no error produced by this terminal condition in this
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context. Hence we can use a constant level rule in place of the analytical solution 
value.
(iii) Constant growth pT+1 =  PTPT/p T-1 
This condition implies
PT =  a  PT+1 +  oT =  a  (p |./pT_ 1) +  uT ,
Prp_j =  o  P>p +  »
and hence
PT =  <* (Pt / ( °  Pt + uT - i )) +  UT*
P^.(c»Pj +Ut _ i ) — o P^ > =  (aprj.+iLp_j)u»p
PTUT—1 ~  °Pt  uT  =  UT UT—r
p ^ l - o i ^ / u ^ j )  =  tbp. (4.19)
* —1 *Now if uT =uT_ 1=u this solution collapses to give pT = ( l—a) u , o#l. Hence a
constant growth rule also uniquely solves for the same value as the analytical
solution. We will show that the advantage of such conditions is that they are also
appropriate when the forcing variable u and hence p has not reached an equilibrium
steady state.
Let us now assume that u follows an autoregressive process
«, =  70 +  71»,_1' <42°)
The combined system (4.20) and (4.11) has two roots of a  and 7j . Equation (4.20) 
ensures that the system is recursive and hence we require that | ck| , | ^  | d  for a 
saddlepoint solution. We can then obtain the following analytical results:
i ,  -  7}®o +  7 * f l 70 -  7}u0 +  70O - 7 i r 1( l - 7 ‘ ) for 7 ,41.0, (4.21m)
“  7o( 1- 7 1)- 1 . for I Tx I < 1 0 . (4.21b)
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^  [t{+ ‘«o +1 = 0
= + -  V 1_7i)~l 7i J 0^ 7l'
=  uo7i ( 1_° 7l)  1 +  7o(1_7l)  1(1_°) 1 uo V 1_7l)  l7 i ( 1_a7i)  1>
for | ac| < 1.0 , |o 7 1 | < 1.0 , 7 ^ 1.0, 
and hence
p, -  7‘ ( i - o 7 1r l i«0-T 0( i-T l r 1] +  70d ^ 1r l ( i-< > r1 i« .» )
Note that we do not require 17  ^| <1.0 in the derivation of this solution for pt - If 
17 j  | < 1.0 then pt converges to a steady state solution of:
P* -  70 ( l - 7 , r 1( l - « r 1- (423)
If 17  ^| >1.0 then both roots are greater than unity and this contravenes the 
saddlepoint condition. When ¡7 ^  >1.0, the exogenous variables are growing 
exponentially. In large scale models used for forecasting non—stationary time series, 
exponential or trend growth in the exogenous variables is quite usual. However, we 
can always obtain a unique trajectory for the pre-determined variable ut given Uq 
and then, using equation (4.22), a solution for pt with a unique steady-state growth 
path as long as | a | ,| a 7 j |  <1.0. In this case the steady-state growth rate is 
obtained as:
P,/Pt—j  -• 7 , M « -  (4.24)
If |o 7 j J > 1.0  then the solution for pt is not finite valued and we rule out this 
possibility.
We now proceed to evaluate different choices of terminal condition in the two
cases:
ss
(») I« I.|T 1I <  10,
0>) |o | . l « 7 1l <  1-0. |T1I > 1 0 .
In order for the solution of interest to  be insensitive to changes in the time horizon 
for sufficiently long solution periods, we require that the terminal period error grow 
no faster than a rate of less than 1 /a  as T  -* ®. Ideally we would like the terminal 
period error to be small for any particular value of T and, rather than growing, to 
vanish at as fast a rate as possible. T he absolute size of the error and its rate of 
reduction are therefore the grounds for comparing different choices.
Case (a): the saddlepoinLsolution
» *
(i) Equilibrium value conditions P«p+1 =  P
For this choice we use the long-run solution to the model as the terminal 
value in period T. This choice is in the  spirit of the proposals of Minford et aL 
(1979, 1980).
p t + i  =  ( i - “ )-1 “.  =  o - a r ' o - ^ r S o
hence
PT =  a ( l - o r 1( l-T i r 1T0 +  UT  (4-2*)
The error is
Pt - P t  =  eT =  a (pT+ l -  PT+1> and
a j ,  =  o  ( l - a r , ) - 1  [u„ -  t 0 ( i — i x ) - 7 T + 1  (*•*•)
Therefore as T -* ■; e^, -♦ 0.0 and so equilibrium terminal conditions possess the 
required property that e j  -* 0.0 .
(ii) Constant level conditions P<p^.| =  p^-
In this case
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P T  =  ( l - a ) _ 1 u T  -  ( I - o J - ' I i 'J'u q  +  7 0 ( l - 1 ’, r 1 ( l - 7 T ) l -  ( 4  2 7 )
The error is then:
(P>p —P<I>) =  ®T =  ^ P t + I - ^T + l^
«T ”  “  7 j K )  ” ’,0(1- 7 1)~1]l71(l-O 71)-1  ')  (4 M)
Therefore, as T -* œ; e^, -* 0 and so constant level conditions also have the required 
property.
(iii) Constant growth conditions P-p+ j  =  P-^/Pt —1 
Here we have
P<p =  a (p^ /P t —l)  "*■ UT =  (^ —our / uT—l)  UT ‘ (4.28)
It is possible to solve this equation for a closed form expression as a function of uQ 
by substituting in for uT_ j, Uj. However, this does not appear to be a useful 
exercise. From the expression given above we can see that as itp  -• u^ = 
70( 1- 7 1)“ 1 and uT /u T_ j  -* 1.0, then pT -4 p^ and so the error vanishes.
In comparing the three types of condition we find all three possess the 
property that the terminal period error vanishes as T -* 00 and therefore all three are 
potentially valid in producing approximations to the saddlepoint solution. Relative 
effectiveness then depends on the size of the error for any particular value of T. 
Comparing the formulae for the equilibrium and constant growth conditions we find 
that the relative error depends on the choices of a, 7Q and 7 j .  W e therefore 
undertake a grid search to examine the errors numerically for all three conditions in 
order to derive some general conclusions about which is likely to produce the 
minimum error. A sample of the results is shown in Table 4.1. From this exercise 
we find the following results:
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TABLE 4.1: The accuracy of alternative terminal conditions: 
the saddlepoint case.
Table shows error in terminal period value as a percentage of the analytical 
solution.
Time horizon
Model
Coefis.
Terminal
Condition
5 10 20 50 100
a=0.95 Equilibrium 0.55 0.04 0.00
7i=0.6 Levels -4.15 -0.32 0.00 —
Growth 166.86 4.51 0.03 0.00
a=0.8 Equilibrium 11.32 2.47 0.14 0.00 _
7j =0.8 Levels -8.49 -1.85 -0.10 0.00 —
Growth 19.36 2.74 0.14 0.00 -
0=0.6 Equilibrium 216.26 112.37 46.37 7.30 0.53
7 ^0 .9 5 Levels -16.22 -8.43 -3.48 -0.55 —0.04
Growth 12.69 3.11 0.74 0.08 0.01
Notes
Model: pt  =  o pt+1 +  ut
“t =  To +  7o= “o” 100
Equilibrium terminal conditions use 
Levels terminal conditions use 
Growth terminal conditions use
PT + l= ( l - o )  V -
PT + 1=PT
Pt + i =Pt /Pt -1-
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(l) Equilibrium terminal values are the most effective in minimizing terminal period 
error only when a  is near unity and 7 j  is away from unity.
(II) Constant growth conditions are relatively effective only when 7  ^ is near unity 
and a  is away from unity.
(m ) Constant level conditions are generally the most effective other than the 
specific cases noted above.
On the basis of these results we conclude that where a model tends to a steady 
state, constant level terminal conditions are likely to  be the best choice. If the 
model jumps very quickly to the steady state then equilibrium values, if they can be 
pre-calculated, are a better choice. If the model is sluggish in moving to 
equilibrium then constant growth conditions become the best choice. These special 
cases occur when the solution trajectory is dominated either by the smallest 
unstable root or the largest stable root respectively.
|fl71J<;l.Q
In this case, p^, will be tending to a steady state growth path of 7  ^ as shown 
above by equation (4.24). We do not therefore envisage applying constant level or 
equilibrium value conditions. Two relevant alternatives are:
(i) applying the equilibrium growth rate,
(ii) applying a constant growth condition.
(i) Equilibrium growth rate pT + 1  =  7j PT 
Hence
pT =  ( l - a 7 i r 1uT -  (1 -07 ,) - 1  7 , [«„ -  70(1-7,)“ *] +  T ^ l- 7 ,) - *- (< 30)
The error is then:
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PT " P T — eT “  °(Pt + 1 - P t + i )
«t  -  o 7o( i - i 1r l i ( i - « r l - T 1( i-o 7 1r 1i- ( « 0
TTherefore eT  is constant for all T. As T -* ®; Pj -• 0 since we recall that Pj =  a  eT- 
Hence using the equilibrium growth rate delivers the required insensitivity property.
(ii) Constant growth terminal conditions PT + 1  =  P^/P t - I
Constant growth terminal conditions yield the same error formula as in the 
saddlepoint case (b). No useful expression emerges beyond the solution:
PT  =  ( I - a « T /« T_ i r l 11T . (4.32)
Numerical simulations have been undertaken for a variety of parameter values. A 
selection of the results is shown in Table 4.2. These results show that the error 
under constant growth assumptions also tends to a constant and thus delivers the 
insensitivity property. However the long-run error is different from the constant 
error induced by using the equilibrium growth rate. The simulations further reveal 
that constant growth conditions perform relatively well when 7  ^ is close to unity i.e. 
the condition | a 7 j |  is easily satisfied. As |o 7 j |  -* 1.0 equilibrium conditions 
become relatively more accurate.
Finally it should be noted that constant growth conditions can produce very 
large errors when the number of time periods is very small. This can be traced to 
the term in (1 -a  Uj / u^ j )- 1  in equation (4.32). If a and all values of ut , t=0,... 
are positive then pt  should also be positive. However it is possible that 
(uT /u T_ 1)> (l/a )  for short time horizons. This would force pT  to be negative! 
This result is confirmed by numerical simulation. Analytically it can be derived by 
considering the growth rate of u( :
V V i  -  [7l«o +  V i - r j r ^ - r i M  /  b { - S ,  +
(4.33)
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TABLE 4.2: The accuracy of alternative terminal conditions: 
the steady-state growth case.
Table shows error in terminal period value as a percentage of the analytical 
solution.
Time horizon
Model
Coeffs.
Terminal
Condition
5 10 20 50 100
a=0.75 Equilibrium -23.20 -8.53 -1.32 -0.01 0.00
T l-i.2 Constant gr -9885.96 28.63 2.81 0.01 0.00
0=0.75 Equilibrium -35.19 -17.43 -7.75 -1.34 -0.11
T j-lO S Constant gr 92.09 14.77 3.28 0.35 0.03
Notes
Model: Pt =  a  p|+ 1  +  ut
“t -  ^0 +  V t - 1 -  T0-« 0 = 10 0-
Equilibrium terminal conditions use p^ >+1=7^ P«p- 
Constant growth terminal conditions use P<j .+1=Pt /Pt - 1-
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As t -• ■ this growth rate tends to 7 j  if 17 j  | >1.0 and hence if | a 7 j  | <1.0 the term 
| aiLp/tLp_^ | <1.0. However, for small T and small values of uQ, the growth rate 
will be close to ( l+ 7 j)  — enough to make pT  go negative. The numerical 
simulations reveal a discontinuity in the terminal period error as a function of 
increasing T after which point the performance of the condition rapidly improves. If 
17 ^| <1.0 the growth rate tends to 1.0 but the problem for short time horizons 
remains. Hence we need to be careful about using constant growth terminal 
conditions when the time horizon is short or the exogenous variables have not 
settled to a growth rate close to their equilibrium. This conclusion helps to explain 
why constant growth conditions perform less well as |c»7 j |  -♦ 1.0 since under these 
circumstances this short run problem is more likely to emerge.
To summarize the results so far we find that constant growth conditions 
perform reasonably well for systems which produce a steady-state growth rate or 
which exhibit sluggish adjustment to equilibrium. The time horizon must be 
reasonably long and the unstable roots not too close to unity. In systems producing 
a steady-state level equilibrium, then constant level conditions are likely to be more 
robust. In both cases, if the smallest unstable root is too close to  unity then the 
system will be very sensitive. In such cases a long time horizon is required and any 
information concerning the equilibrium solution will help to reduce sensitivity. In a 
model of mixed growth and level equilibria for different variables then we obviously 
need a mixed set of terminal conditions. If the nature of the model solution is not 
known then a first guess may be made by examining the order of integration 
(Granger, 1981) of the individual variables over an historical period. We might 
select growth conditions for 1(1) (or non-stationary) variables and level conditions 
for 1(0) (or stationary) variables.
4.3 The impficfttioM of m i n i  f la d t t t o t  for model solution
We now consider the implications of alternative terminal conditions for solving 
a model when the system roots do not possess the required stability properties. In
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an empirical setting we may be unaware whether the model that has been 
constructed is stable or not. Sensitivity tests must therefore be used not only to 
validate the choice of terminal condition but also to establish the stability of the 
model. This procedure is especially relevant for nonlinear systems for which we 
cannot obtain dynamic roots.
If | o |> l  in our demonstration model then there is no saddlepoint solution. 
Instead, there is an infinite number of stable solutions and the analytical solutions 
(4.13, 4.19) are not defined (since a1, is explosive). However the use of a fixed 
terminal value will select one of the infinite number of stable paths. Consider the 
tw o-period solution using either a fixed terminal value (9 3= 1)3 ) or a constant level 
terminal condition (P3=P2):
1 - a  0 »1 " 1
0  l - o p 2 " 2
0  0 1 Ip 3 I.P3J
l - o  0 P i " l
0  l - o P2 u 2
0 - 1  1 [p 3 .0
W e consider solving this system by a first-order iterative technique. The 
three schemes for achieving consistent expectations outlined in Chapter 3 all 
coincide when there is only one equation. The Jacobi iteration matrices are
respectively:
0 a  0 and 0 o  0
0 0 a 0 0 o
o
’
0e
0 1 0
The spectral radii of the two systems are 0 and Jâ  respectively. The stability 
condition is | or| <1.0 in which case V5<1.0. Hence the convergence conditions of 
the first-order iterative technique using constant level terminal conditions coincide
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with the those for the existence of a  saddlepoint. There is in fact a solution with a 
constant level at the final period defined by p2= ( l—o j u j ,  P j = a ( l —o Ju j + U j  but this 
solution is not uniquely stable and the algorithm will not converge to these values. 
On the other hand, if a fixed terminal value is used then convergence is always 
achieved. This result generalizes to  simultaneous systems and longer time periods. 
If fixed values are used one may therefore select a solution to this model even when 
there is more than one stable solution and this non—uniqueness will not be apparent. 
Hence the use of such conditions may be misleading. This result has an analogy in 
the solution of a linear backward—looking model. Given a fixed initial condition it 
always possible to solve such a model for a finite time horizon even when it is 
unstable.
We would like to able to generalize these results to a system of mixed leads 
and lags and to constant growth terminal conditions. However, there seems to be 
no such generalization which can be derived analytically for an arbitrary, finite time 
horizon. Even for two-period solutions, the roots of the system and the spectral 
radius of the iteration matrices become highly complicated. Furthermore, the use of 
constant growth terminal conditions introduces a nonlinearity which precludes the 
use of linear algebra and hence we need to resort to numerical simulation 
experience.
We use a slightly more general version of our demonstration model which 
includes a lag term as well as a lead:
pt =  “pt + i +  ^ t - i +  ut  -  “ t - i  (43e)
Our results in this section are independent of the precise form in which u enters the 
equation. This equation is sim ilar to the reduced form of Muth’s 1961 small 
macro—model (equation 4.12, p325). It is also similar to  the exchange rate equation 
in some vintages of the NIESR model. We solve different parameterizations of this 
system for the range of terminal conditions, for different time horizons and for 
different bases.
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(i) Fixed terminal values
Using arbitrary, fixed-value conditions and a Fair—Taylor solution algorithm, 
this model solves for all choices of 0<a,/3<l including those combinations which do 
not satisfy the saddlepoint condition. However, those models involving parameter 
choices which do not satisfy the saddlepoint conditions become relatively more 
difficult to solve as the time horizon is extended. Furthermore, the solution itself is 
sensitive to the time horizon in these non-saddlepoint cases.
(ii) Constant level conditions
Using constant level terminal conditions, parameter combinations leading to 
both roots being greater than unity (or both less than unity) result in explosive 
iterative paths and hence fail to solve. Hence we can surmise that a general 
nonlinear system is likely to fail to solve due to numerical problems in similar 
circumstances. However, for short horizons (e.g. less than  ten periods) a  solution is 
produced for models which contain one or two unit roots (a+ /3= l). These solutions, 
with one exception discussed below, are sensitive to th e  simulation horizon and 
therefore non—unique.
When one root is unity and the other greater than  unity (e.g. o=0.4, /?=0.6) 
the constant level terminal condition produces a solution which appears to be stable 
and unique. This special case arises because the initial condition is fixed and hence 
the unit root, which is present instead of a stable root, does not cause the solution 
to fail and there is a unique solution for a given initial condition. This solution is 
then attainable and unique for any time horizon.
(iii) Constant growth conditions
Using constant growth terminal conditions, a solution is achieved in only two 
cases: when a saddlepoint property holds in the model (e.g. a=0=OA) or in the 
special case noted above when there is one unstable root and one unit root.
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On the basis of these experiments, summarized in Table 4.3, constant growth 
terminal conditions are more consistent than constant level conditions in revealing 
certain non—saddlepoint cases. For long time horizons, either choice of terminal 
condition tends to non-convergence in these unit root models. These conclusions 
reflect the fact that in very short horizons the terminal condition has an undue 
influence on the spectral radius of the iteration matrix and can reduce it to less than 
unity for some non—saddlepoint models. Constant growth conditions do not appear 
to suffer from this problem in the same way as constant level conditions.
As a result of these findings, the unit root model appears to be an interesting 
special case. If there exists a unit root instead of an unstable root (e.g. a single 
equation random walk specified as a forward difference) then there is no stable 
solution but no explosive solutions either: there are an infinite number of possible 
solutions depending on the choice of terminal value. In this case we can only map a 
trajectory from a given initial condition to a given terminal value: constant growth 
and (ultimately) constant level conditions both fail to solve. The terminal condition 
must therefore be a fixed value and this will then define a unique solution path. 
This conclusion should not be surprising since even a lag model with a random walk 
implies that we cannot predict a unique long-run value of a variable independent of 
the initial conditions. However, because the terminal condition is arbitrary 
numerically, it does not have to be arbitrary economically. We can still use a priori 
reasoning to choose a likely path and specify a terminal value.
In order to examine stability by simulation methods, we solve three nonlinear 
models using different solution periods and terminal conditions to assess the 
sensitivity of the solution. If a model is stable, the solution period sufficiently long 
and the terminal condition appropriate, then the solution over the period of interest 
will not be affected by increasing the sample length. This principle is built into the 
solution method of Fair and Taylor (1983) as their Type III iterations in which the 
model is continually re-solved over a solution path which is gradually increased
TABLE 4.3: Summary of convergence results 
for alternative terminal values
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M odel: Pt =  a p t+1 +  0  Pt_ !  +  « , -
First root
Second root Aj <1 * 1 -1 Aj >1
a2< i F 1 solves2 
L,G fail
F,L solve 
G fails
F,L,G solve
A j- l F,L solve3 
G fails
F,L solve5 
G fails
F,L,G solve
A2>1 F,L,G solve4 F,L,G solve6 F solves7 
L,G fail
Notes
1 *
F — Fixed terminal value i.e. pT+1=p
L — Levels terminal condition i.e. P jx ^ a P f
G — Growth terminal condition i.e. PT+1=PTP-p/PT—1
2 e.g. a = 0.7, 0 =0.6, |A j| =  |A j| =  0.925
3 e g. or =  0.4, 0 =0.6, At =  0.66, Aj =  1.0
4 e g. a  =  0.4, 0 =0.4, Aj =  0.5, Aj =  2.0
5 e.g. a  =  0.5, 0 =0.5, Aj =  1.0, Aj =  1.0
6 e.g. a  =  0.6, 0 =0.4, Aj =  1.0, Aj =  1.5
7 e.g. a  =  0.6, 0 =0.7, I Aj| =  | A ,| =  1.0»
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until no sensitivity is observed. That process (known as the Extended Path 
algorithm) is not used generally by models of the United Kingdom economy for 
every solution, partly because of its obvious cost implications. It can also distract 
attention from the choice of terminal condition. Fair and Taylor simply set the 
terminal value from a base (control) solution. If the model is unstable then Fair 
and Taylor’s Type III iterations should not converge. Our own sensitivity analysis 
effectively repeats the Extended Path procedure on a one-off basis and examines 
every solution. We also consider variations in the terminal conditions to see 
whether different types of condition reveal different properties. Once the stability 
properties of the model are established, the user just needs to keep a watchful eye on 
the simulations, as discussed in (iv) below.
(i) Liverpool model
By default, the Liverpool (LPL) model sets the values of the terminal 
conditions in accordance with equilibrium conditions derived from a theoretically 
derived linear representation of the model. Although discussion of the general 
problem and the general nature of these conditions usually appears in presentations 
of the model (e.g. Minford et al, 1984), the actual conditions employed have been 
published only by Wallis et al (1985). Three points are worth noting about the 
LPL model structure and its terminal conditions. Firstly, no dependent variable in 
the structural form of this model has its own expectation as an explanatory variable. 
This renders single equation analysis of the dynamics of even less relevance than 
usual. Secondly, it should be noted that the terminal conditions do not constrain 
the solution to pass smoothly through the terminal point or imply that the solution 
would remain at the terminal values after the terminal date if the time horizon were 
extended. Hence equilibrium terminal conditions do not actually constrain the 
model solution to reach a stable equilibrium. For example, although capacity 
utilization (defined as the deviation of output from trend) is constrained to zero in 
period T + l, it is freely determined by the model in period T. Finally, how long the 
model takes to reach equilibrium is an open question and the model is generally
1TABLE 4.4: Expectation^ variables and terminal conditions: 
LPL model
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Expectational variables Equation in which expectation appears
Capacity utilization Non-durable consumption
Real debt interest Equilibrium government spending
Real exchange rate 
1 year ahead 
5 years ahead
Real short interest rate 
Real long interest rate
Inflation
1 year ahead 
Average 5 years ahead
Nominal short interest rate 
Nominal long interest rate
Terminal conditions
(T denotes the last time period of the solution)
Capacity utilization Measured as deviation from trend output 
and projected at zero
Real debt interest Projected by its value in period T times 
the growth of equilibrium GDP at T
Real exchange rate Projected 5 periods after T at a constant 
value given by multiplying the value of the 
equilibrium level of the exchange rate at T 
by its growth rate at T.
Inflation Projected 5 periods at constant value given 
by the value of the exogenous PSBR/GDP ratio 
at period T
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observed to be rather sluggish.
Four variables have expectations which appear in the model: capacity 
utilization (deviation from trend), inflation, real debt interest and the real exchange 
rate. Two of these, inflation and the exchange rate, appear twice with different lead 
lengths, in order to determine both short and long rates of interest (both real and 
nominal). The terminal conditions for inflation and capacity utilization are set by 
exogenous variables, whereas the other two terminal conditions are generated from 
the paths of ‘long-run equilibrium’ variables which are determined endogenously. 
These conditions are detailed in Table 4.4. It is not clear, however, that they 
specifically represent the long-run solution of the empirical version of the model 
rather than that of the theoretical model on which they are based. For example, in 
the empirical model the equilibrium rate of inflation is equal to  the long-run 
PSBR/GDP ratio (which is exogenous and yields the terminal inflation value) only 
if the rate of growth of real money demand is zero. Since the latter is determined 
by an equation which contains a time trend and the level of GDP (which has a 
non—zero equilibrium trend), this seems unlikely to  occur.
Using the Autumn 1984 version of the model, we solve the model reducing the 
time horizon by annual increments. The same conclusions obtain whether the 
period is shortened or lengthened. Solution paths for real debt interest and the real 
exchange rate are shown in Figure 4.1. Similar response patterns occur in all the 
other endogenous variable trajectories.
Two main conclusions emerge from this exercise. First, there does seem to be 
a unique long-run path to which the early parts of the solution provide a good 
approximation. As the solution period is increased, this becomes insensitive to the 
terminal date. Second, the last five periods of each solution show marked and 
consistent deviations from this path. This divergence begins in the period at which 
the terminal conditions have a direct effect. This produces a prima facie case that 
the equilibrium terminal conditions represent a poor approximation to the long-run 
stable solution path. A model user would have little confidence in the results during 
this divergent period (Liverpool themselves only report forecast solutions for five
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Figure 4.1 LPL model, 1984: alternative solution periods
I l l
Figure 4 .2  LPL m odel: e x ch a n g e  rate trajectories
\
Equilibrium exchange rate
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years ahead).
The reason for the poor performance of the equilibrium conditions is given by 
the behaviour of the real exchange rate. Whereas the terminal condition for the real 
exchange rate is derived from the equilibrium real exchange rate equation, the 
actual real exchange rate shows a persistent divergence from the equilibrium level, 
this being greater than the latter value by a factor of two. These paths are shown in 
Figure 4.2 for a 14 year horizon. The implication of this gap between actual and 
equilibrium values is that the expected real exchange rate ‘jumps’ in year 9 (1994), 
leading to the dynamic behaviour of endogenous variables over the last five years of 
the solution noted earlier. The gap between the actual and equilibrium exchange 
rate can be traced back to the value of the first-order serial correlation coefficient 
(0.9) in the exchange rate equation. Hence the model is too sluggish to achieve 
equilibrium in fourteen years.
In Figure 4.3 we show comparative results for the application of different types 
of terminal condition to the model. Several solutions over a short period are 
compared with a longer run solution in which the LPL equilibrium conditions were 
applied. It is apparent that the LPL terminal conditions applied to the shorter 
forecast, do not perform well, exhibiting a substantial divergence for up to six years 
prior to the terminal date. Terminal conditions based on constant growth rates or 
constant levels do much better, with negligible distortion. Examining all variables, 
it becomes apparent that some are better served by constant growth rates and some, 
like the exchange rate, by a constant level depending on the long-run trajectories of 
the conditioning variables.
In the Autumn 1985 version of the model, corrections are made to the 
equilibrium terminal conditions in such a way as to  prevent the real exchange rate 
jumping to the equilibrium level. Instead it jumps to  the same rate of growth as the 
equilibrium exchange rate. The resulting sensitivity analysis, for real debt interest 
and the real exchange rate, is shown in Figure 4.4. Clearly the sensitivity of this 
solution path has been almost entirely removed and this result is reflected in other 
variables. However, the nature of the equilibrium terminal conditions on other
113
Figure 4.3 LPL model: alternative terminal conditions
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Figuro 4.4 LPL model, 1985: alternative solution periods
(b ) Re al ex ch an ge  rate .
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variables raises further potential problems in simulation analysis. The sensitivity 
may reappear for different simulations and this is discussed in (iv) below.
(ii) LBS model
The LBS model contains three expectation terms in its financial sector. The 
price of gilts has a constant level terminal condition, the prices of equities and 
overseas assets both have constant growth rate conditions. This information is 
summarized in Table 4.5. In Figure 4.5a we present some sensitivity analysis 
focusing on the price of gilts which is representative of all three variables.
The first obvious conclusion is that the sensitivity has a seasonal pattern i.e. 
the trajectory depends on which quarter of the year the simulation takes as an end 
period. The price of gilts clearly has a seasonal pattern over its entire base solution. 
Failure to predict this seasonal component leads to  drastic over and undershooting 
depending on which quarter of the year the solution finishes in. This effect is 
transmitted through the whole model so that even GDP has a seasonal pattern.
The LBS model is largely constructed using seasonally adjusted or 
theoretically non-seasonal data (e.g. the financial sector data are not adjusted but 
should not be seasonal). The seasonal pattern in the base solution is therefore 
somewhat surprising. In general, seasonality can be induced in a model by the 
inputs or the equation dynamics. In this model, the presence of seasonality can be 
traced back to the residual adjustments, exogenous variables, seasonal dummies 
initial conditions for lagged endogenous variables, and fourth—order equation 
dynamics. Of particular importance is the uprating of tax allowances and local 
authority rates in line with the annual inflation rate in each budget quarter. 
Strictly, such uprating ought to be seasonally adjusted before input into a model 
forecasting seasonally adjusted data.
If a saddlepoint path exhibits seasonality then the terminal conditions must be 
adjusted to take account of the fact. The LBS model does seem to  possess a 
saddlepoint path as reflected in the lack of sensitivity of the first half of the 
solution. In a quarterly model, possible adjustments to the constant level and
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TABLE 4.5: Expectation^ variables and terminal conditions: 
LBS model
Expectational variables Terminal conditions
Gilt price Constant level, quarter on quarter
Equity price Constant rate of growth, quarter on quarter
Overseas assets price Constant rate of growth, quarter on quarter
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Figure 4.5 LBS model: price of gilts
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constant growth conditions could therefore take the form y«j«+ j =  y<r+j_4  an(*
yT + j/yT + j-4  =  yT + j—4^yT + j—8 (or iT + j / ^ + j - k  ”  ^T + j-V ^ T + j-k -« ) 
respectively. These conditions are expressed in annual terms and so will accurately 
reproduce the seasonal component, adjusting the terminal value accordingly and 
eliminating the seasonality in the sensitivity results.
In Figure 4.5b we show some alternative solutions to the LBS model for a 
short time horizon in which a variety of terminal conditions are applied. We apply 
three types of condition: the LBS mixture, constant levels, and constant growth 
rates (results labelled A, B and C respectively). We then apply the correction for 
seasonality to each in turn (labelled D, E, F). Terminal conditions in which 
seasonality is taken account of clearly perform better than those in which it is not. 
Of the latter, the constant levels version appears to do remarkably well but this 
reflects the seasonal pattern at the chosen terminal date and a turning point in the 
series which fortuitously occurs at that point. This turning point is caused by the 
fact that the base is a genuine ex ante forecast and has been adjusted carefully for 
the period of interest. Hence the residual adjustments are much fewer and much 
smoother after the first five years.
(iii) NIESR model
The NIESR model contains 40 expectations terms in 11 variables with leads of 
up to four periods ahead. These variables and their terminal conditions are detailed 
in Table 4.6. By far the most important of these variables is the real exchange rate. 
The other 10 variables all use constant growth rate terminal conditions. In this 
version (model 8), the NIESR model has an imposed unit root in the real exchange 
rate equation which can be written:
In pt  *  0.102 In p%_ x +  (1-0.102) In pM 1 +  0.009 A d, (4.25)
where p is the real effective exchange rate and d is the real UK:Rest of the World 
interest rate differential. Since d is exogenous and no other variable enters the
TABLE 4.6: Expectation»! variables and terminal conditions: 
NTESR model
Expectational variables
All have leads of up to four quarters ahead:
Output index (GDP)
Output index (manufacturing)
Output index (other!
Output index (mainly public)
Consumer price index
Wholesale price of manufactures
Average earnings
Personal disposable income
Interest rate  on local authority debt
Nominal effective exchange rate
Rate of employer’s national insurance contributions
Terminal conditions
All use a constant rate of growth, quarter on quarter, except for 
the nominal effective exchange rate, which is calculated from :
lo*(i p/pf)x + 1  “  log (< p/pf)0 +  1.75 [log (X/M )t  -  log (X /M )0]
where e is the  nominal exchange rate, p is the wholesale price of manufactures, 
p* is the foreign wholesale price (implicitly projected at a constant growth rate) 
X is total exports, M is total imports, T is the last solution period and 0 the 
last historical period.
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equation, the single equation roots deliver the system roots of 1.0 and 0.114 . The 
system therefore has a unit root where it should have a root outside the unit drde 
to meet the saddlepoint condition. The model therefore has no unique stable 
solution and (consistent with the results of Section 4.4) fails to solve for constant 
growth terminal conditions. Any fixed terminal value supplied will, however, 
generate a solution to the model. Sensitivity analysis is not necessary to come to 
this condusion. The NIESR model imposes a terminal condition which links the 
exchange rate to its initial condition (yQ) and any long-run change in the current 
trade balance (see Table 4.6). This condition ensures that the exchange rate moves 
in the long run to (partly) clear the current trade balance.
In examining the sensitivity of the model we are handicapped by a large 
residual adjustment to the exchange rate in the final period of the forecast, which 
ensures that the exchange rate is roughly constant over the forecast. In changing 
the terminal date we usually assume implicitly that the exogenous inputs are on a 
stable trajectory over the horizon covered by the different end—points. This 
forecasting residual denies that assumption and introduces sensitivity to  the time 
horizon. Removing the residual causes the model to fail to solve for the full solution 
period. We therefore remove the residual and shorten the horizon until the model 
solves successfully. One period shorter is sufficient and this new solution serves as a 
base from which we consider deviations.
Figure 4.6 demonstrates the sensitivity of the exchange rate solution to 
changes in the terminal date. Similar patterns are repeated for all other endogenous 
variables due to the common characteristic equation. Three results stand out. 
First, the sensitivity of the solution is not confined to the final few periods but 
affects even the first period. This is symptomatic of our demonstration examples 
but not of the LPL and LBS models. The result for the NIESR model reflects the 
pervasive influence of the exchange rate equation, coupled with the unit root. A 
second result is the overall degree of the sensitivity: up to 3 points on the nominal 
exchange rate, 0.5% on GDP and up to  5 points on the price level. Finally, the 
results are clearly seasonal as we found for the LBS model. As in the LBS case, the
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NIESR model is constructed largely with seasonally adjusted data and the 
seasonality reflects the exogenous inputs and equation dynamics. The most 
important factor is again the annual uprating of tax allowances in the budget 
quarter.
Because the unit root allows any choice of terminal value, no alternatives are 
tried here. We can rule out conditions such as a constant growth rate for the real 
exchange rate although a constant level condition should yield an arbitrary solution 
for short time horizons. With a unit root, the terminal condition must embody 
sufficient exogenous information to tie down the terminal value.
Later vintages of the NIESR model (e.g. Model 9, Autumn 1986) incorporate 
two corrections. The exchange rate equation is altered to include an endogenous 
current account term thus altering the system root of unity. The terminal condition 
for the exchange rate has therefore changed and a constant growth assumption is 
now employed. However, probably due to a near—unit root remaining, the time 
horizon for the current model is required to  be very long (up from 23 periods to 40) 
and an element of an equilibrium condition remains in that the exchange rate is 
required move so as to eliminate any change from the base level of net overseas 
assets.
The terminal conditions are also changed in that the average of the 
quarter—on—quarter growth rates over the previous year is used as the 
quarter-on-quarter growth rate at the terminal date. This change successfully 
removes most of the seasonality in the sensitivity analysis but not all. The 
quarter-on—quarter growth rate terminal condition is not the original source of the 
seasonality in the model but acts as a transmission mechanism. The correction is 
only intended to remove the seasonality in the sensitivity results not the underlying 
seasonality in the models dynamic solution. Using the average growth rate does not 
accurately reflect the differing quarter-on—quarter growth rates in different quarters 
of the year whereas our proposals made above do capture this variation.
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(iv) Simulation responses
In simulations with these models, any sensitivity with respect to  the terminal 
date affects both the base and perturbed solutions and the issue is whether these 
effects cancel out. It is also possible that different terminal conditions yield 
different responses and this possibility also needs to  be examined.
Using the LPL model with an amended terminal condition for the real 
exchange rate, there is no sensitivity to the terminal date in the simulation 
response. The main question for this model is therefore whether the continuing use 
of some equilibrium values for other terminal conditions affects the simulation 
properties. In particular the terminal value of inflation is set by an exogenous 
variable proxying the equilibrium PSBR/GDP ratio (see Table 4.4). We consider 
three types of simulation, retaining the LPL terminal conditions. Firstly, we have 
simulations which involve a change in this exogenous variable and hence 
automatically adjust the terminal value. Secondly we examine simulations which do 
not adjust the terminal value explicitly but do not imply a long-run change in the 
inflation rate. Finally we consider simulations in which there is an implied 
long-run change in the inflation rate but for which the exogenous terminal value 
remains constant.
(a) A standard government expenditure shock simulation, under balanced financing 
rules is introduced by changing the exogenous PSBR/GDP ratio and hence the 
terminal values are directly re-calculated. Consequently we observe no sensitivity 
of the simulation properties to changes in the solution horizon. Furthermore, we 
observe no major differences when the terminal condition is altered to a constant 
growth rate or constant level. For this simulation the explicit adjustment to the 
terminal value appears to be accurate.
(b) The same conclusion is reached for any simulations which do not imply a change 
in the long-run inflation rate. Typically this includes all temporary shocks, 
tax-financed government expenditure changes or a shock to world trade. In all of
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these simulations there is no substantial long-run effect on real money growth 
which is the only endogenous component in the inflation equation.
(c) Equilibrium conditions are found to affect the results for any shock which 
implies a rise in the long-run inflation rate and which does not involve a direct 
change to the terminal condition e.g. a permanent government expenditure increase 
financed by monetary growth. In these cases, the equilibrium terminal conditions 
force the inflation rate to return to base at the final period, thus distorting the 
response of the model. The interpretation of such a simulation result is that 
government expenditure and monetary growth return to base in the final period. 
Even for this interpretation, the result is distorted because the equilibrium is being 
imposed immediately upon cessation of the shock.
If we wish to examine a shock for which the inflation rate is allowed to rise in 
the long-run, we can allow the price level to be determined by constant growth 
terminal conditions. This implies that the equilibrium can be characterised by any 
stable inflation rate rather than a particular value of inflation. Sensitivity analysis 
then reveals that a permanent increase in government expenditure, financed by 
monetary growth is neither distorted, nor sensitive to the time horison.
In some simulations even constant growth terminal conditions are insufficient 
to guarantee that the solution corresponds to that of the desired shock. A 
permanent reduction in the VAT rate which is allowed to permanently affect the 
PSBR, which in turn is financed by balanced monetary growth, implies an 
accelerating inflation rate in the LPL model. In such a simulation the exogenous 
PSBR/GDP ratio is explicitly changed whereas government expenditure and tax 
rates remain constant. The terminal condition is thus explicitly changed, but the 
implication of this change is that inflation attains a stable level in the final period. 
Constant growth conditions on the price level yield a very similar solution in which 
inflationary growth is truncated at the terminal date. Constant growth conditions 
on inflation (rather than the price level) do not yield a solution. This latter result 
delivers the correct conclusion that the model is being used in such a way that it
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becomes globally unstable. It should not therefore yield any solution purporting to 
be stable. A model user must be aware of, and watch out for any circumstances in 
which the terminal condition appears to be inconsistent with the dynamic trajectory 
of the simulation response. Ultimately simulations must be restricted to those for 
which a saddlepoint solution exists.
This particular example reflects the fact that the simulation involves more 
than a simple shock. If we simply add a small perturbation to an exogenous 
variable, the stability properties of the model should be preserved — if it is stable in 
the base, it is almost always stable in a small neighbourhood. If, however, the 
exogenous variable is put on an unstable trajectory, or used as an instrument to 
target an endogenous variable, the stability properties may alter. In the example 
given above, the VAT rate is increased and the PSBR is allowed to vary. This is 
achieved by targeting the level of government expenditure, otherwise endogenous, 
using the exogenous PSBR/GDP ratio as an instrument. This prevents government 
expenditure adjusting to  return the PSBR to its base level. This additional rule, for 
this shock, makes the model unstable.
In the LBS model the seasonality of the solution discussed above leads to a 
modest degree of sensitivity to the terminal date and to the terminal condition. 
Amending the terminal conditions to take account of seasonality successfully 
removes this sensitivity. The conditions employed then appear to be valid for all 
interesting simulations (e.g. all those reported in Fisher et al, 1988, 1989).
In the unit root version of the NIESR model the terminal condition is 
arbitrary and must be selected using off-model information. Hence different 
simulation properties could be revealed by different assumptions. For example, 
assuming a long-run response of the exchange rate to  the trade balance gives quite 
different multiplier properties. However the effects of seasonality on the simulation 
results can again be removed by appropriate amendments as discussed above. In 
later vintages of the model, with the unit-root problem resolved, constant growth 
conditions appear to be appropriate for most of the variables but a long time 
horizon appears to be necessary to remove sensitivity. Given our results above that
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the performance of constant growth conditions deteriorates as the smallest unstable 
root tends to unity, and tha t the required time horizon therefore increases, it may 
be that equilibrium—type terminal conditions would be more appropriate for the 
exchange rate in the NIESR model.
4.5 Summary and Conclusions
In this Chapter we first derive the standard saddlepoint condition for a unique 
stable solution in a forward expectations model and discuss how terminal conditions 
are used to select such a solution in a finite horizon problem. The choice of terminal 
value has received scant attention in the literature and the issue does not seem to 
have been resolved. Minford et aL (1979, 1980) suggest the use of conditions which 
characterize their model’s known equilibrium, whereas Wallis et aL (1985, 1986) 
recommend the use of rules base on constant growth rates or levels. Either choice is 
dismissed by some authors as arbitrary (e.g. Blake et aL, 1989). In this chapter we 
examine the degree of approximation involved in employing different types of 
terminal condition on a simple demonstration model and show that, in general, the 
terminal condition should reflect the long-run trajectory of the variables concerned: 
either constant level or constant growth rate conditions. In models with unstable 
roots near unity, the effectiveness of the terminal condition in approximating the 
saddlepoint is improved if the long-run solution or long-run growth rate is known 
since these provide better terminal values than those constructed from the solution 
itself.
We assess the implications of different choices of terminal condition for the 
numerical solution of models with particular emphasis on the non-saddlepoint case. 
In general we conclude tha t constant growth conditions only allow convergence 
when a saddlepoint solution exists, whereas fixed value conditions allow convergence 
in all cases. The latter are therefore more robust but their use may conceal the 
instability of the model.
We test out various terminal conditions on three large-scale nonlinear 
forecasting models. We find that the results of our analysis are confirmed, with
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constant growth terminal conditions working well on models with well-established 
saddlepoint solutions but breaking down for a unit-root model. Ultimately, the 
choice of terminal condition is dependent on the model structure. The most 
im portant conclusion is therefore that sensitivity testing is vital both to establish 
the stability properties of a model and to validate the terminal condition and time 
horizon employed.
Chapter 5
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND STOCHASTIC SIMULATION
In this chapter, we begin by examining the consequences of different 
assumptions concerning input shocks in forward expectations models. The 
alternative assumptions concern whether the shocks are anticipated or 
unanticipated; temporary or permanent. This then leads us to  a proposed method 
of stochastic simulation for such models. A series of stochastic shocks will generally 
be a sequence of unanticipated temporary shocks although other possibilities are not 
ruled out. Our proposed stochastic simulation method differs from two previous 
proposals in the literature. The reasons for these differences are critically assessed.
Numerical results for large-scale models using different assumptions about 
input shocks are presented in Wallis et al. (1986, Section 2.4). In Section 5.1, we 
develop a comprehensive analysis of how anticipated and unanticipated shocks can 
be introduced into a general dynamic model. This leads to a slightly wider range of 
possibilities than those considered by Wallis et aL. In Section 5.2 we extend the 
numerical results of Wallis et al. on the same large-scale models. In Section 5.3 
we analyse the introduction of temporary and permanent shocks and combine this 
with the possibility of unanticipated changes to the duration of the shock. Again, 
this leads to a wider range of possibilities than those examined in Wallis et aL; 
numerical results are presented in Section 5.4.
In Section 5.5 we develop methods for stochastic simulation of large-scale 
forward expectations models. The method presented here is different from that used 
by Hall and Henry (1985a,b) and th a t suggested by Fair (1984, pp383—384). Those 
methods are shown to require extrem e assumptions about the input shocks. In 
Section 5.6 we use stochastic simulation to evaluate the variability of output and 
the price level in the face of stochastic shocks. The experiments are repeated under 
alternative financing rules for the PSBR, so updating an earlier study by Fisher, 
Wallis and Whitley (1985) which employed stochastic simulation on models without
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forward expectations. We can therefore examine whether changes to the models, 
and the introduction of forward expectations in particular, have implications for 
those previous results. Section 5.7 contains a summary and concluding comments.
5.1 An jig  gated and Baantlcipated shocks
Consider the following two demonstration models, the first with forward 
expectations the second with a lagged dependent variable:
where the u t term is the source of all input shocks. We then introduce an impulse 
shock 6 to  u  in period s and examine the solution for yt , t= l, . . . ,T . In the lag model 
(5.2) the solution is unambiguous: there is no effect on y( , t= l,...,s—1; yg is
all the effects occur at or after the introduction of the shock.
The solution to the model (5.1) for consistent forward expectations is 
derived in Chapter 4 and is given by equation (4.15) which we re-sta te  as:
therefore more properly regarded as the expected values at the end of period t—1 and 
usually only u( at most is an observed value in equation (5.3). The effects of a 
particular shock are then dependent on an assumption concerning how expectations 
of the forcing variable u( are formed. If the shock 6 is anticipated at the end of
will not change from base. Hence, in this particular forward expectations model, all 
the effects of an anticipated shock occur at or before the date of its introduction.
* t =  “ !,t + i | t - i  +  ut ' 
* t ~  0 * t - i  +  V
(5.1)
(5.2)
increased by 5; yg+. is increased by $ i = l .....T -s. Hence in this particular model,
(5-3)
However, the values u., i= t+ l .... T—1 are those used to form &nd are
period 0 (s>0), yt , t= l,...,s  will increase by an amount of a*~*6, and yt , t= s+ l,...,T
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We next assume that 6 becomes anticipated only at the end of period s—k. 
Let us re-write equation (5.3) as:
7‘ "  +  +  *t  <M >
First of all, consider the case of k = l  so that the shock is unanticipated prior to 
period t; then us | t _i> t= l,...,s—1 is unaffected by 6 and hence so is yt , t= l,...,s—1. 
The first period to be affected is y8 which increases by 6 and then yg+j, i= l,...,T -s 
is unchanged. Hence the only reaction to 6 occurs in period s. Between the two 
extreme cases (k= l, k=s), we could assume that 6 is anticipated in period s—k, 
l<k<s. In these cases there will be a  response of a8-*£ beginning in period s-k but 
the response in earlier periods will be zero as will be the response of yg+-, 
i» l,...,T -s.
We therefore see that different assumptions concerning how far in advance 
the input shocks are anticipated generate different responses from a forward looking 
model. These assumptions determine, in just one respect, the expectations 
formation concerning the exogenous variables and stochastic disturbances rather 
than the endogenous variables. By definition, the exogenous variables and 
disturbance terms are not explained by the model structure. Therefore we can only 
assess the impact of alternative expectations assumptions using sensitivity analysis.
A general dynamic model possesses both lag and forward expectation terms, 
and the results provide a generalization of our demonstration examples. Let us 
consider a more general form of model:
B(L)jr, -  A1(F)yt+1|t_ 1 +  C(L)x, +  »,. (*■#)
The terms in equation (5.5) are defined as for equation (4.9). We assume that there 
is a dynamic consistent expectations base solution y^, t= l,...,T  and that the 
residual terms have been set to  appropriate values (for example, sample-period
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residuals, zero or the forecast adjustments). We then wish to introduce a shock, wg, 
at period s, so that xg=xg+wg. We divide UP the POMiWlities into two alternative 
assumptions we can make concerning the date at which wg becomes known: either 
wg is anticipated at the end of period s—k, l<k<s, i.e. before/at the date of the 
shock; or wg is not anticipated until the end of period t= s—k (0<k<—T+s) i.e some 
date after the shock is introduced.
In the first case (l<k<s), the solution for periods t= l,...,s -k  remains 
unchanged from base. We therefore re-calculate the solution from period s—k+1 
and solve under consistent expectations for yt , t=8—k+ l,...,T , taking into account 
the shock wg. We link the base solution for the horizon l,...,s—k with this perturbed 
solution to give a complete solution over the horizon 1,...,T. The main question of 
experimental design in such a calculation is the value of k, i.e. for how many periods 
in advance is the shock wg correctly anticipated. If k = l then the shock is 
anticipated only as it occurs and we call this an unanticipated shock. In this first 
general case, the only difference in experimental design between the anticipated and 
unanticipated shocks is the start of the perturbed simulation horizon.
If s—T<k<0 then we move to the case in which the shock is anticipated only 
at some point after the end of period s and is unanticipated even in the period in 
which it first directly affects y. In our simpler demonstration example (5.3) we 
assumed that the shock was always anticipated at least by the end of period t—1. 
Relaxing that assumption and setting k=0 for that model would produce a response 
equal to the shock in period s (since yg depends directly on the actual value of ug 
not its expectation) and zero for all other periods. Hence, assuming that k=0 is 
equivalent to assuming that k= l for equation (5.4). This reflects the lack of lag 
terms in that model (hence 6 does not affect yg+1| g_ 1, nor the model solution for 
yg+., i» l,...,T —•). In the more general model (5.5) the solution reflects the 
presence of lagged terms; hence the response is non-zero after period s. 
Furthermore, the expectations formed at the beginning of period s depend on 
whether wg is anticipated or not since the forward expectations y|+ j | ,_ i  
affected by anticipated changes in wg.
are
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In this second general case (s—T<k<0) we will only consider k=0 for 
simplicity, so that wg is always known by the end of the period in which it is 
introduced. The results for k=0 generalize easily to cover s—T<k<0. We then
observe tha t wg affects yg but not yg_j_-|g_i>0. Here we need two solutions in
addition to  the base simulation. We use the base to determine yg_J_1 1 g_We then
solve for yg given wg and the base value of yg+1| g_ j- Finally we solve for 
yt , t= s+ l,...,T ; for consistent expectations given wg> yg. This is then a fully 
unanticipated shock. This second kind of shock was not considered in the exercise 
of Wallis et aL (1986).
We can extend this analysis to a series of shocks either interdependent or 
independent. A series of interdependent shocks is a sequence wp, p=s,...,T which 
can be anticipated after the first shock in the sequence is realized. Hence wg+j 
becomes known at the same time as wg for all j>0. In case one (k>0) we simply 
solve for yt , t= s^c+ l,...,T  given all the wp. In case two (k<0) the solutions for yt , 
t= l,...,s—1 and for yg+i| g_ 1 (i>0) are the same as for a single shock. Only the 
solution for yt , t= s+ l,...,T  is different and that solution is now given wp, p=s,...,T  
and not just wg.
To extend to a series of independent shocks (which therefore cannot be 
anticipated in advance), wg, w8+i>—>wx -£  (£>0 for reasons which follow) then we 
have to repeat the calculations in each case for each new unanticipated shock. For 
every period in which a new piece of information, wg, becomes anticipated, we need 
to  calculate one new dynamic solution for each time period s with all shocks wg+j 
set to zero (their expected value). In the second type of unanticipated shock we 
need two solutions for each period. We first need to evaluate the expectations from 
a  dynamic consistent expectations solution given the lagged solution values from the 
previous period and no new shock. We then evaluate the impact of the shock from a 
single period solution given those expectations. The final shock is in period T—l  
since we must keep some extra periods unshocked at the end of the horizon of 
interest to  generate the expectations for the final period. For the interdependent 
sequence the shocks can occur right up to period T as long as that sequence
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possesses a stable trajectory (although one would still maintain T at a date beyond 
the horizon of interest).
In this section we have analysed the introduction of anticipated and 
unanticipated shocks in a general linear model. In the case of a single period shock 
we require either one or two solutions in addition to the base. It will be apparent 
that this analysis also generates the basic approach to deal with stochastic 
simulation in Section 5.3.
5.2 Un&ntiripatcd w d  anticipated »hotti; empirical reraHa
In this section we give an empirical illustration of the difference in effect 
between anticipated and unanticipated shocks. As noted above, conventional 
backward-looking models react no differently to anticipated and unanticipated 
shocks whereas if the shock is anticipated with forward-consistent expectations we 
expect to observe a change in behaviour prior to the actual shock. A common 
example in the U.K. economy is that if agents expect excise duties to be raised in 
the annual budget, then we observe a pre-budget spending boom on alcohol, 
tobacco, petrol etc.. In the following exercises we assume that the anticipated 
shocks do actually then occur. However it is entirely possible that agents may form 
expectations on the basis of a change in policy which does not then occur. The 
failure to change policy then becomes a particular type of unanticipated shock and 
this possibility is examined further in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
If a  model meets the stability criteria given in Section 4.1 then it has a 
unique long-run solution. We then expect to observe the same long-run effects for 
anticipated shocks as for unanticipated shocks, since the same steady-state growth 
path should be attained in both cases.
In general, models do not allow for different reactions to anticipated/ 
unanticipated shocks through the specification of individual equations, and 
differences emerge only from complete model solutions. A counter example is the 
LPL model which incorporates the reaction of economic agents to unanticipated
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inflation (defined as through a  term in the real wage equation (with a
negative coefficient). Under consistent expectations this term is identically zero for 
all except the first period where the lagged expectation term (y ^ g )  411 i*“4**^
condition formed outside of the solution period (at the beginning of period 0) and 
hence is not required to be consistent. The unanticipated inflation term can be set 
either to zero (the anticipated case) or can be calculated using the initial condition 
(the unanticipated case). In order to isolate the impact of this term we report a 
second set of results from the LPL model examining the impact of unanticipated 
inflation only.
(i) LBS and NIESR models
The shock to both the LBS and NIESR models is a step increase in real 
general government expenditure of £386m per quarter, assuming fixed nominal 
interest rates (implied money finance) and is introduced in quarter 9. We carry out 
three experiments. First we assume that the shock is anticipated at the start of the 
time horizon (quarter 0). Second we assume that it becomes known at the end of 
period 8 so that it is anticipated for the period in which it takes effect. Third, we 
assume that the shock becomes known at the end of period 9 and so it is completely 
unanticipated. The results for the response of GDP and the nominal exchange rate 
are graphed in Figures 5.1 (NIESR) and 5.2 (LBS).
For both models the effect of an unanticipated relative to an anticipated 
shock is a slightly smaller response of GDP in the period in which the shock is 
introduced. If the shock is not anticipated until after it occurs (quarter 9), the 
initial impact is lowest but the highest peak effect is observed later in the solution 
horizon. For GDP, differences persist over the whole of the solution. In both 
models, the effect of the unanticipated shocks starts slightly smaller and ends 
slightly larger, with the fully unanticipated simulation finishing with the largest 
effect of the three. The difference between the two types of unanticipated shock is 
not large but both have a persistently larger effect in the long-run than the 
anticipated shock (although the rate of change over time is the same). The
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Figure 5 .2  C om parison  o f  anticipated  and
unanticipated sh o ck s : LBS m odel.
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anticipated shocks support the proposition that some effects may be felt in advance 
of the imposition of the shock.
The pre-impact effects are much more important for the exchange rate 
than for GDP. The pre-shock effects on the exchange rate show an initial jump 
down in the first period followed by a steady depreciation and there is no noticeable 
change in its trajectory in the period when the shock is actually introduced.
It is noticeable that the simulations in both  models do not appear to be 
tending to the same long-run solution for GDP whereas the exchange rate paths are 
very similar. In both models there may be some distortion due to the sensitivity of 
the solutions to  the terminal condition (see Chapter 4). The only major difference 
between the two models is that the LBS model is more responsive overall, 
particularly for the exchange rate.
(ii) LPL model
In the comparable experiment for the LPL model, illustrated by Figure 
5.3a, we again impart a step impulse to government expenditure under an 
assumption of money finance. In this case the shock takes effect in period (year) 5 
and is either fully anticipated or anticipated only a t the end of period 4.
There are clear signs that both anticipated and unanticipated solutions tend 
towards the same long-run solution, with the difference largely in terms of 
dynamics. Unlike the quarterly models, the unanticipated effects are stronger than 
in the anticipated case in the period in which the  shock is introduced, but this 
ranking is reversed after two periods. The pre-im pact effects are also far more 
significant for this model and it is a quite striking result that GDP falls for several 
years before the government expenditure shock is introduced. This reflects the 
model property that anticipated future inflation has a negative impact on current 
GDP.
A second set of LPL simulations are shown in Figure 5.3b to reflect the 
unanticipated inflation term in the wage equation as discussed above. The increase 
in government expenditure occurs in the first period for both the anticipated and
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Figure 5 .3  C om parison  o f  anticipated and 
unanticipated sh o ck s : LPL m odel.
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unanticipated cases and any difference in the solution is entirely due to  the inclusion 
of this term. This leads to a marked difference in the results for the period in which 
the shock occurs, but this is rapidly eliminated so tha t the two simulations coincide 
after about 5 years. The unanticipated shock causes real wages to be lower in the 
first period and hence output is higher than in the anticipated case.
The results suggest, therefore, that the choice of unantidpated/antidpated 
assumption does m atter for the models although prindpally in terms of thdr 
short—run dynamic response. In the case of the LPL model, similar implications can 
be drawn from both the antidpated and unanticipated variants after 5—6 periods of 
the simulation, but the two quarterly models are more sluggish and the relatively 
short solution periods produce some medium-term discrepancy. Taking account the 
fact that the LPL model is annual and the other two are quarterly, then this 
difference is probably insignificant. The LPL responses also demonstrate that the 
effects can be extremely powerful when the unanticipated shock is directly 
formulated as part of a behavioural equation.
The shocks illustrated for all three models are to real general government 
expenditure. There is a simultaneous monetary impulse in the quarterly models due 
to the fixed nominal interest rate assumption. The LPL model has endogenous 
interest rates by construction and so the monetary shock is introduced 
simultaneously as part of the financing assumption. As a  possible alternative, we 
find that shocks directly to nominal interest rates in the quarterly models yield 
similar conclusions except that there is only a small long-run response of GDP for 
any of the simulations.
The second basic component of experimental design is the difference 
between permanent and temporary policy changes. A temporary policy change may 
reflect policy reversal in which case the nature of tha t reversal may be treated as 
anticipated or unanticipated. In this section we concentrate on the
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permanent/temporary distinction as in Wallis et aL (1986), but also consider the 
question of unanticipated policy reversal/continuation.
Conventional backward looking models react no differently to permanent 
and temporary shocks during the period in which they are in force. If we assume 
that such a model meets its stability conditions as described in Section 4.1 then it 
possesses a long-run steady-state solution. A permanent policy change will 
generally take the solution to the model on to a new steady—state trajectory. A 
temporary policy change will take the model solution on to the same path whilst it 
is in force. Once the temporary shock is removed, the model will tend back towards 
the original steady state, at a rate of adjustment depending on the intrinsic 
dynamics. The difference between a permanent and temporary policy change on a 
conventional model is therefore restricted to the period following the removal of the 
temporary change.
The long-run difference between temporary and permanent shocks is also a 
feature in models with forward expectations variables. In addition, they may react 
differently to a shock during the period in which it is in force, depending on whether 
it is anticipated to be permanent or temporary. If the temporary nature of a policy 
is anticipated, differences in reaction occur before the policy removal. Only if a 
shock is anticipated to  be permanent but is actually temporary is the difference 
between temporary and permanent shocks restricted to the period following the 
removal of the shock. In our empirical results which follow, we generalize the 
results of Wallis et aL (1986) to include the case of unanticipated policy reversal and 
unanticipated policy continuation. For this purpose we assume that the policy is 
limited to the application or not of a shock to a policy variable.
As in the antidpated/unantidpated distinction, the models do not usually 
distinguish different reactions to permanent and temporary stimuli through the 
spedfication of individual equations. Although a consumption function might rest 
on a permanent income theory, for example, separate identification of permanent 
and transitory components of income seldom occurs. If we consider the forward 
expectations model (5.1) and its solution (5.3) we can immediately see how the
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solution for yt depends on the expected values of ug, s=t,...,T  (and any implied 
change in y^.). The effect of a temporary shock is to truncate the influence of future 
changes in ut and thus to diminish the effect on y^ in this simple model (for positive 
shocks, and given the implied coefficient of unity on u( ). We note that for finite 
horizon simulations, the temporary shock should end sufficiently far in advance of 
the terminal date that the terminal condition causes no distortion to the results.
The experiment to  be used is a shock of £386m to real general government 
expenditure, financed by increased monetary growth (fixed nominal interest rates 
for the quarterly models) as in Section 5.2. For each model the time horizon of the 
temporary shock is taken as a reasonable proportion of the available sample. For 
the LBS this is five years and for the LPL model, six. For the NIESR model, the 
available time horizon is relatively short and so only three years are used. Both 
permanent and temporary shocks are unanticipated on introduction. As variant 
solutions we simulate unanticipated changes in the duration of the shock. These are 
referred to as unanticipated policy reversal and unanticipated policy continuation. 
In these cases we assume that expectations immediately switch to a correct 
prediction of the new regime when the change is made.
In the LPL model, nominal monetary growth is exogenous and balanced— or 
money—financed increases in government expenditure must be accompanied by an 
explicit increase in monetary growth. The model identifies two separate exogenous 
monetary growth variables one denoted "temporary” and the other "permanent". 
Since either may be used to  finance a government expenditure change, this prompts 
the question of how long such a change can be financed by "temporary" monetary 
growth — to which there seems to be no definitive answer. The "permanent" 
counterpart of monetary growth in the LPL model is calibrated to give 
balanced-finance changes in  the PSBR and automatically adjusts the terminal value 
of inflation. When using temporary monetary growth for long periods the terminal 
condition must be relaxed (e.g. using constant growth rates) so as to find its own
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level corresponding to the stable solution. It is then a numerical issue as to  whether 
the model is stable under a "permanent" shock to "temporary" monetary growth.
The response of GDP and the nominal exchange rate for the quarterly 
models are graphed in Figures 5.4 (NIESR) and 5.5 (LBS). We observe tha t the 
simulation responses of both models are in general smaller when the shock is 
temporary than when it is permanent, as forecast from our demonstration model, 
although the differences are not that substantial for the LBS model. For both 
models, after the end of the temporary shock, the GDP trajectory returns close to 
its base level whereas the nominal exchange rate returns to  a  trajectory parallel to 
its base. The temporary shock exhibits a permanent effect on the price level and 
hence on all nominal variables. The permanent shock appears to cause a permanent 
shift to the level of GDP and a constantly depreciating nominal exchange rate.
The unanticipated policy reversal/continuation simulations are identical to 
their permanent/temporary companions until the change in policy takes effect. On 
both quarterly models the trajectories then switch suddenly. The two temporary 
shocks attain very similar trajectories to each other within a few periods of the 
regime change, as do the two permanent shocks. In these models the main effect of 
the temporary/permanent distinction is the effect on the short-run of agent’s 
expectations about future policy being incorrect.
Under "temporary" money finance in the LPL model, illustrated by Figure 
5.6a, an unsustained shock generates larger output effects but weaker price effects 
than its sustained counterpart. The reversal of the ranking of the GDP responses 
compared with the quarterly model reflects the strong negative effect of future 
inflation from the permanent shock on current output, which more than offsets the 
effects of increased demand from the increased government expenditure. In the 
unsustained case the inflation effects are much weaker. After the end of the 
temporary shock the level of output returns rapidly to its base level. The 
permanent shock also has no long-run effect on the level of GDP. Hence the 
responses of the LPL model support the propositions of the new classical model 
under both temporary and permanent shocks.
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Figure 5 .4  C om parison  o f  tem p orary  a n d  
perm an en t sh o ck s : NIESR m od el.
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Figure 5 .5  C om parison  o f  tem porary and 
perm an en t sh o ck s : LBS m odel.
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Once the terminal conditions have been correctly set, there is no difference 
in the GDP responses depending on whether permanent or temporary monetary 
growth is used to  finance the PSBR. Figure 5.6b illustrates the use of the 
temporary component for a five year and fourteen year horizon. The only 
differences from Figure 5.6a are that both the temporary and permanent shocks 
generate a smaller GDP response (0.25% on average rather than 0.35%) and this 
reflects slightly higher inflation rates.
These conclusions from the LPL model suggest that a government 
expenditure increase will only have a substantial impact on the real economy if it is 
perceived to be temporary, as in the case of a  pre-election boom. Such examples 
occur in practice with the stop-go policies historically associated with general 
elections in the U.K.. Governments typically relax fiscal and/or monetary policy in 
the period immediately before a general election. If such a relaxation was thought 
to be a pre-election boom, then the LPL model predicts tha t it would work: a 
higher rate of growth, lower unemployment and some inflationary increase for the 
duration. If it was thought to have been a permanent change in policy then there 
would be no boom. The conclusion from the LPL model is tha t for a pre-election 
boom to work, agents must know that it will be reversed post-election.
In conclusion we do find some differences between temporary and 
permanent shocks. In the quarterly models the temporary shocks tend to have 
weaker output and price level effects than their permanent counterparts, but the 
differences for the various shocks are not tha t great. In contrast the LPL model 
generates larger output effects for an unsustained shock. Here the higher price 
effects generated by a sustained shock adversely affect output. All the models 
suggest that an unsustained money financed expansion of spending merely raises the 
price level, but a sustained increase generates a  higher inflation rate.
5.5 Stflchartic emulation
As discussed in Chapter 2, stochastic simulation generates an empirical 
distribution of solutions for the endogenous variables whereas deterministic
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simulation generates only point estimates. The empirical distribution is used for 
two main purposes. The vector of first moments estimated from the distribution 
gives unbiased estimates of the conditional expectations of the endogenous variables 
whereas the deterministic solution is a biased estimate. Higher order moments of 
the distribution are also of interest, either in their own right or in order to generate 
confidence intervals around forecasts.
In forward expectations models, the issue is complicated by the presence of 
explicit conditional expectations terms as explanatory variables and by the effect of 
alternative information assumptions in constructing values for these variables. If 
the information set includes the stochastic properties of the model then, for full 
rationality, every deterministic simulation should not have model consistent 
expectations but rather expectations which are unbiased estimates of the conditional 
expectation.
Stochastic simulation methods can be derived directly from the discussion 
in Section 5.1 of a series of independent, unanticipated shocks. Consider a vector of 
random disturbances, v^, t= l,...,T , each of which enters the information set in an 
unanticipated fashion, i.e. vg becomes known either at the end of period s or at the 
end of period s—1. We assume therefore that either agents can recognize such 
shocks instantly or with a one-period lag. The appropriate solution method is then 
the dynamic solution mode for a series of independent shocks. As each element of v 
enters the information set, a new solution must be formed, beginning in period s and 
given lagged values generated by the solution to the previous time period. This 
solution must then solve for enough periods to correctly generate the expectations
yg+11«_i- A stochastic simulation follows by drawing a large number of
pseudo—random disturbances and re-solving the model dynamically for each draw.
There remains the distinction between whether vg is anticipated at the end 
of period s—l or known only at the end of period s. If the latter assumption is made, 
two solutions are required for each random shock, first with vg=0 to  obtain 
ys + l |s - l  an<* 8econ<* P ven this expected value and vg. This substantially increases 
the cost and complexity of a  dynamic stochastic simulation.
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Each simulation is a dynamic solution in which agents are revising 
expectations as each piece of information becomes known. Hence the v^, t= l,...,s—1, 
are treated as known in period s and each solution for yg is given lagged solution 
values for y^, t= l,...,s—1. If we repeat this exercise for R pseudo—random draws of
vt , t= l .... T—i  (retaining l  unshocked periods to satisfy the stability conditions) we
can obtain a distribution of solutions for yt , t = l r ..,T—t  Each observation of this 
distribution can be interpreted as a possible alternative out-tu rn  of the economy 
and its moments can be interpreted as the mean out-turn, standard deviation of the 
out-turn, etc.
In order to generate the vector of pseudo—random disturbances, we need to 
consider carefully the calculation and distribution of the realized structural 
disturbances. Whichever of the methods discussed in Chapter 2 that are used to 
generate pseudo-random disturbances, one needs to form estimates of the realized 
disturbances over some historical period. In the parametric methods (i.e. all other 
than the Mariano and Brown approach) we assume that the realized disturbances 
are generated from a normal distribution. The estimates of the disturbances are the 
single-equation residuals from the structural equations and are therefore dependent 
on the unobserved historical values of expectations variables. Since these values are 
unknown, we must consider ways of approximating the expectations in a single 
equation context such that the structural residuals, and hence our pseudo—random 
draws, have the desired distribution. We propose to use the actual historical 
outcome as a proxy for the expectation (i.e. a perfect foresight assumption) and 
briefly consider the resulting distribution.
Under a rational expectations assumption, agents’ expectations should be 
unbiased estimates of the actual outcome with no deterministic error component: 
such an error could be exploited systematically to improve the forecast. Hence the 
residuals generated by assuming perfect foresight should have zero mean error. 
That they also have the correct variance is less obvious since the residuals generated 
in this way incorporate the error in the expectation. For example, taking equation 
(5.1) and treating u( as a random disturbance term we have:
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yt ~  “ yt + l l t - l  +  Tt ’ v , '  N(0. (5.6»)
yt + i | t - i  =  yt + i +  V <, - N(0, <^) (5.6b)
yt =  o y t + l  +  wf w , =  t,  + a (5.6c)
if E(vt et ) =  0, then
Wt  - N(0. + a V ) (5.6d)
If (5.6b) is a correct representation of expectations formation, then equation (5.6d) 
gives the correct variance when the model is solved for consistent expectations. 
This follows since the consistent expectation terms in model solution are generated 
by identities which set 11—l =yt-*-l ne8lectin8 the error term implied by 
equation (5.6b). Generating residuals using a perfect foresight assumption 
compensates for this omission by combining both error terms in the input 
disturbances. If an explicit expectations mechanism, and hence expectations values 
were available then the two disturbances would be separately identified each with 
its own variance, and the error in the expectations formation equation would be 
entered separately.
The model’s equations are often estimated using McCallum’s (1976) 
instrumental variable/2 stage least squares (IV/2SLS) approach in which the 
expectation is approximated by the historical outcome and then instrumented. The 
residuals from any 2SLS regression have a normal distribution only when the actual 
explanatory variable values are substituted back into the final regression. In our 
case the variables being instrumented are the forward expectations terms whose 
"actual" values are the one-period ahead historical values. Hence the use of a 
perfect foresight assumption in calculating single equation residuals should be 
consistent with the distributional assumptions used in estimation.
The residuals from these equations will, in general, be serially correlated 
since the disturbance v^+1 will be partly responsible for the error in the expectation 
of yt+ l  1,e* vt + l  1111(1 *t u e  correl*ted- In extension of the McCallum 
procedure, Wickens (1982, p64) claims that the residuals are not serially correlated
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but this follows only as a result of particular informational assumptions. If serial 
correlation is found to be present, it can be included in the pseudo-random 
disturbances for dynamic simulation by an amended form of the McCarthy (1972) 
procedure given by Schink (1971).
Other proposed methods o f stochastic simulation.
Two other methods of stochastic simulation for forward-expectations 
models have been suggested in the literature; by Hall and Henry (1985a,b) and Fair 
(1984, pp383—384). The Fair method is only a suggestion and does not appear to 
have ever been applied. This scheme involves the following steps.
(i) Given draws of u^, t= l,...,T —i, r= l,...,R , solve the model R times for consistent 
expectations, each solution being given the values of v* over the entire horizon.
(ii) Average the solutions for yt , t= l,...,T —l  and use these to  construct the 
expectation terms.
(iii) Subject the model to another stochastic simulation holding expectations fixed 
at the values calculated at step (ii). This final solution is calculated one period at a 
time, presumably with either average or actual values for the lags — this is not made 
clear by Fair.
The properties of this method do not appear to have been fully analysed. It 
can only be applied for a static stochastic simulation because step (iii) is for one 
period only — it cannot be extended to the dynamic case because expectations are 
held fixed at their average value and cannot respond to the random shocks. Once a 
shock has been observed and yt has changed, we would expect yt+ 2 | t  t0 chan8e- 
Fair confirms the static nature of his method when he explicitly states that the final 
solution only requires random draws for the period of interest. Furthermore, it is 
not clear why the average expectations Rom the first stochastic simulation are 
rational. Each solution is constructed as if each vg is fully anticipated in period 
zero. This seems to be an arbitrary and extreme assumption.
Hall and Henry explicitly refer to  their use of stochastic simulation as a 
method of obtaining "rational" rather than consistent expectations. By this they
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explain that they mean unbiased estimates i.e. which correct for the bias arising 
from the deterministic simulation of a nonlinear model. They thus attem pt to 
differentiate between their approach and that for obtaining the full distribution for 
the endogenous variables in a forward-consistent-expectations model. There seem 
to be no justifiable grounds for such a distinction. The unbiased expectation that 
they seek is an unbiased estimate of the mathematical conditional expectation of the 
endogenous variables. Such an estimate is provided by estimating the first moment 
from a sample of possible out-turns of the economy. Our stochastic simulation 
procedure outlined above automatically provides "unbiased" expectations 
conditional on the model and the exogenous variable values.
The algorithm used by Hall and Henry is not actually described in either of 
their 1985 papers nor their 1987 survey of their work. The precise details of the 
algorithm reported here are based on a verbal description provided by Stephen Hall. 
The method is distinct from our preferred technique and that of Fair; it proceeds as 
follows:
(i) Solve the model dynamically for y( , t= l,...,T  given v^=0 under consistent 
expectations for (y j+ i | t _ i )  fro™ the solution.
(ii) Holding the expectations fixed, solve for y*, t= l,...,T , r= l,...,R  using R 
successive drawings of pseudo-random disturbances vt , t= l,...,T -£
(iii) Estimate the average values yt and obtain ( y t+ i |t_ i - y t+ i)  M 111 estimate of 
the average error in the expectations.
(iv) Re-set y f |- l | 40(1 P®1*0” 11 another stochastic simulation; iterate until
the expectations do not change.
The convergence properties of this algorithm are not evaluated by Hall and 
Henry but it would appear that if y^ _^ _^  | ^ j  has converged to an unchanging value, 
then it must also have converged to yt+ 1 - The distribution produced by step (iv) of 
this algorithm does not constitute an estimate of the distribution of possible 
out-turns for the economy. The expectation terms are held fixed at yt+1 and hence 
the variance of yt  does not reflect any variance component due to the expectations 
terms. The algorithm thus implicitly assumes that all shocks remain unanticipated
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even after they have occurred. We can make a variety of assumptions about when a 
disturbance becomes known, but to assume that it remains unknown after it has 
affected yt  seems to be an extreme assumption. In practice, once a shock has 
occurred, even if previously unanticipated, expectations of all future periods will be 
revised. At period t=0, agents know that they will revise their expectations in the 
future as shocks unfold. If our stochastic simulation does not reflect this then it 
cannot generate a true estimate of the distribution of the endogenous variables. 
Hence the Hall and Henry method makes an arbitrary assumption at the other 
extreme to tha t of Fair.
In Fisher, Wallis and Whitley (1985, hereafter FWW) we considered the 
effects of differing assumptions concerning the financing rules for implied PSBR 
changes. In the experiments reported in Sections 5.2 and 5.4 we assume that such 
changes are financed by the endogenous movements of the money stock (exogenous 
changes in the LPL model only). The models are not generally set up in such a way 
that bond financing assumptions can be automatically applied. In all three models, 
bond financing is imposed by holding the money stock fixed. This can be achieved 
by varying bond stocks in the LBS model, nominal interest rates in the NIESR 
model and by not changing the money stock in the LPL model. The two possible 
variations are more properly described as an endogenous money stock or money 
targeting but we retain the labels and money and bond financing respectively.
FWW report two types of simulations to show the effect of the alternative 
assumptions. The first method used is simply deterministic simulation over a fixed 
time horizon to examine the different dynamic trajectories of output and the price 
level. The theoretical literature on this topic is founded on the work of Christ 
(1968) and Blinder and Solow (1973). More recently, Whittaker et aL (1986) used a 
theoretical model with a range of plausible parameter values and conclude that fixed
money stock rules are less stable than fixed bond stock rules.
In general, FWW find some empirical support for the results of Whittaker
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et aL. The results from dynamic simulations are, however, somewhat inconclusive 
due to the difficulties of extracting long-run properties from large-scale nonlinear 
models (for one possible resolution of this problem see Deleau et aL, 1989). 
Whittaker et aL also find that alternative expectations formation mechanisms do 
not affect their conclusions but this issue could not be addressed on the model 
vintages used by FWW.
The second method used by FWW is to undertake stochastic simulations 
under the alternative financing rules so as to examine the changes in the 
distributions of output and prices. Thus one can examine the variance of the 
endogenous variables as well as their dynamic variability. The theoretical literature 
(Currie, (1976, 1978); Rau, (1985)) again suggests that using money rather than 
bonds to accommodate PSBR changes leads to greater stability — in this case a 
lower variance of output.
The models used by FWW in the stochastic simulations are the LBS and 
NIESR models before the introduction of forward expectations. In this section we 
therefore extend their results using the next generation of those models, including 
forward expectations. Not only does this allow us to evaluate the issue of 
alternative financing rules but also the effects of introducing forward expectations.
In Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 we give results of stochastic simulation 
experiments consistent with those of FWW but with solution of the models under 
consistent expectations, as outlined above in Section 5.5. We assume that the 
shocks are anticipated at the beginning of the period in which they are introduced. 
We include the LPL model as well as the NIESR and LBS models in these 
experiments.
In order to generate the pseudo—random draws we use the McCarthy (1972) 
procedure and thus make an assumption that they have the same variance- 
covariance matrix as the model’s single-equation errors and that they are normally 
distributed. The LPL model coefficients are mostly calibrated for forecasting rather 
than being freely estimated and the observed single equation residuals may not 
possess the properties of a normal distribution We could resort to non—parametric
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methods such as those of Mariano and Brown (1984) but those methods require a 
reasonable sample size to work with and we are limited to eight available on this 
model (a small sample size will also adversely affect the properties of the residuals 
generated by the McCarthy method). In all three models we restrict attention to a 
single period stochastic simulation. The 250 replications used then require 250 
dynamic simulations equivalent to 250 consistent expectations solutions — this is 
already a substantially greater cost than a dynamic stochastic simulation on a 
conventional model. The extension to the dynamic case is not only more costly but 
unlikely to be fruitful in this context since the dynamic solutions to  the models are 
not very robust dynamically under a bond financing assumption — which provides 
further support for the possible dynamic instability under fixed nominal money 
stock rules.
The random number generator used here is not truncated and will therefore 
occasionally draw observations in the extreme tail of the normal distribution for 
which the nonlinear models cannot solve (e.g. if it means unemployment becoming 
negative). The scale of the input shocks for the quarterly models is thus reduced to 
minimize the chances of extreme draws and thereby to ensure tha t the distribution 
does not have significantly truncated tails. This is especially im portant given that 
we are interested primarily in the second moment rather than the first. We then 
consider only the relative magnitude of the degree of variability and not the 
absolute magnitudes (see notes to tables for further information on the experimental 
design). (i)
(i) NIESR model
Taking the NIESR results presented in Table 5.1, we show appropriately 
scaled results from FWW in brackets alongside the results for the forward 
expectations models. We see that under bond finance the standard deviation of 
GDP rises significantly compared with money finance. In this model, a fixed money 
stock is dynamically unstable under forward consistent expectations and so the 
money stock has only been fixed in the first period of the eight quarter solution
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TABLE 5.1: Stochastic simulation of the NIESR model4
Standard deviations
Experiment1 12 GDP3 45 Price level3
Money finance 59 (5») 0.234 (0.17)
o
Bond finance 75 (73.5) 0.226 (0.20)
Notes
1
Solution period is eight quarters, 1985(3)-1987(2); stochastic shocks applied to 
first quarter only (hence these are one-step-ahead results!; 250 replications using 
McCarthy technique, no antithetic variates. The standard error of the standard 
deviation is (approximately) o/J2n.
2 Bond finance assumption is maintained only in the first quarter using the 
exogenous nominal interest rate to target £M^.
3 Input disturbances are scaled down to one tenth of historical disturbances in 
order to prevent numerical failures and thus to avoid truncating the input 
distribution. Output units are £m and index pts for GDP and the price level 
respectively but should then be re-scaled by a factor of 10.
4 NIESR model is version 8, Autumn 1985.
5 Figures in brackets are scaled down values calculated from the results of Fisher, 
Wallis and Whitley (1986) for an earlier non-forward-expectations version of the 
model.
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horizon. The instability reflects weak interest rate effects on the money stock, 
strong interest effects elsewhere (especially on the exchange rate which gives the 
most important forward looking channel) and weak money influences on the model. 
To evaluate the significance of the increase in the standard deviation we calculate 
its standard error which is approximately < x //E  or in this case 74/^Ufl «  3. Hence 
the difference of 15 represents approximately 5 standard errors. In contrast, the 
standard deviation of the price level has fallen but not significantly.
These results give similar conclusions to those of FWW on the earlier, 
backward—looking version of the NIESR model (Model 7 as opposed to Model 8). 
The main change in the results is that the variability of the price level declines 
under bond finance when expectations are consistent whereas under the earlier 
treatment, it increased. In fact the variability of the price level under bond finance 
has not greatly changed and the result rather reflects an increase in variability 
under money finance. Output (GDP) has an increase in variability under bond 
finance, compared with money finance, which is almost identical on the two model 
vintages. This increase in variability is much more marked if real interest rates are 
used as an instrument to target the money stock, as opposed to nominal interest 
rates. In principle, there are many different policy assumptions which could be 
evaluated using this approach. Obviously the results reflect not only the 
introduction of equations with forward-consistent expectations terms, but also the 
changes in other equations between the two versions of the model, which means that 
the comparison should be treated with some degree of caution.
(ii) LBS model
Results for the LBS model are shown in Table 5.2. In this model the 
incorporation of forward expectations has greatly increased the model’s sensitivity 
to shocks (see Wallis et al, 1985, 1986) and this is reflected in an increase in 
variability of more than double for GDP compared with FWW. Again, the main 
qualitative difference is that price level variability under bond finance is now about 
three standard errors less than under money finance whereas previously rough parity
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TABLE 5.2: Stochastic simulation o f the LBS model**
Standard deviations3
Experiment* 1 234 GDP3 Price level3
Money finance 126 (40) 0.101 (0.078)
2
Bond finance 132 (81) 0.087 (0.078)
Notes
1
Solution period is eight quarters, 1986(1)-1987(4); stochastic shocks applied to 
first quarter only (hence these are one-step-ahead results!; 250 replications using 
McCarthy technique, no antithetic variates. The standard error of the standard 
deviation is (approximately) a / ^ n .
2 Bond finance assumption is maintained over eight quarters and is applied using 
short term bill stocks to target £Mg.
3 Input disturbances are scaled down to one tenth of historical disturbances in 
order to prevent numerical failures and thus to avoid truncating the input 
distribution. Output units are £m and index points for GDP and the price level 
respectively but should then be re-scaled by a factor of 10.
4 LBS model is that used to  forecast in Autumn 1985.
3 Figures in brackets are scaled down values calculated from the results of Fisher, 
Wallis and Whitley (1986) for an earlier non-forward-expectations version of the 
model.
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was achieved. Output variability, while still larger under bond finance, is now only 
one standard error larger as opposed to more than seven in the previous vintage of 
model. Hence the incorporation of forward expectations in this model has 
substantially reduced the real effects and increased the nominal differences between 
money and bond finance.
The different reactions of the two models to the incorporation of forward 
expectations reflects the different ways in which this has been done. In the LBS 
model a fast moving real exchange rate coupled with sluggish wages and prices 
produces a very sensitive model. This vintage of the NIESR model has more 
pervasive expectations terms but the exchange rate movement is sluggish and thus 
the model is less sensitive. We generally find a greater variance of GDP under bond 
finance than under money finance; the reverse being true for the price level.
(iii) LPL model
In the LPL model the stochastic simulations under money finance involve 
changing an exogenous nominal money growth variable to hold government 
expenditure constant whereas bond finance requires nominal monetary growth to  be 
held fixed whilst there is some movement in general government expenditure as the 
output level changes. Hence the results may not be strictly comparable with the 
quarterly models which assume that general government expenditure is fixed under 
both money and bond finance. The results for the LPL model are the complete 
opposite of those for the two quarterly models. Under bond finance, the output 
variance is lower and that of the price level higher than under money finance. The 
difference between the output standard deviations is substantially less than one 
standard error and so no strong conclusions may be drawn. However, the price 
level’s standard deviations differ by about two standard errors.
This is a strong result when one considers the model’s structure. The 
inflation equation is a function only of exogenous nominal monetary growth and 
endogenous real monetary growth. For the variance of the price level to decrease
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TABLE 5.3: Stochastic simulation of the LPL model
Standard deviations
Experiment1 GDP Price level
(£m) (index pts 80=100)
Balanced finance 6672 4.94
o
Bond finance 6459 5.55
Notes
Solution period is fourteen years, 1988—2001; stochastic shocks applied to first 
quarter only (hence these are one-step-ahead results); 250 replications using 
McCarthy technique, no antithetic variates. The standard error of the standard
deviation is (approximately) o/Jlii.
2 Bond finance assumes that government expenditure is held constant and no extra 
nominal money growth is allowed. Balanced finance assumes that government 
expenditure is held constant and the implied PSBR/GDP ratio changes to ensure 
•that this results.
3 LPL model is annual, no comparison may be drawn between Table 0.3 and 
Tables 6.1, 6.2. For this model, there is no scaling down of the variance of the input 
distribution.
4 LPL model is that used to forecast in Autumn 1987.
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when nominal monetary growth is being varied to hold government expenditure 
fixed implies strong covariance between real money demand and the "exogenous" 
variable.
These results demonstrate the substantial differences in model properties 
between the NIESR and LBS models on the one hand and the LPL model on the 
other. The application of stochastic simulation has allowed us to compare the 
model properties for higher order moments and not just the deterministic 
simulations. These reveal the lower variance of output under bond finance on the 
LPL model, even though real debt interest rapidly accumulates in line with the 
dynamically unstable case of Blinder and Solow (1973).
5.7 S n m m a ry
Stochastic simulation is a feasible computational option on conventional 
models (see the large literature surveys in Fisher and Salmon, 1986; reproduced and 
extended in Hall and Henry, 1987, pp248—249). The correct procedure for a forward 
expectations model is many times more expensive. To date it has only proved 
practical for a one—period—ahead forecast. However, for the smaller LPL model at 
least, it should be possible to extend to the dynamic case. Future improvements in 
computing speed could also make it practical for larger models.
The main interest in stochastic simulation is likely to arise for issues 
concerning the higher-order moments of the distribution, especially the variance. 
The example considered in Section 5.6 concerning alternative financing rules yields 
some useful results which appear to be consistent for the quarterly models. We find 
that bond financed changes in the PSBR due to stochastic shocks yield a higher 
variance for output and a lower variance for the price level than when such PSBR 
changes are financed by changes in the money stock. These results appear to be 
consistent with the theoretical literature.
We can also use estimates of higher-order moments to help assess the 
introduction of forward expectations into the quarterly models. The main
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differences compared with the results of Fisher, Wallis and Whitley (1985) on an 
earlier vintage of model, is seen to be a more significant reduction in the price level 
variance under bond finance. The LBS model has also been made more sensitive 
generally. These results for the variance are consistent with the findings of 
Whittaker et al. (1986) that the expectations formation mechanism does not affect 
the results of their model when investigating dynamic stability.
The opposite ranking of variances for the LPL model under alternative 
financing rules is a reminder that such exercises primarily reveal useful information 
about the model’s (stochastic) structure and only tell us about the real economy if 
the model is a good approximation to it.
Chapter 6
ALTERNATIVE MODEL FORMS AND SOLUTION MODES: 
HISTORICAL TRACKING
The aim of this chapter is threefold. First we draw out the links between 
different model forms (as laid out by Salmon and Wallis, 1982) and the alternative 
types of solution for macroeconomic models such as single-equation calculations, 
static and dynamic simulation. We then develop analogous model forms for rational 
expectations models and  their corresponding solutions. In particular we propose 
single-equation and static simulation procedures for which particular attention 
must be paid to treating  the expectations terms as estimates of agent’s actual 
(aggregate) rational expectations. Finally, we present a study of the historical 
tracking performance o f models of the United Kingdom economy which requires the 
use of single-equation, static and dynamic solution methods.
6.1 Conventional models
In a conventional dynamic econometric model there are a number of identical 
representations of the  same system. Consider the structural form of the general 
dynamic linear model defined as in (4.1) above,
B(L)yt +  C fL )^  =  ut . (6.1)
Usually the model w ill be normalized so that BQ has unit elements on the main 
diagonal. If Bq=I, th e  equations have no instantaneous coupling and each element 
of yt  can immediately be expressed as a function of predetermined variables only.
In the general case BQ#I and to express y{ as a function of predetermined 
variables we use the following reduced form (if Bq is nonsingular):
( 6 .2 )
y t  -  +  -  +  V t - p  +  ° ( LK ]  +  B o V
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An alternative form of the model is given by expressing yt  as a  function of 
exogenous variables and disturbance terms only; multiplying through by the inverse 
of B(L) rather than Bq (under appropriate conditions on B(L), see Chapter 4).
jr, =  —B(L)-1 C(L)it +  B ( L ) - \  (0.3)
This is referred to by Salmon and Wallis (1982) as the final form. Now, a loose 
correspondence can be drawn between (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3), and the solution modes 
of an econometric model as follows.
Single-equation "solutions" to a simultaneous model depend on a particular 
normalization of the system. Each structural equation has a nominated dependent 
variable for which the single-equation solution is calculated. The calculation is 
performed holding all explanatory variables a t observed historical values whilst 
setting the residual terms to zero. In a linear system estimated by OLS, the single 
equation solution calculated over the estimation sample corresponds to  the fitted 
values of the regression (assuming the same normalization is used as in estimation). 
We can re-express the structural form (6.1) as
jr, -  (I -  B(L))yt -  C(L)x, +  u,. (8.4)
Each equation of system (6.4) can then be w ritten as:
*it -  J i f  ^  V L)J jt "  ¿ j ,  Cik<L> x k t +  v  <6 5>
i -  1 ,... ,n.
where B.j(L), CJk(L) are scalar polynomials in  the lag operator formed from 
elements (i,j) and (i,k) respectively of the m atrix  polynomials B(L) and C(L). If 
B-j(O) is unity, as is conventional, the first term  on the right-hand side cancels out
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with —Bjj(0)yj. in the second term. When ut is set to sero, the solution to  equation 
(6.5) is then the single equation solution which we denote y ^ . The most useful 
products of this calculation however, are the single—equation residuals ut =y^—y®e. 
We may think of y*e as being consistent with the (unsolved) structural form (6.1) 
and the single equation regression model.
The single equation solution to a simultaneous model is a useful tool in 
modelling work. For example, it provides a useful diagnostic check tha t an equation 
has been coded properly. Over an out-of-sample historical period, the 
single-equation residuals can be used to indicate when an equation has broken 
down. In stochastic simulation, single-equation residuals are used to provide an 
estimate of the estimation residuals and their variance—covariance m atrix  for the 
various techniques discussed in Section 2.3. The most frequent use of these 
residuals, however, is to  provide residual adjustments in counter-factual solutions 
(Artis, 1984). In such analysis one requires a base run which coincides with the 
historical record. A single equation calculation is therefore made across all 
equations to estimate the entire vector ut - We demonstrate below that when these 
residual values are then used as adjustments to the solution, the model will 
reproduce the historical record. Finally, a single-equation solution can be used 
when a coefficient or equation (or sub-sector) of a model is altered (e.g. a policy 
rule is changed). A single-equation calculation, using as input a base solution to 
the original model, will determine the adjustments needed to leave the solution for 
the model unchanged when the new equation(s) is introduced. The new model 
properties can then be assessed around the original base: an important requirement 
for nonlinear systems which are state dependent.
A static solution to the model (6.1) is generated by setting all pre—determined 
variables, i.e. exogenous and lagged endogenous variables, to their actual values and 
solving only for current endogenous terms. The model can be re-expressed as:
V t  ■  -  +  -  +  V t - p l  -  C(LK  + (8.6)
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With u( set to  zero, solving equation (6.6) for a particular value of t  produces the 
static solution which we will denote y*\ This solution can be thought of as 
corresponding to the reduced form (6.2). If the disturbance terms ut are set to  their 
observed values, rather than zero, then solving equation (6.6) will obviously 
reproduce the historical values for yt as required in the counter—factual case.
The static solution mode is rather infrequently used in large-scale modelling. 
However, Fisher and Wallis (1988) argue that static solution is the most appropriate 
mode for historical tracking exercises which are designed to evaluate a model’s 
performance in explaining the past. The arguments supporting this point of view 
are presented in Section 6.3.
A dynamic solution to the model (6.1) is generated over a period t= l,...,T  by 
allowing the solution values from one period to feed through to the following 
periods. Hence only the exogenous variables are fixed at their observed values. The 
model can be re-expressed as:
B(L)yt =  -C(L)xt +  ut> (6.7)
t * l .......T.
Solving equation (6.7) with the disturbance terms set to zero produces a full 
dynamic solution denoted y^, t= l,...,T . This is performed recursively after setting 
initial values for yg>—»yi_p- It is equivalent to solving a repeated version of (6.6)
for t = l .....T, where lagged values are set to solution values from y^_j,...,y^_p.
This solution is analogous to  a finite—time solution to the final form although it 
may also be termed the dynamic reduced form. Unlike the single-equation or static 
modes, dynamic solution requires no historical data for the endogenous variables 
over the solution horizon (only the initial conditions and exogenous variables are 
needed). Hence, by forecasting the exogenous variables, dynamic solution is used to 
provide a genuine ex ante forecast. In this case the disturbance terms may be set to 
non-zero values or to known future disturbances. If a dynamic solution is 
conducted over an historical period and the residuals set to their single-equation
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values then, as noted previously, equation (6.7) will re-produce the historical values
The correspondence of dynamic solution to the final form is not exact because
The dynamic solution is thus perhaps more consistent with the final equations in
which B(L) 1 in (6.3) is written as b (L )/|B (L )|, where b(L) is the adjoint matrix 
and |B (L)| the determinantal polynomial, hence
Dynamic solution is the standard operating mode for ex ante forecasting and policy 
analysis, counterfactual or otherwise.
There is one further solution of potential interest. The dynamic single- 
equation calculation is generated by taking individual structural equations such as 
equation (6.5) and solving them in a dynamic mode for the dependent variable. The 
model equations can be expressed as:
The solution to equation (6.9) for y-t , t= l,...,T  is the dynamic single equation
system representations but may be thought of as the final form for each equation 
treated as an independent model (i.e. treating all other endogenous variables as 
exogenous).
The dynamic single-equation solution is rarely used in modelling work other 
than to describe the properties of individual equations. Of particular interest may 
be the long-run solution for y^8 when the equation is subjected to  a shock.
From this analysis we have drawn a correspondence between conventional
the term B(L) 1 in equation (6.3) implies an infinite distributed lag on x( and u .^
|B (L )|y t =  -b(L)C(L)xt + b(L)ut . (6.8)
Bu<L)yit =  - j J B i jM J 'j t  -  c >(L>xt +  “i f (8.9)
t -  1....... T.
solution which we denote y^8. This solution does not correspond with any of the
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models (single equation; static; dynamic) and the models’ alternative 
representations (structural form; reduced form; final form). For a linear system the 
algebraic forms given above can be used to deliver the different representations and 
hence the different solutions directly. When generalizing to nonlinear systems we 
cannot express the model in such convenient "closed" form expression. However, we 
can define the structural form, reduced form and final form as follows:
h - i ..... ¡ w  xf  xt - l ......xt—q' * )  =  V (•■W)
y, -  8(y ,_ i. - J ,_ p .» t . ^ _ i ..... x, ( i l l )
y , =  h (xt , x ,_ j.....u,; ♦ ), (9.12.)
.....^ l - p ' XC V l -  xt—q* ut ' *)• (6.12b)
where ♦  is a vector of parameters; f, g, h, h are vectors of nonlinear functions; 
y0» "*3rl—p u e  the P initial conditions required to generate an exact solution (6.12b) 
to the final form (6.12a). The model is usually constructed in the form of (6.10). 
The functional forms of equations (5.11, 5.12a,b) are not normally known and hence 
these solutions are generated numerically by the procedures described in Chapter 3. 
The correspondence to model solution modes then carries through to the numerical 
solutions generated by (6.10), (6.11) and (6.12b). Note that the stability and 
existence conditions can no longer be derived by linear matrix algebra and we 
usually assume that (6.11) and (6.12b) exist, and examine stability ex post by 
numerical methods.
6.2 Forward expectation models
Consider the following linear model with forward expectations:
B(L)yt  +  C(L)x, +  A(F)yl+ 1 | , _ j  -  u,, (9.1S)
where the terms are defined as before and, in particular, the forward operator F acts 
a« Fyt + s | t - l =yt + s + l | t - r  We then Proceed t0 establish the corresponding model
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forms and solution modes. In order to establish these for ms/modes we must 
remember that the forward expectations terms are generally unobserved variables 
representing the conditional expectations of economic agents. Different assumptions 
with respect to the content of the information set l will yield different solutions 
to  the model.
The structural form of the model is given by equation (6.13). The 
corresponding single-equation solution is generated by taking an individual 
equation from (6.13) such as:
Where, as before, the first term on the right-hand side of (6.14) (y-t ) will usually 
cancel with By(0)y-t in the second term. Single equation calculations can only be 
performed ex post since we require knowledge of the exogenous variables and 
current-dated endogenous variables on the right-hand side of equation (6.14). The 
residuals and dependent variables are estimated by solving equation (6.14) for 
yt =y®e and hence ut «y^—y|®. However, in order to solve equation (6.14) we first 
need to determine values for the unobserved expectations yjt+ g | t_ j-  Given the use 
of a rational expectations assumption in estimation, and since most estimators 
proceed by using actual forward values subject to instrumental variables (e.g. 
McCallum, 1976a) one option is to replace the expectations with the actual forward 
values. This was our proposed method for stochastic simulation in Chapter 5. This 
perfect foresight assumption will also be appropriate when single equation residuals 
are required to fix a dynamic or static solution to a base run or the historical record. 
A simple one lead, one lag model gives:
n m n
yit -  yit -  £ ,  C‘k(L'  Xkt _  j= i  V P)T* + 1|*-1
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yt _  Blyt—1 +  Ayl+l|t +  Cxt +  et’ 
yt+ l| t - l  “  yt+ l  +  't  W h en ce
7 i  =  BlJ,t - l  +  Ayt+1 +  Cxt +  et +  A t f  ( 6 1 5 )
Hence the single-equation residual contains the disturbance term of the behavioural 
equation and the error in the expectation.
In the single-equation context we do not wish to use the full model to deliver 
the expectations since the single-equation residuals for each equation should not 
reflect the (mis—Specification of other equations in the system. Perfect foresight is 
consistent with the rational expectations assumptions without invoking the full 
model structure. However, there are other possible assumptions we could make 
concerning the expectations terms. Dropping rational expectations, we could 
substitute in explicit time series rules (or adaptive expectations rules) as in Frenkel, 
Goldstein and Masson (1988, appendix).
The reduced form of the model can be derived for the equivalent 
representation to equation (6.6) by inverting BQ in (6.13) to  give:
r t  -  - Bo1[Biy« - i  +  - + V t - p  +  c(L)xt +  A(F)),t + i | t - i 1 +  Bo1“f
(6.16)
The corresponding static solution mode is given by solving:
V t  = - i V t - i  +•■•+ V t - p  +  ° ( L)xt + A(F)y t + i |t - i i  +  ut*
(6.17)
for yt=yjte with the disturbances ut set to *ero. The reduced form residuals can 
then be estimated as :yjte)- Since the static solution mode requires
knowledge of lagged endogenous variables it is valid only over an historical solution 
base. As before we need to define the unobserved expectations terms
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A(F )yt+ i | t_ r  In  the full model context the rational expectation is that provided 
by the model’s own forecast yt+ 1 , t= l,...,T . This must be obtained by a dynamic 
consistent expectations solution to  the model to which we now turn.
The final form of the model is given by re—writing equation (6.13):
[B(L) +  A(F)]jrt  =  -C (L )i, +  u, («18»)
Jt  -  —(B(L) +  A(F)]—’c(L )x , +  (B(L) +  AfF)]” 1«, (8.18b)
where [B(L)+D(F)]—1 will give an infinite distributed lag and lead on xt and u^ .
The dynamic solution implied by this model form now makes the consistent
expectations assumption yt_j_811_l = y t-l-s' 14 is obtained by solving equation (6.18a)
for yt =yje subject to initial values for yQ ,..,yi_p and terminal values for 
y,p+1.....yx+ k  48 discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
In dynamic consistent expectations simulation of a rational expectations 
model, the disturbance terms are set to their expectation of zero or to known values 
and the exogenous variables are similarly taken as given or projected either by time 
series models or judgmental forecasts. These assumptions are appropriate for ex 
ante forecasting or policy analysis in which policy changes are announced in 
advance. In Chapter 5 we showed how the dynamic solution can be extended to 
take account of anticipated and unanticipated shocks, temporary or permanent 
shocks and stochastic simulation.
The static simulation mode can then be derived in a similar fashion to the 
stochastic simulation procedure as a series of dynamic simulations, starting in 
successive periods to  generate the expectations terms used as explanatory variables 
in each period of interest. Thus there are at least as many dynamic simulations 
required as there are time periods in the static simulation horizon. The first period 
of each dynamic simulation yields one observation of the static simulation. The 
differences from stochastic simulation are: firstly, that the series of shocks are the 
realized values of the  exogenous variables becoming known; secondly that all initial 
conditions are taken from the historical record rather than from lagged solution
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values; third and finally, there is only one sequence of shocks.
As in Chapter 5, we can make alternative assumptions about the information 
set with respect to the exogenous variables. For example, we could assume that x( 
is anticipated at the end of period t—1 whereas *t+g, »>0 remains unanticipated. In 
this case we forecast values for *t+g, s = l , . . .T - t  and the dynamic solution which 
then produces yt+ j | t_x will simultaneously yield the static simulation from its first 
period. Similarly, we can assume that x^+ ^ is anticipated at the end of period t—1, 
forecast values for xt+ jj+gi s>0 as required, and then solve simultaneously for 
yt + l | t_ l  and y*te. A more complicated alternative is to  make the fully 
unanticipated assumption of Chapter 5. In  this case, xt only becomes anticipated at 
the end of period t  but yt still depends on the ex post realized value of xt . We then 
need two solutions for each period of the static simulation. First we forecast xg, 
s=t,...,T  and solve for the expectations u8in8 a dynamic simulation.
Holding expectations fixed at these values, we then set equal to its historical 
value and re-solve for y®te. The choice of which assumption is most appropriate 
will depend on what information assumptions were made in estimation.
Finally, we can use differing assumptions concerning the agent's expectations 
which are not based on the models’ own forecasts. There are two obvious 
possibilities: perfect foresight or adaptive expectations. In a perfect foresight 
assumption we can replace agent’s expectations with the actual value as in the 
single equation case. This might be a useful extreme and simplifying assumption -  
it is certainly computationally more convenient since it requires only a standard 
static simulation as for a backward-looking model. In an adaptive expectations 
mode, we could replace the expectations with extrapolative models as suggested by 
Frenkel et aL (1988). If agents are actually using rational expectations formed on 
the basis of the model, neither of these assumptions will yield a tracking fit as good 
as when using model generated expectations.
6.3 Birtorical tricking
In order to assess the adequacy and validity of large-scale economic models, it
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has long been the practice to compare the solutions of such models with the 
historical data record. This rest of this chapter presents such a "historical tracking" 
exercise, which compares the performance of six current models of the UK economy 
over the period 1978-85. This period began with a severe recession th a t a t  the time 
was forecast with limited success (Barker, 1985), so it is of interest to  ask how well 
models revised in the light of that experience now perform overall. Also, given the 
interest in evaluating the economic consequences of the Thatcher regime, to quote 
Buiter and Miller’s (1983) title, we consider whether the models’ historical tracking 
record provides an adequate baseline for counterfactual policy analysis exercises. 
The models examined in this exercise are the quarterly models of th e  Bank of 
England (BE), Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT), the National Institute o f Economic 
and Social Research (NIESR), and the London Business School (LBS); and the 
annual models of the Liverpool University Research Group in Macroeconomics 
(LPL) and the City University Business School (CUBS). The versions of each 
model are those deposited with the ESRC Macroeconomic Modelling Bureau in the 
autumn of 1987. Their properties are reported in Fisher et aL (1988) and  references 
therein.
Our general approach is to compute for each period the "static" solution for 
the endogenous variables of the model, with all lagged variables and  current 
exogenous variables taking their known values and with no other adjustments or 
interventions to the model. These solutions are then compared w ith  the actual 
outcomes. This form of solution represents a one-step-ahead ex post forecast from 
the model; it corresponds to the "hands-off ex post forecast" calculated as a means 
of decomposing the error of published ex ante forecasts in the B ureau’s forecast 
assessments (Wallis et al.} 1986, Ch.4; 1987, Ch.4). Attention is not restricted to 
the use of the model in a practical forecasting setting however, since th e  period over 
which a historical tracking exercise is conducted often includes part o f the sample 
period over which the model was estimated. Indeed, historical tracking performance 
over the sample period is often used as a measure of system performance during the 
model specification stage.
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This approach should be contrasted with that of dynamic simulation. As 
mentioned above, this is the standard mode of operating an econometric model in 
forecasting and policy analysis exercises, but it is inappropriate in the present 
context, for reasons discussed below. Of the recent examples of historical exercises 
using UK models, Britton and W hittaker (1982, HMT model), Brooks and Henry 
(1983, NIESR), Holly and Longbottom (1982, LBS), Dunn et aL (1984, BE) and 
Beenstock et aL (1986, CUBS) all concentrate on the dynamic simulation approach, 
and only the latter two additionally quote static simulation results.
As noted above, historical tracking also has a specific part to play in assessing 
the adequacy of a model for use in economic policy evaluation and counterfactual 
analysis, on which a substantial literature exists. The recent U.K. literature has 
followed largely from experiments by Artis and Green (1982) on the HMT model, 
although the methods can be traced back to Blinder and Goldfeld (1976) and earlier 
to  Godley and Hopkin (1965). Other recent examples have used a variety of models 
and include Artis et aL (1984, HMT and NIESR models), Saville and Gardiner 
(1986, NIESR), Matthews and Minford (1987, LPL) and Mackie et aL (1989, BE). 
A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the validity of such counterfactual 
exercises is that the model is an adequate approximation to the underlying economic 
process. The judgment of economic adequacy has a certain subjective element, but 
we might objectively require a satisfactory statistical approximation. If a model 
cannot explain the actual systematic variation in the data then it cannot be 
expected to discriminate between the sources of that variation. However, none of 
the above dted references contain more than a cursory prior evaluation although, as 
noted, tracking exercises on these models are available elsewhere.
In the rest of this chapter we first address the methodological issues in 
historical tracking, leading to our choice of static simulation. For rational 
expectation models we use the methods described in Section 6.2. In Section 6.5 we 
then present the results of a systematic historical tracking exercise on each of the 
models over the period 1978-85, assessing the historical record model by model. In 
Section 6.6 we undertake cross—model comparisons, using Theil inequality
174
coefficients and forecast encompassing tests. Finally, in Section 6.7 we evaluate the 
use of the models for counterfactual exercises and suggest some adjustments.
Consider a simplified structural form of a standard dynamic linear model given 
by equation (2.2)
V t  +  V t - i  +  c *t =  ut> <619)
As noted in Section 6.1, the static solution of the model is based on the 
reduced form representation of (6.19), and for given initial conditions yQ and known 
values of the exogenous and lagged endogenous variables is obtained as
7 , -----(B „l  Bl3rt_ j  +  B“1 C x,). t- l , . . . ,T .  (« 20)
The resulting prediction errors vt =y^—yt are given by the reduced form disturbances
In a dynamic simulation, the solution values satisfy the recursion
V t  +  V t -1 +  Cx, =  0, t - l .  - .T , J0  -  J0 («.21)
hence the dynamic reduced form solution can be expressed as
yt  =  a V 0 - V  AIBq1 C ^  t - l .....T, (6.22)
where A =-B q1B 1- The dynamic simulation errors wt= y t~yt likewise satisfy the 
recursion
‘ =■1.T, w„ («23)
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and hence are given as
(6.24)
As is evident from this analysis, both the static and dynamic reduced form 
errors are linear combinations of the structural disturbances. There is therefore no 
extra information present in simulation errors: it is simply presented in a different 
way. Under the "classical" assumptions that the u’s are independently and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) with mean zero and constant covariance matrix E, it 
follows that vt and w( also have mean zero. However, whereas the v’s are also i.i.d. 
with constant covariance matrix (Bq*)'E Bq1, the w’s are heteroskedastic and 
serially correlated and hence difficult to interpret. In particular, sample second 
moments of the w’s should not be calculated, as their theoretical counterparts, the 
auto- and cross-covariances, are not constant but vary over the period.
The preceding discussion has not considered coefficient estimation error, and 
this serves to  complicate matters further. For a correctly specified and consistently 
estimated model, however, the above results hold in the limit. Turning to 
finite-sample considerations, Pagan (1989) shows that if the structural residuals u^  
sum to zero over the estimation period, which is true for most econometric 
estimators, then the reduced form residuals v( also sum to zero over the estimation 
period. That is, for the estimation period t= l,...,T , we have
T - . T  .
E V  = Bq1 E u =  0. 
t - 1  1 u t= l  1
(6.25)
Turning to the dynamic simulation residuals wt , equation (6.24) gives
T T  - T .
(6.26)
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so that, again summing over the estimation period, we have 
T .
(Bq +  B j) wt -  B1wt  =  0. (6.27)
Thus the mean of the dynamic simulation residuals is approximately zero, 
depending on the value of T—*w,p, and Pagan describes conditions under which
- 1  * PT wT -» 0. The general conclusion is that the property of unbiasedness is delivered 
automatically, if the estimation and simulation periods coincide. Hence
unbiasedness does not represent a useful model validation criterion, being 
independent of the misspecification or otherwise of the model.
Hendry and Richard (1982) criticize the use of dynamic simulation as a model 
selection criterion, since the accuracy of a dynamic simulation track depends on the 
extent to which the model attributes data variance to factors that it treats as being 
outside the model, irrespective of the justification for doing so. It is not enough 
simply to agree on a set of variables to be taken as exogenous for the purpose of 
cross—model comparison, as the winning model may still have little to commend it: 
the validity of the simulation should be assessed by testing these exogeneity claims. 
Nevertheless in our experiments we find that the quarterly models have a very 
similar classification of exogenous variables and similar assumptions about the 
underlying stance of policy; where potential differences exist we attempt to 
standardize. For the annual models, however, there are not only important 
differences in exogeneity and policy stance but also the difficulties of temporal 
aggregation. As a result the simulations on the LPL and CUBS models are not 
directly comparable with those on the quarterly models.
In the tracking exercises reported below we accordingly choose to  use only 
one-step-ahead ex post forecast errors, that is reduced form residuals, as a measure 
of system performance. This approach avoids the problems of interpreting dynamic 
simulation residuals discussed above. The link between the reduced form and
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structural disturbances must be borne in mind, together with the zero sample mean 
result, although other problems may limit its applicability. First, the models are 
typically estimated by single-equation techniques, and in practice the estimation 
periods of these individual equations may not coincide. Secondly, the empirical 
models of the UK economy all contain a number of imposed relationships and 
technical equations, whose residuals may not have zero mean over any period and 
may not satisfy homoskedasticity or serial independence assumptions. Thus the 
reduced form residuals may exhibit non-zero means particularly when, as below, the 
performance over a sub-sample of the historical period available is under 
consideration. Nevertheless a non—zero mean for the reduced form residuals 
indicates that the model is incompatible with the data, and hence can be interpreted 
as evidence of model failure. Such systematic effects in the reduced form residuals 
can sometimes be traced to single-equation properties, which can then be examined 
by standard econometric techniques. Errors arising from inappropriate estimation 
methods are more difficult to attribute, however. Information concerning 
covariances that have not been picked up in estimation may also emerge in the 
reduced form residuals, but this again is difficult to attribute to specific parts of the 
structure.
Finally, it must be remembered that the practical models are nonlinear in 
variables, and that in general a nonlinear model does not possess an explicit reduced 
form. The reduced form errors defined by the deterministic solution of a nonlinear 
system in general do not have zero mean, since they are nonlinear transformations of 
the structural disturbances (see, for example, Fisher and Salmon, 1986). Hence it 
may be possible to  obtain errors that are systematically non-zero simply due to 
nonlinearity, although such effects should be of second order of importance relative 
to misspedfication. Nevertheless the interpretation and analysis of summary 
statistics based on the reduced form residuals, such as mean absolute errors, 
auto-correlations, variances etc., may be undermined by the nonlinearity of the 
model, and in the first instance such quantities are used in a purely descriptive
manner.
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6.5 The historical tracking record of the models
In this section, results are presented on the static simulation errors (reduced 
form residuals) for a selection of variables across the six models. We focus on four 
key variables — unemployment (thousands), the annual rate of GDP growth (output 
measure, percentage points per annum), the annual rate of inflation (consumption 
price, percentage points per annum) and the nominal exchange rate (trade weighted 
basket; index points, 1975=100). The historical values of these variables, on a 
quarterly basis, are shown in Figure 6.1. These exhibit the well-known general 
movements over this period, including in respect of output growth the recession of 
1979-81 and the miners’ strike of 1984. In addition two particular short-term 
episodes should be noted. The jump in price inflation in 1979(3), with an 
off-setting fall in 1980(3), reflects the introduction of a higher, unified rate of VAT 
in the June 1979 budget. The sudden fall in output in 1979(1), reversed in 1979(2), 
is mainly caused by a road haulage strike which delayed exports at the beginning of 
the year.
The reported errors are calculated as yt~yt , which is conventional in the 
modelling literature, rather than as yt~yt , which is conventional in the econometric 
literature; a positive value therefore represents an over—prediction. For each case, 
the mean error, mean absolute error (MAE), standard deviation (s), root mean 
square error (RMSE), and first-order autocorrelation coefficient (p) are reported in 
Table 6.1; a descriptive account is given below, model by model.
In using historical tracking results as a model diagnostic, it is helpful to 
identify the structural equations which may be the source of particular difficulties in 
the full model solution. To assist in this we consider regressions of the reduced form 
residuals on single-equation errors, analogous to the relation v( =  B~*u( discussed 
above. In general everything depends on everything else, but we see that in a 
number of cases relatively few single-equation residuals explain a substantial 
proportion of the variance in the reduced form residuals. If the latter exhibit 
aberrant behaviour then this variance decomposition helps to locate equations of the
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TABLE 6.1: Static simulation residuals, summary statistics
X MAE s RMSE P
Unemployment
(000’s)
BE -69 76 57 90 0.79
HMT 157 169 116 195 0.76
NIESR 40 73 77 86 0.47
LBS -115 80 109 110 0.45
LPL —48 269 283 288 0.34
CUBS -190 372 392 436 0.24
Annual Price Inflation
(% points)
BE -0.13 0.55 0.71 0.73 0.31
HMT 7.20 7.20 1.30 7.34 0.54
NIESR 0.30 0.68 0.77 0.82 0.09
LBS -0.85 1.13 1.06 1.40 0.76
LPL -6.50 6.50 2.92 7.12 0.48
CUBS -0.08 1.38 1.77 1.77 0.40
Nominal exchange rate
(index pts 80=10i0)BE 1.5 5.0 6.2 6.3 0.16
HMT -3.0 4.1 4.2 5.1 0.22
NIESR -10.8 11.1 5.8 12.7 0.25
LBS 43.6 53.8 53.7 69.2 0.63
LPL 6.3 6.9 5.6 8.4 0.48
CUBS 0.9 2.3 2.7 2.7 0.30
(% points) 
BE 1.15 1.43 1.51 1.90 0.41
HMT -0.19 1.64 2.14 2.14 0.18
NIESR 0.003 1.27 1.73 1.73 0.11
LBS -0.66 1.22 1.30 1.46 0.15
LPL -2.00 2.80 2.73 3.66 0.70
CUBS -0.01 1.20 1.40 1.40 -0.63
Notes
MAE
8
RMSE
P
mean error
mean absolute error
standard deviation
root mean squared error
first order auto-correlation coefficient
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model that require attention. In the nonlinear case, any transformation applied to 
the "dependent" variable (the endogenous variable on which the equation is 
normalized) is reversed before single—equation residuals are calculated. These are 
then given in the same units as the variable in question, but may not correspond to 
estimation residuals. In this calculation, right-hand-side endogenous variables 
assume their known values.
(i) Bank of England (BE)
The historical tracking errors for the BE model are shown in Figure 6.2. The 
unemployment residuals show two separate periods of consistent under—prediction 
1980(1)—1981(3) and 1982(2)-1985(4). The early portion is mainly due to large, 
systematically positive errors in the total hours equation, which feed positively into 
manufacturing employment. The drift away over the latter period can be attributed 
partly to this hours equation and partly to the manufacturing employment equation 
itself. In an econometric analysis of labour market models, this latter equation, 
estimated up to 1981(4), exhibited predictive failure and autocorrelation (Wallis et 
aL, 1986, Tables 6.9, 6.13).
On the inflation rate, the single striking feature is the apparent failure to pick 
up in full the effects over the period 1979(3)—1980(2) of the increase in the VAT 
rate, particularly in its effects on the price of durables. Much of the remaining error 
is transmitted from the exchange rate.
The exchange rate residuals are large, with a standard deviation of 6.2 index 
points and a mean error of 1.5. The main problem is a failure to pick up the 
depreciation of the nominal rate 1981(l)-(3). The BE exchange rate equation in 
this model version is not estimated and is entirely backward looking, depending on a 
number of fourth order lags of explanatory variables. The result is that it heavily 
lags exchange rate movements. Furthermore, the equation is not homogeneous in 
prices due to over-differencing of the explanatory variables. The reduced form 
residuals and single-equation residuals have a near one-to-one relationship, with 
the latter explaining some 86% of the reduced form error variance.
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GDP growth is over—predicted in the period 1978(1)—1980(2) and to a lesser 
extent from 1984(2)—1985(4). There are significant errors on all the components 
over this period, but exports, imports and stockbuilding are relatively important. 
In general the residuals on imports from 1980(3)—1985(4) offset errors on 
consumption, exports and stockbuilding. In particular the reduced—form residual 
variance can be traced back to systematic single-equation errors on four equations, 
namely exports of non—manufactured goods, and three stockbuilding equations. Of 
these latter equations, those for manufacturers’ finished goods and work in progress 
and distributors’ stocks failed tests of predictive performance in previous 
econometric analysis (Wallis et a l, 1987, Ch. 5).
(ii) Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT)
When solved in a "hands—off1' mode the HMT model produces strikingly large 
errors in unemployment, as shown in Figure 6.3. The causes can be traced to three 
technical relationships for employment (by local authorities, central government 
and nationalized industries) and a price sector equation for the tax content of 
"other" retail prices. At first sight the unemployment residuals appear to improve 
over 1984(1)—1985(4), but this is caused by errors elsewhere offsetting those noted 
above. Principal among these is an over-estimate of unemployed school-leavers 
(up to 200,000!) which in turn can be attributed to the properties of the three 
equations determining the number of school leavers. Two other substantial sources 
of error in this sector, which also account for errors in other sectors, are the 
treatment of average earnings in the private sector and labour taxes. Average 
earnings in the private sector (manufacturing and non—manufacturing) are assumed 
to be proportional to manufacturing earnings only, despite the fact that the 
non-manufacturing private sector is the larger component: grossing—up earnings in 
this fashion does not appear to be reliable.
The inflation residuals largely reflect the tax content equation for "other" 
retail prices, and there are significant jumps due to the higher VAT rate. A number 
of price equations have systematic single-equation errors, but these equations do
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not appear to have been estimated, and in the reduced form their errors mostly 
cancel out. Other important influences come through from earnings and taxes (see 
above) and the exchange rate (see below).
The exchange rate tracking errors do not appear to be random, but yield an 
apparent cycle of some six to seven periods. The exchange rate predictions tend to 
lag exchange rate movements as well as exhibiting a consistent tendency to under— 
predict. The exchange rate equations comprise three behavioural relationships that 
determine the rate itself, the expected rate next quarter and the equilibrium rate. 
However the latter two variables are not observed, and none of the three equations 
(nor their reduced form) is freely estimated. In the HMT dataset, the value of the 
expected exchange rate next period is equal to the actual value in the current 
period, implicitly representing a no-change or random walk assumption, but this is 
not consistent with the structure of the expected exchange rate equation. Similarly 
the equilibrium rate "data" do not appear to satisfy the corresponding equation. 
Given that all three "structural" equations are determined from a  single estimated 
equation, it is impossible to apportion the error between them.
Output growth is over-predicted in 1978, 1980(1) and 1984(2)—1984(4) and 
substantially under—predicted in 1981(1), a period of output decline, and 1983(1). 
The over-prediction in 1978 occurs in a number of GDP components, but 
particularly exports and investment. Over the whole period the growth errors mask 
large off-setting errors in the growth of individual GDP components, with 
consistent over—prediction of stockbuilding and imports and under—prediction of 
consumption. Reduced form errors in all these sectors can be traced back to single 
equation residuals in those sectors without any effects dominating.
(iii) National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR)
The NIESR model is a consistent expectations model with 40 forward-looking 
terms in 10 variables and is sensitive to the assumptions concerning expectations 
formation. Figure 6.4 shows the results obtained when expectations are based on an 
information set dated t—1, (i.e. not including the actual values of x() using the
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method described in Section 6.2. The exogenous variable forecasts used in forming 
expectations are those supplied with the model and used in an earlier exercise by 
Hall (1987).
The unemployment residuals in Figure 6.4 show one period of consistent 
under—prediction, namely the two years 1983(4)—1985(4). This is consistent with 
positive single-equation errors on three of the four employment equations 
(manufacturing, other private industries, and public services) which were estimated 
up to  1983(4) only.
The residuals on inflation are generally quite small, although the reduction in 
inflation in the latter half of the period is not well captured. Two of the largest 
errors occur in 1979(3) and 1980(3), reflecting the imposition of the higher rate of 
VAT. The reduced form error variation for inflation can be largely ascribed to the 
single-equation performance of the price and exchange rate equations.
The exchange rate residuals are the most dramatic and the axes on Figure 6.4 
have been stretched to accommodate them. The exchange rate reacts sharply to 
changes in the balance of trade term, which has exports measured in foreign 
currency units, and this reaction is exacerbated by forward-looking expectations, 
since the model also persistently overestimates the deterioration in this measure of 
trade performance. The result is a consistent under—prediction of the exchange 
rate, the mean error being —10.8. The variance of the nominal exchange rate 
residuals around this mean can be largely explained by the single-equation errors on 
the real exchange rate, which do not exhibit any systematic pattern.
The main features of growth errors are two positive outliers in 1978(4) and 
1979(2) and an under—prediction for three consecutive quarters in 1982, but the 
mean is very close to zero. These results obscure offsetting errors in GDP 
components. Most notable are two investment equations, for distribution and 
business services and private sector dwellings, both of which tend to under—predict 
over the sample. Other consistent errors come through single-equation errors on 
factor cost adjustment, stocks (particularly distributive trades) and imports. The 
stocks and investment equations for the distributive sub-sector both failed
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forecasting tests in earlier econometric analysis (see Wallis et a l, 1987, Table 6.7, 
Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.5 shows some variant solutions in which expectations are formed 
using different information assumptions concerning the exogenous variables. The 
adaptive and perfect foresight assumptions give results which are very similar to the 
ex post solution shown in Figure 6.4 except for the exchange rate forecast. Now the 
effect of the balance of trade errors is limited to the current period, and the 
exchange rate residuals more closely resemble zero mean i.i.d. errors. The relatively 
poor performance of the model-consistent treatment of exchange rate expectations 
is suggestive of misspedfication of the exchange rate equation. Within the 
model—consistent expectations framework, using an information set dated at time t 
makes all the forecasts much worse except for the inflation rate, implying that for 
this model this assumption is less valid than the t—1 dating used above.
(iv) London Business School (LBS)
In attempting to solve the LBS model over an historical period, considerable 
problems arise due to extreme movements in the exchange rate. This model has 
three forward expectations terms, one of which is for the exchange rate (defined as 
the domestic price of foreign assets, that is, as the reciprocal of the definition used 
elsewhere in this paper), and in order to generate complete solutions for the 
expectations variables it proved necessary to make a residual adjustment to the 
model. The source of the extreme behaviour of the exchange rate is the large 
financial sector of the model, whose calibration has been criticized (Courakis, 1988) 
and which, in ex ante forecasting, is subject to substantial residual adjustment. The 
largest single-equation errors occur on overseas bank loans and it was found that 
adjusting for these errors resulted in a reduction in the exchange rate residuals 
sufficient to allow the model to solve in all periods. In periods which solved without 
these adjustments, it was found th a t their addition had no significant impact on the 
other key variables — unemployment, output growth and inflation — nor on the 
variance of the exchange rate residuads, but only their mean.
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The unemployment residuals shown in Figure 6.6 do not exhibit any trend 
behaviour although there are several sub—periods during which residuals are 
consistently either positive or negative for at least 4 successive quarters -  
1979(3)—1981(1), 1981(3)—1982(2), 1983(2)-1984(2), 1984(3)-1985(2). Also there 
are two large outliers in 1978(1) and 1978(2), which are due in turn to outlying 
residuals on the female working population and male working population variables, 
respectively. Overall, the residuals can be traced back partly to single-equation 
residuals in the labour sector, but also to price effects feeding through from the rate 
of change of the exchange rate.
The inflation residuals are inversely proportional to the exchange rate 
residuals. The residuals on the level of the exchange rate are reflected in every 
period in its first difference and thereby in the inflation rate for import prices, oil 
prices etc. The exchange rate residuals are therefore the key problem with this 
model, as reflected in a mean error of 44 index points and a standard deviation of 
54. These residuals are ultimately due to a great many systematic and large errors 
in the financial sector which are then accentuated by the expectations process. 
Under perfect foresight or adaptive expectations the maximum residual is 15 rather 
than the 180 observed in Figure 6.6. These two variant solutions are presented in 
Figure 6.7, where it is seen that the errors on growth are very similar, those on 
unemployment slightly less variable and the inflation residuals substantially less 
variable than in the previous case. In general, the output growth residuals once 
again mask much larger offsetting errors in all the GDP components.
(v) Liverpool University Research Group in Macroeconomics (LPL)
Static simulation residuals for the Liverpool model are shown in Figure 6.8, 
using an information set dated t—1 as discussed in Section 6.2. One-step—ahead 
forecasts become one—year—ahead forecasts in the annual models, which produce 
larger residuals than the quarterly models, and the scales of the graphs are 
correspondingly altered.
The unemployment residuals in 1979 and 1980 represent approximately 20 and
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25 per cent of the actual values, respectively, and the inflation residuals are negative 
throughout (mean -6.5). The nominal exchange rate is substantially overpredicted 
from 1981 to 1985 giving an overall mean error of 6.3, and growth is substantially 
underpredicted.
The errors on unemployment, inflation and the exchange rate can be traced 
back to the same fundamental causes. A large number of the equations of this 
model have systematic and large single-equation residuals. Most notable of these 
are government expenditure, the stock of goods, real money demand and real wages, 
these four errors accounting for most of the reduced form error variance for all four 
key variables. The poor single-equation performance of the model is linked to the 
way in which the model’s coefficients are derived. The original version of the model 
was based on equations which were freely estimated from data up to 1980 (reported 
in Minford et aL, 1984). However all the important parameters in the current 
version are imposed (see Wallis et aL, 1986, Ch.5; 1987, Ch.5 for tests of the 
parameterization of the unemployment, wage and goods equations). In ex ante 
forecasting exercises, the remainder of the coefficients — constants, time trends — are 
calibrated using one or two periods of recent data. It is quite clear that no attempt 
has been made to fit th is version of the model to the data over the period 
1978-1985.
A further reason for th e  reduced form mean error on inflation is due to one of 
the forecasting rules for the exogenous variables (all of which were supplied with the 
model). The exogenous "temporary" component of nominal money growth is 
forecast as zero although it clearly does not have a zero mean over this period, and 
this contributes to the consistent underprediction of inflation.
Variant solutions have been calculated in which expectations are formed using 
an information set including exogenous variables dated t and under a perfect 
foresight assumption and the  results are shown in Figure 6.9. Both of these 
assumptions produce worse results than those reported in Figure 6.8.
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(vi) City University Business School (CUBS)
The reduced form residuals for the CUBS model are shown in Figure 6.10. In 
general the results reveal no systematic evidence of model failure although the 
variances of the residuals for unemployment and inflation are large (standard 
deviations 392 and 1.77 respectively). The unemployment residuals can be traced 
back to  outlier single-equation errors on both labour supply (1984-85) and labour 
demand (1979, 1981 and 1983) which, however, are not obviously systematic. 
Similarly the main source of the inflation residual seems to be its own 
single-equation performance which explains 97% of the variance of the static 
simulation residuals. The inflation single-equation errors also explain 62% of the 
exchange rate residuals. The over-prediction of growth in 1983-84 can be 
attributed to a combination of the inflation and labour market errors. It appears 
tha t some of these errors are associated with post-sample predictive failure of the 
corresponding equations.
(vii) Concluding comments
Of the four variables considered across six models, in very few cases do the 
residuals have the appearance of the zero—mean independent random errors of the 
econometrics textbooks. Few common explanations for the performance of the 
models emerge from the preceding discussion, however, and we offer two general 
observations.
First, with respect to the 1979-81 recession, the historical tracking 
performance represents an improvement over the poor ex ante forecasting 
performance of those modelling groups who were publishing forecasts at the time 
(described, for example, by Barker, 1985), with the notable exception of the LPL 
growth figures. The model modifications that were introduced in the period 
following these forecasting failures (see, for example, W allis, 1989, Section 4) appear 
to  dominate the benefit of using actual realized values of exogenous variables, and 
have indeed yielded better results. On the other hand, the miners’ strike of 1984-85 
is treated as an extraneous event, and the output residuals for this period
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consistently across the models indicate that not only was this an unanticipated 
event but that no model modifications are called for in its  aftermath.
Secondly, of the four variables considered, it is the  exchange rate that in 
general appears to be the most difficult to track. Whereas the determination of the 
exchange rate has received considerable attention in th e  theoretical and applied 
literature, this does not yet appear to have borne empirical fruit, neither in 
single-equation nor in full model analysis. The treatm ent of the exchange rate is 
somewhat different across the models, as noted above, so there is no common 
explanation except that modelling the exchange rate is hard. Similarly there are 
few common features in the exchange rate residuals, and their correlations across 
models are small, the greatest similarity being between th e  two official models, BE 
and HMT, which have the most similar exchange rate systems, neither of which is 
directly estimated.
6.6 Cross-model comparisons
In this section the relative performance of the models is assessed more 
formally, using a standardized summary statistic (Theil’s inequality coefficient) and 
encompassing tests. Comparisons of macroeconometric models face a number of 
well-known difficulties: models may differ in size, in  temporal and sectoral 
aggregation, in exogeneity assumptions and in the underlying treatment of policy 
variables. The different size of models often reflects the degree of sectoral 
disaggregation, although in the case of the largest of the present models (HMT), this 
is due to its detailed treatment of the public sector. In focusing on a small number 
of key macroeconomic variables, we implicitly neglect th e  information advantage 
that a larger model may have by virtue of its accounting for a larger number of 
variables. With respect to temporal aggregation, that is, in  this case, the difference 
between annual and quarterly models, we use a standardized summary measure in 
an attempt to ensure comparability. With respect to exogeneity, in general there is 
a consistent treatment of external and policy variables across the quarterly models, 
but some differences emerge in the annual models. For example, the world price of
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oil, which is treated as an exogenous variable in four models and a causally prior 
endogenous variable in a fifth (LBS), does not appear in the LPL model. However 
this model treats government expenditure as an endogenous variable, determined so 
as to ensure a constant PSBR/GDP ratio, hence residuals on this variable make a 
contribution to overall model performance from which other models do not suffer. 
Both LPL and CUBS treat the interest rate as endogenous and the growth of th e  
nominal money stock as exogenous -  a contrary assumption to that of the quarterly 
models.
(i) Theil inequality coefficients
The Theil inequality coefficient is defined as the ratio of the RMSE of the  
model forecast to the RMSE of a no-change forecast, that is, the root mean square 
of the first difference of the relevant variable. For a given variable, a value greater 
than one indicates that the one-step-ahead ex post forecast under consideration 
here performs less well (in the root mean square sense) than a simple random walk 
model. The coefficient is unit—free, and standardizes for the difficulty of forecasting 
different variables, and so can be compared across variables. Finally, by calculating 
the first difference over a quarter or a year as appropriate, quarterly and annual 
models can be compared.
The results for the four key variables and six models are shown in the first six 
rows of Table 6.2. It is seen that only 10 of the 24 coefficients are less than one, 
indicating that in more than half of the cases considered, the model fits no better 
than a random walk model; a statement which is true, and more dramatically so, for 
all explanations of the exchange rate except that of CUBS. Of the four variables 
considered, the average inequality coefficient is smallest in the case of 
unemployment.
The ranking of the models according to their performance on each variable is 
of course the same as that based on the RMSE’s given in Table 6.1. If the  
inequality coefficients are averaged across variables to obtain an overall ranking, 
then CUBS and BE are ranked first and second, respectively. This calculation
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TABLE 6.2: Theil inequality coefficients
Model Unemployment Inflation Nominal
Exchange
Rate
Output
Growth
BE 0.921 0.493 1.826 1.234
HMT 1.996 4.960 1.478 1.390
NIESR 0.880 0.554 3.681 1.123
LBS 1.126 0.950 20.06 0.95
LPL 0.819 2.011 1.654 1.476
CUBS 1.240 0.500 0.531 0.565
HMT(a) 1.242 0.751 1.348 1.435
NIESR(a.e.) 0.798 0.520 1.269 1.218
LBS(a.e.) 1.00 0.363 1.820 0.882
LPL(a) 1.047 0.808 1.087 1.139
Notes
ia) adjusted model -  see text a.e.) adaptive expectations variant
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weights the four variables equally (with zero weight, implicitly, on all other 
variables), and the fact that the rankings differ across variables indicates tha t the 
overall ranking is sensitive to the chosen weights. Thus if unemployment is 
considered an important variable and its relative weight is increased, then the 
ranking of the CUBS model declines. Likewise increasing the weight attached to the 
exchange rate worsens the standing of the BE model. There are no obvious 
correlations of ranking, variable by variable or overall, with model size.
(ii) Encompassing tests
Forecast encompassing tests between rival models (Chong and Hendry, 1986)
rest on the idea of combining forecasts (Bates and Granger, 1969). Consider a
“ 1 * ocombination of one forecast, y t , based on model Mj, with a competitor, y^, based
on model M2; if the combined forecast has an error variance tha t is not significantly
smaller than that of y j, then y^ appears to offer no additional information, and Mj
encompasses M2 A comparison may be based on the regression equation
and a test of the null hypothesis 0 = 1 .  Chong and Hendry (1986) propose an 
encompassing test of Mj by testing the null hypothesis o^ =  0 in the regression
that is, by seeing whether the second forecast helps to explain the error in the first 
forecast. Their development rests on two assumptions that are not satisfied in our 
present exercise, however. First, the forecast period is assumed to be outside the 
estimation sample period and second, the forecasts are assumed to have satisfied 
within—model tests before encompassing tests are entertained. A common example 
of such a test is provided by the realization—forecast regression
y, =  i  y} +  (i-ffi y? +  ut ( 6 .28 )
n - A  -  <v? + ut (6.29)
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yt  «  a  +  0 y t +  ut , (6.30)
where the relevant null hypothesis is a  = 0, 0  =  1: if this is rejected, then forecast 
errors could be reduced by exploiting their correlation with the forecast. Given that 
this occurs in the majority of our cases, we undertake cross—model comparisons by 
considering the generalized realization—forecast regression
The relation to the Chong-Hendry regression (6.29) is noted by rewriting (6.31) as
The coefficient 02 thus indicates the extent to which M2 explains M j’s error, given 
that the performance of Mj can by itself be improved. Similarly, an encompassing 
test of M2 is based on the coefficient 0^ in (6.31). Each model can be treated as the 
null hypothesis in turn, the pair of tests being based on the single regression (6.31).
The results of a comparison of the two annual models, CUBS and LPL, are 
shown in Table 6.3, which gives the t—ratios of the regression coefficients in (6.31) 
for each of four variables. It is seen that for unemployment, LPL encompasses 
CUBS, in that the CUBS null hypothesis is rejected but the LPL null hypothesis is 
not rejected, whereas for the exchange rate, CUBS encompasses LPL. For the 
remaining two variables, neither model can reject the other, treated as a null 
hypothesis.
Corresponding pairwise comparisons of the quarterly models are shown in 
Table 6.4. In each case the model treated as the null hypothesis is denoted by the 
row and that against which it is tested denoted by the column. Also included in the 
final column is a joint test against all three competing models: denoting the null 
model as M j, the table presents the F-statistic (with 3,27 degrees of freedom) for 
the null hypothesis /?2=/?3=/?4=0, in an obvious generalization of the regression
y, =  a  +  /9,yJ +  +  " f (6.31)
y , -  y{ =  <* +  (0 ,-1 ) y{ +  0 2y t  +  V (6.32)
TABLE 6.3 Forecast encompassing tests, annual models
203
M j: CUBS 
M2 : LPL
M j : LPL 
M2 : CUBS
Unemployment 2.06 0.05
Inflation 1.61 1.35
Exchange rate 0.28 4.26
Output growth 1.27 1.21
Note
Entries are (absolute) t-ratios (5 d.f.) in a regression of M j’s error on 
M2’s forecast.
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TABLE 6.4 Forecast encompassing tests, quarterly models
BE HMT NIESR LBS All
Unemployment
BE 0.30 0.03 1.32 0.58
HMT 11.28 4.99 4.92 42.44
NIESR 8.25 2.15 2.66 23.05
LBS 11.87 5.08 5.54 43.94
Inflation
BE 1.92 1.80 3.51 13.21
HMT 3.86 4.25 5.18 20.82
NIESR 3.46 3.95 7.01 19.24
LBS 2.65 2.70 4.95 10.36
Exchange Rate
BE 4.11 2.44 2.51 5.37
HMT 0.39 0.49 0.02 0.085
NIESR 4.51 6.02 1.53 11.27
LBS 5.40 7.03 3.00 15.57
Output Growth
BE 1.06 3.18 4.36 6.98
HMT 4.47 4.79 5.66 16.96
NIESR 4.88 3.77 3.79 12.59
LBS 5.05 3.70 2.72 9.13
Note
Each entry is the (absolute) t-ra tio  associated with the regression of the 
residual error from the moael denoted by the row, on the forecast from the 
model denoted by the column. In the column labelled "all", the entries are 
F-statistics with (3,27) degrees of freedom in a regression of the model 
error on the forecasts from all the other models. Regressions include a 
constant and the model’s own forecast.
205
(6.31). It is seen that, for unemployment, the BE model is not rejected, nor is the 
HMT model for the exchange rate. In all other cases there is no encompassing 
model, each having something to contribute in explaining the other models’ errors.
These comparisons indicate that the models each have deficiencies, and that 
these differ across the models. Each model could, in some general sense, be 
improved by taking account of the properties of the other models.
6.7 UBPg the models for coqnterfoctual simulations
One of the motivations for historical tracking exercises is to assess the 
reliability of the models in  providing a base for counterfactual analysis. In such 
exercises the models are  usually adjusted by adding back their single-equation 
errors, so that the base trajectory is the historical record itself. Various "w hat was 
the effect of ..." or "what would have happened if ..." questions are then addressed 
by changing domestic policy variables or external variables and comparing the 
resulting solution with th e  base. The effect of alternative policy rules may be 
investigated in a similar fashion. Such exercises produce reliable results, however, 
only if the underlying model provides an adequate representation of the relevant 
economic behaviour. As noted above, the assessment of "adequacy" has a subjective 
element, relating to the theoretical foundations of the model, its overall properties, 
and the amount of detail i t  provides on the subject of interest. However, unless the 
model also provides a  good statistical account of the behaviour of variables of 
interest, it must be deemed inadequate for counterfactual exercises. If the model 
itself represents a poor explanation of the historical record, omitting various 
systematic effects that require considerable residual adjustment before the solution 
is on track, then the estimates it provides under alternative scenarios are 
correspondingly unreliable. A perturbed solution is subject to the same specification 
errors as the base solution, and as these are not in general simple additive constants, 
their effect does not cancel out when the two solutions are compared: two wrongs 
don’t make a right! In some cases, however, it may be possible to make relatively
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straightforward modifications to a model in order to improve matters. We consider 
the extent to which the need for such improvements is indicated by the results 
presented above, and the extent to which they are possible.
One of the most straightforward alterations to a model is simply to drop a 
variable, that is, to  treat a recalcitrant endogenous variable as exogenous, switching 
out the appropriate equation of the model. In the present case, the obvious 
candidate for such treatment is the exchange rate, and in ex ante forecasting the 
exchange rate equation is often overridden or, equivalently, subject to heavy 
residual adjustment. In their counterfactual experiments with the BE model, for 
example, Maclrie et al (1989) treat the exchange rate as exogenous. In general this 
produces biased results, however, because feedbacks through the deleted equation 
are automatically suppressed, and because the responses of other endogenous 
variables to the circumstances that produce the given values of the exogenized 
variable have to be ignored, as those circumstances are not described. The question 
"what if the exchange rate were x per cent lower" cannot be answered sensibly 
unless a plausible scenario in which this occurs is described, and its other 
ramifications assessed. Of course the problems are less acute if the exogenized 
variable is relatively constant, but this is typically not the case, a variable being 
exogenized precisely because its unusual movements cannot be explained.
In the HMT model, seven technical relations dealing with disaggregated public 
sector employment, school leavers’ unemployment and the tax content of certain 
retail prices cause problems. Although dealing with rather detailed matters, these 
equations have errors that permeate the full model solution, and they are obvious 
candidates for switching out. In this case the variables thereby made exogenous 
would seldom be regarded as of central importance, and corresponding variables on 
the other models are treated as exogenous. For example, the conventional 
unemployment measure used in this Chapter excludes school leavers, and so unless 
unemployed school leavers are a focus of attention, or represent an important 
transmission mechanism in the labour market, treating this variable as exogenous 
loses little information. Dropping these seven equations improves the tracking
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performance overall. In particular the Theil inequality coefficient for inflation is no 
longer an outlier, but is reduced below 1 in common with the other quarterly 
models, as shown in the "HMT adjusted" row of Table 6.2.
The LPL model is used in a historical tracking exercise by M atthews and 
Minford (1987), whose claim that the model "fits past data well" does not appear to 
be well supported by the results presented above. In fact Matthews and Minford 
use an amended version of the LPL model. The amendments comprise various 
adjustments to the money demand equation and intercept adjustments to  the  stock 
of goods equation: these remove the systematic error in the growth and inflation 
trajectories. In the case of the money demand equation, certain tax and  benefit 
variables which proxy a black economy effect are deleted, in order to keep th is effect 
unchanged in their experiments, and compensating intercept adjustments are  made. 
Such amendments centre the growth and inflation residuals plotted in Figure 6.8 on 
zero, while retaining a similar time profile. The Theil inequality coefficients for 
these two variables (and for the exchange rate) are reduced, that for inflation being 
reduced below one, as in other models (see Table 6.2), although the coefficient for 
unemployment is increased.
It is noted in discussion of the LPL model above that several of the calibrated 
equations of the model have little empirical support, and in other models examples 
are dted in which equations have obvious statistical deficiencies. There is then an 
obvious course of action to obtain a better base solution for counterfactual exercises, 
namely to respecify such equations in order to improve matters. In several cases 
preliminary investigation indicates that this can be done.
This Chapter begins by examining the link between model forms and solution 
modes. The standard analysis of model forms is extended to the forward- 
expectations case and solution modes are developed corresponding to the standard 
single-equation, static and dynamic solutions of a conventional model. The 
presence of unobservable forward expectations terms allows us to propose a  variety
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of solutions in each case depending on differing assumptions concerning the 
information set used to form expectations.
In the later sections, a historical tracking exercise is presented which requires 
the use of all three solution modes and allows us to assess the impact of the 
information assumptions. We begin this exercise by considering the methodology of 
historical tracking. We argue that static simulation rather than the more 
commonly employed dynamic simulation is the appropriate mode of analysis. We 
apply this approach to six current models of the UK economy over the period 
1978-85 including three forward expectations models. The results are 
disappointing, with Theil inequality coefficients exceeding one in more than half of 
the cases tabulated (six models, four key variables). There is no clear distinction 
between consistent-expectations models and more traditional backward-looking 
models in this respect: the major difficulties lie elsewhere.
Static simulation over a historical period reveals the goodness of fit of the 
model as a complete system. In some cases it is then possible to  trace errors back to 
particular equations of the model, perhaps inappropriately specified or estimated 
technical or behavioural relations, and so to identify areas of the model that require 
attention. Some examples specific to individual models emerge in our analysis, but 
the most general example concerns those parts of the models that deal with the 
exchange rate. The difficulty of empirical modelling of the exchange rate is well 
known, and the poor results in the present paper conform to the prevailing, 
disappointing consensus.
Irrespective of this particular difficulty, one might ask why it is that models 
that are in  such regular use in forecasting and policy analysis exercises are so poorly 
validated historically. It would appear that, whereas individual equations are often 
thoroughly tested against the historical record, once a satisfactory specification at 
that level is obtained and the equation inserted into the complete model, attention 
is concentrated on the use of the model in "forward-looking" forecasting and policy 
analysis. These may be the more pressing problems facing the model proprietor, 
and "backward-looking" historical validation, system—wide, is correspondingly
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neglected. When the model does not perform well historically, however, and no 
good explanation of its failure is available, the reliability of analysis based on the 
model is called into question.
One specific use of the models which demands greater prior attention to  their 
historical tracking performance is in counterfactual analysis. Here a good account of 
the historical behaviour of relevant variables is a prerequisite for the study of their 
possible behaviour under alternative scenarios — questions of what might have been. 
The device of deleting a troublesome variable may create as many problems as it 
solves. While in some cases simple alterations to the models can be made to 
improve matters, the overall inadequacy of the historical solution as a baseline for 
counterfactual analysis serves to underline the general deficiency of the models.
Chapter 7
OPTIM AL CONTROL AND INFLA TION -U NEM PLO YM EN T T R A D E -O FFS
In this chapter we develop methods for the optimal control of large-scale 
nonlinear models containing forward expectations. We then show how optimal 
control methods can be used and interpreted in the context of model analysis rather 
than policy analysis. Finally, we present an empirical examination of the inflation- 
unemployment trade-offs in three large-scale models which serves to evaluate the 
cost of the optimal control algorithms and to demonstrate their use in model 
analysis.
7.1 Optim al control ^ igorithnu for forward expectation} model»
The general optimal control problem was discussed in Section 2.4 and we 
briefly restate the problem here. In policy optimization we generally have 
conflicting objectives. These objectives are explicitly stated in a scalar—valued loss 
function. Optimal policies are those which minimize that loss function subject to 
the econometric model. It is conventional to employ a quadratic objective function 
which we re-state from equation (2.15):
m U J °  =  j  (Y—Y)'W y(Y—Y) +  j  (X—X )'W x(X—X), (7.1)
where capital letters denote stacked vectors of variables e.g. Y '=(yJ,...,y^,); the 
weighting matrices W^, are positive semi-definite; tilde denotes a target or 
desired value (e.g. Y). Equation (7.1) is minimized with respect to elements of X 
subject to the econometric model which may be written in stacked form as in 
equation (2.14) e.g.:
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V t  =  B1 * 1 -1 +  Cxt +  ut (7.2»)
becomes
DY =  GX +  BYq +  U, (7.2b)
where
Bq ° c 0
D = B 1 .
0 -Bj -b J
, G =
0 c
“ d Y o (Yq, ... 0) is an initial
condition.
In the forward expectation case it is convenient to separate out the 
expectations terms as separate variables as in Section (3.6) since we will no longer 
be imposing consistent expectations in every solution. Hence the model becomes:
DY =  GX + BYQ +  HY* (7.3)
where Y*' is 1111(1 ( e g )  H
A 0 
0 A
For linear systems with forward expectations, different optimal solutions can 
be obtained by the use of different first order conditions as shown in Section 2.8. 
These conditions correspond to different scenarios and, for example, vary between 
the time-consistent and time-inconsistent optimization. For linear models such 
solutions have been examined, inter alia, by Miller and Salmon (1985), and Cohen 
and Michel (1988) in continuous time; Hughes Hallett (1987) and Ghosh, Gilbert 
and Hughes Hallett (1987) in discrete time. In this section we are concerned to 
develop numerical procedures for determining analogous solutions in nonlinear 
models. In particular we wish to consider and build on the methods suggested by 
Hall (1984, 1986), Rustem (1989), HoUy and Zarrop (1979, 1983) (used by Bray, 
1988). In particular these will be compared to the method used in Wallis et aL 
(1987, Ch.3).
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The various methods can be characterized by interpreting them as dynamic 
games played between two players -  the policy maker calculating optimal 
trajectories, and economic agents setting expectations. The policy maker will 
always have an explicit objective function. Other agents will behave rationally by 
formulating expectations to be consistent with the model’s predictions. This will be 
regarded as an optimization on the part of economic agents. This optimization may 
be implicit in a consistent expectations solution procedure or can be made explicit 
in a loss function as in the penalty function solution for consistent expectations 
(Section 3.6). It is not necessary for economic agents to act collectively if we 
assume that they are an homogeneous set acting independently but identically so 
that in aggregate their actions are like those of one player.
Three solutions will be considered and existing procedures will be critically 
assessed. Where necessary alternative procedures are proposed. The three solutions 
can be viewed as:
(a) time-consistent and expectations consistent,
(b) expectations—inconsistent/cooperative,
(c) time-inconsistent and expectations-consistent.
In practice type (b) methods have been used to attem pt a type (c) solution. The 
methods we propose for type (a) and type (c) solutions can be interpreted as 
nonlinear, discrete time analogues of the solutions proposed by Cohen and Michel 
(1988).
A time-consistent optimal policy is defined as the best policy from amongst 
those which the policy-maker has no incentive to change simply due to  the passage 
of time i.e. if the policy-maker re-optimizes starting from a later time period, the 
optimal solution remains unchanged. In section 2 we showed that the optimal 
policy for our demonstration model was not time-inconsistent if it was not forward 
looking i.e. changes in the optimal policy in period 2 did not affect the outcome for 
period 1. This result leads to a general method for obtaining the time-consistent
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solution as the outcome of a non-cooperative Nash game. A non-cooperative Nash 
game is played between two players who each take the others reaction function as 
given. A Nash solution is one for which neither player can unilaterally improve 
their position. The solution must therefore have the property that it minimizes the 
objective function for the policy-maker taking agents’ expectations as given, and 
minimizes economic agents’ objective functions given the optimal policy settings. 
We then define the optimization process for economic agents as tha t of finding 
consistent expectations given policy settings. By separating out the forward 
expectations from the policy optimization calculation, we automatically remove any 
time-inconsistency by artificially setting to zero the derivative which causes 
inconsistency. Expectations consistency is then enforced by searching across 
time-consistent strategies until expectations-consistency is achieved.
The solution may be achieved numerically by a Cournot-style process which 
iterates between the policy maker’s optimization problem and the agent’s consistent 
expectations problem as follows. This is analogous to the "guess and iterate" 
procedure of Cohen and Michel (1988).
Algorithm (a) Nash/non-cooperative
(i) Obtain arbitrary values for the expectations y®+ j,  t = l ..... T  (e.g. by a
consistent-expectations solution to the base).
(ii) Solve the policy optimization problem by minimizing J°  with respect to the 
policy instruments subject to fixed expectations, using a conventional nonlinear 
optimization package, to obtain y^, t= l,...,T  and a terminal value
(iii) Check for consistency of expectations i.e. |(yt ^ j —y®^j)/y®+1 |<  r, V
t= l ....T  for some small r. If consistency has been achieved then stop. Else go to
step (iv).
(iv) Solve the model for consistent expectations given the optimal instrument 
values calculated in step (ii). Return to step (ii).
If these iterations converge the solution will possess the desired properties of
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optimality for policy makers, time-consistency of the optimal policy and 
expectations consistency. The numerical cost may be substantial, equal to 
pCj +  pC2 for p iterations of steps (ii)-{iv); where C j is the average cost of a 
consistent expectations solution for given exogenous variable values and C2 is the 
average cost of an optimization under fixed expectations.
This algorithm can be made more efficient in a number of ways. Since the 
process is a two-part iteration such as that used to solve for expectations, we could 
employ incomplete iterations on either step (ii) or step (iv) as in Chapter 2. One 
incomplete iteration would be generated by a  partial optimization at step (ii), e.g. 
only one iteration of the nonlinear optimization algorithm will usually give a good 
approximation to the exact optimum. Once expectations have converged, the 
number of optimization iterations would be extended. An alternative incomplete 
iteration could be made by taking one (or a few) steps of a penalty function solution 
for consistent expectations at step (iv). Both step (ii) and step (iv) could be made 
faster by restricting convergence tests to the  variables of interest. Incomplete 
iterations will generally increase the necessary number of outer loop iterations (p) 
between steps (ii) and (iv). The most efficient algorithm would be that which finds 
the best trade-off between C j, C2 on the one hand and p on the other.
The only prior attem pt to generate this type of optimal time-consistent 
solution appears to that by Hall (1984, 1986). Hall’s algorithm is a special case of 
our general procedure in which step (iv) is replaced by the following:
(iv ') Set y®+1 =  yt+ 1 , t= l,...,T  where yt+ 1  is obtained from step (ii). Return to 
step (ii).
This algorithm is equivalent to an incomplete loop of the consistent- 
expectations solution at step (iv) which uses only one iteration of Hall’s (1985) first 
order method. However, this is unlikely to be appropriate for more general models 
than that investigated by Hall. In his case the consistent-expectations problem is 
very specific — the expectations terms are confined to one consumption equation.
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This apparent short cut could actually make the procedure very expensive and 
possibly non-convergent in more general models. By using the restricted step (iv ') 
the cost will be approximately p2C2 for p2 iterations of steps (ii)—( iv '), but p2 will 
be at least the number of iterations required to solve the model for consistent 
expectations using the Hall (1985) algorithm, in which the model stacked over time, 
is treated as one large equation system. For the NIESR model, p2 will therefore be 
in excess of one hundred. For the LBS and LPL models the Hall (1985) algorithm 
has not yet been found to work successfully at all due to numerical instabilities (see 
Fisher, Holly and Hughes Hallett, 1985, pp.22-23). Furthermore, the  changes 
induced in the policy variable at step (ii) will affect the solution path. In general 
this increased variation in the policy variables will increase p2 above its  value for 
the base solution. At worst this could cause the iterations to  become 
non-convergent. Since both Cj and C2 are likely to be large we have an interest in 
minimizing p and so the restriction implied by (iv ') is unlikely to be beneficial.
A second method for making this algorithm efficient is to obtain good start 
values. Since the time-consistent solution is of particular interest alongside the 
time-inconsistent solution then the latter could be used as a start value (or vice 
versa if the time-consistent solution was found to be cheaper to construct).
Alternatively we could use extrapolation parameters to speed up convergence 
between steps (ii) and (iv). The most obvious possibility here is an extrapolation/ 
damping factor on the optimal policy trajectory i.e. x (s)= tx (s—1)+(1—7 )x(s) at 
iteration (s) where denotes the result of step (ii) and * denotes the inpu t into step 
(iv). Extrapolation parameters are likely to be especially important if incomplete 
iterations are being employed.
Finally, the time-consistent solution could be generated by linearised versions 
of the models in which case the computation is much easier. This approach has 
been developed by Gaines, al-Nowaihi and Levine (1987). In applications where the 
time-consistency is itself the most important issue, linearization may be the most 
efficient method but it  is always possible that removing the nonlinearities will alter 
the conclusions of the study.
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The algorithm for time—consistent solutions can be extended to cover games 
played between economic agents and several policy makers. Such games are 
particularly appropriate for multi—country models where there are policy makers for 
each country. A particular extension has recently been given by Bray (1989) 
following Rustem (1989). In this case step (ii) is replaced by a loop in which the 
policy optimization problem is solved for each player in turn. In this extension it 
may be more convenient to retain the penalty function method for solving out the 
expectations since the same software can be applied. As noted above incomplete 
optimizations (one step) may reduce the overall cost.
It is important to note that this algorithm is intended to find the optimal 
time-consistent policy for a government using a discretionary optimization 
approach i.e. one which is willing, if able, to set policies so as to take advantage of 
agents’ expectations formed in the past. In the new-classical model of Kydland and 
Prescott, the time-consistent optimal solution only exists if a government cares 
about inflation as well as unemployment. If a government only cared about 
reducing unemployment, it is not possible for a time—consistent solution to be 
achieved: there is always an incentive for such a government to deceive, agents 
always know that such an incentive exists and the result is an inflation rate of 
infinity (i.e. the solution given at (2.31) no longer exists). In a new-classical model 
any persistent attempts by a government to reduce unemployment below the 
natural rate leads to accelerating inflation. Although this result is based on extreme 
assumptions which are unlikely to exactly replicated in an empirical model, the 
feasible solution space of a nonlinear model is generally bounded and relatively 
small (see the following section). Hence, for certain objective functions there may 
be no time-consistent, expectations—consistent solution that is a feasible outcome 
given a government intent on using discretionary policy optimization. The above 
algorithm may therefore be non-convergent.
(b) CoopermtiTC. em cU tiom -inoM uiitait
The solution to algorithm (a) is an optimal non-cooperative outcome. The
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cooperative analogue could arise as the outcome of a cooperative Nash game in 
which policy makers agreed to stick to their announced policy and agents behaved 
as if their expectations were inconsistent — such an agreement might still be 
perfectly rational if agents were compensated in some way. An example might be 
an agreed incomes policy in which union wage bargainers reduced their claims (as if 
their expectations of inflation were lower than they really were) in return for 
agreement on government economic and social policy (e.g. a "social contract"). 
Such an outcome could be consistent with the optimal cheating solution of the 
Kydland—Prescott model at equation (2.32).
The solution to  a  cooperative game is obtained by a joint minimization of the 
objective function e.g.:
min Je =  J°  +  i ( Y + -Y * ) '  Wfi(Y+ -Y *) +  *( Y*)'  Wy( Y«5) (7.4)
where Y* is given as for equation (7.3) but Y+ / is now given by (y2>-»y*r+i)- The 
weighting matrices We, Wy are positive semi—definite and the magnitude of Wg, 
Wy relative to Wx, W y must be agreed by the two cooperating partners. The Y* 
variables are now treated as control instruments along with X in J°  (equation 7.1). 
If J°  is empty then this is a generalization of the objective function used in the 
penalty function solution method examined in Chapter 3.
Algorithm (b) Nash cooperative
(i) Obtain arbitrary values for the expectations y®+ j,  t* l , . . . ,T  (e.g. by a 
consistent expectations solution to the base).
(ii) Solve the joint optimal control problem by minimizing J e with respect to the 
policy instruments and the expectation terms.
This solution has certain computational attractions in tha t the optimal values 
and expectations are calculated simultaneously and it can be implemented in a 
standard optimization software package without any special adjustment. Since the
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outcome is for a cooperative game, the notion of time-consistency is not relevant. 
The outcome can only be implemented if the two players contract to stick to their 
agreed policies/expectations.
This type of algorithm was first suggested by Holly and Zarrop (1979, 1983) 
not for the cooperative case of the expectations-inconsistent solution but for an 
expectations-consistent outcome. In order to achieve this solution the weights Wg 
must be set to be large relative to  the Wy, Wx and Wy elsewhere in J e , so that at 
the optimum expectations are consistent. In this variant this procedure is then 
using an unconstrained penalty function approach to give policy optimization 
subject to  the constraint of consistent expectations. In the control literature this is 
well known to be an ill-conditioned problem (see, inter alia, Bertsekas, 1975; 
Luenberger, 1973, Ch.12) although it does not appear to have been realized in 
connection with this economic application. The ill-conditioning arises near the 
optimum when the constraint part of the objective function achieves a  near-zero 
outcome whereas the other part remains non-zero. The problems emerge in a 
practical sense in that it is difficult to choose Wg. If these weights are too large the 
solution will remain at the nearest consistent expectations solution; too small and 
expectations remain inconsistent. In order to overcome this difficulty, the weights 
Wfi should be gradually increased during the iterations. Unfortunately there is no 
general algorithm in the literature for doing this automatically for this context. 
However we could amend algorithm (b) as follows. Start with Wg relatively small 
in step (i), and add a further step (in).
(in) Test for consistency of expectations |(yt+ 1 — y*+1)/(y*+ i ) |  <  r , V t= l,...,T . 
If expectations consistent then stop. If not, then increase the weights We and go to 
step (ii).
Bray (1988) uses algorithm (b) with step (in) applied manually and found 
considerable difficulty in locating the optimum. This experience is entirely 
consistent with our analysis and our own failed empirical attempts to employ this
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algorithm to optimize subject to consistent expectations.
A further problem with the Holly and Zarrop application is the interpretation 
of the results. I t is claimed (Holly and Zarrop, 1983, pp28—31) that a consistent- 
expectations solution generated by algorithm (b) is also time-consistent. However, 
since the optimization is undertaken with expectations changing simultaneously, the 
forward-looking part of the model is affecting the optimal policy calculation. 
Hence, the solution must be potentially time—inconsistent in the sense defined in 
this chapter. This criticism of Holly and Zarrop has also been made recently by 
Wohltmann and  Kromer who argue that the notions of time-consistency and tim e- 
inconsistency used by Holly and Zarrop are directly contrary to  those of Kydland 
and Prescott. This criticism is confirmed by our analysis. Since the Holly and 
Zarrop solution is numerically problematic, we propose to find the tim e- 
inconsistent solution from a more appropriate formulation of the problem.
(c) Time—inconsistent , w rectatipiig-TOnTOteat
The optim al time-inconsistent solution yields the minimum to the policy­
makers objective function over all expectations-consistent solutions. The problem 
takes the form o f  a Stackelberg leader-follower game since the policy maker takes 
into account th e  fact that expectations are formed consistently when he optimizes. 
Economic agents, however, simply accept the announced policy and form 
expectations as if  that policy is to  be pursued. As with all dynamic Stackelberg 
solutions, this is potentially time-inconsistent as discussed by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977). With no cheating this would deliver the no-loss solution to the 
Kydland—Prescott model given by equation (2.31).
We generate the solution by setting up an objective function for the policy 
maker which is minimized taking into account the consistent expectations formation 
process and not ju s t a vector of expectations as in algorithm (a). This is a standard 
optimization w ith  the additional feature that all derivative evaluations and 
intermediate iterations use a consistent expectations solution procedure.
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Algorithm (c) Stackelberg leader—follower
(i) Solve the optimal control problem to minimize J °  using a consistent 
expectations solution for all solutions to  the model including derivative calculations.
Rather than minimize subject to  a  consistent-expectations constraint as in the 
Holly and Zarrop version of algorithm (b), we have implicitly substituted the 
constraint into the model and this removes the numerical ill-conditioning from the 
problem. This approach can be viewed as a natural extension to part of the optimal 
control literature for discrete time models in which the system is stacked over time. 
For linear models the extension to  rational expectations is considered by Hughes 
Hallett (1987) and Ghosh, Gilbert and Hughes Hallett (1987, pp.253-261). For 
nonlinear models this general approach was briefly described (but not used) by Fair 
(1984, p.385) and is used implicitly (but not described) by Hall (1984, 1986).
Computationally algorithm (b) appeals because an expectations model could 
be slotted into any optimal control algorithm. However when we first used this 
method (see Wallis et aL, 1987, Ch.3), it was found that certain features of the 
expectations model require changes to  the routines which have been developed for 
conventional models. Convergence of the expectations usually requires that the 
instruments are on a stable trajectory near the terminal date. If this criterion is not 
met, there may not be a stable solution path for the solution algorithm to locate 
(see Chapter 4). Hence we specify the control problem over a sub—period of the 
time—horizon with appropriate smooth projection of the instruments up to the 
terminal date. These long-run considerations then become an explicit part of the 
optimization problem.
The procedure also complicates the control algorithm itself. The derivative- 
based procedures usually construct a  Jacobian matrix to control the descent 
direction. Elements of this matrix take the form for target variables
i= l,...,ny; instrument variables j= l, . . . ,n x; and time periods s,t= l,...,T . This matrix 
is approximated using finite differences calculated from dynamic solutions to the 
model. In principle the matrix (which is (ny.T)»(nx.T)) needs nx-T model solutions
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to construct. Because this is very costly, two restrictions are usually observed:
0, t< s (7.5a)
? it+ k , k=l,...,T . (7.5b)
fc j.+ k
These two assumptions will hold exactly in a linear model without forward 
expectations. The first states that current dated variables are not affected by future 
policy changes, the second states that the effects of policy are not state dependent.
Given these assumptions, only nx model solutions are required to evaluate the 
numerical derivatives and the derivative matrix is lower triangular. In a model 
with forward expectations, the first of these restrictions (7.5a) cannot hold because 
variables are linked backwards in time as well as forwards. A t least 2nx solutions 
are therefore required, one to construct the lower triangle and one to construct the 
upper triangle for each instrument. This latter derivative evaluation is performed 
using an impulse shock to the terminal period. In our experience this is sufficient 
for well behaved models and instruments, but not generally.
The second assumption (7.5b) is unlikely to be very accurate as an 
approximation because, apart from the nonlinearity of the model, there is increased 
dependence on initial and terminal values and we find differences in anticipated and 
unanticipated effects. This assumption is therefore particularly suspect in the 
regions of t= 0  and t= T . One might therefore need to compute nx>T solutions just 
to evaluate the derivatives. For example in the NIESR model the response to a 
shock can be very sensitive to its introduction date and the derivatives need to be 
calculated for every period and nx-T model solutions are required.
These two changes to a standard optimization procedure can be viewed as 
beneficial rather than undesirable. Even in a conventional model there is always a 
terminal period problem in which the algorithm can take advantage of the finite 
time horizon to attain implausible results near the end period. This can be dealt 
with by applying a suitable penalty near the terminal date to act as a transversality
%
'
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condition (Dixit, 1976, p ll4). In a forward expectations model, the problem is more 
explicit and attention is focused on retaining stability of the solution. Similarly, the 
response of current variables to  future policy changes focuses attention on the 
question of anticipated and unanticipated effects.
Summary
In this section we have proposed three routines for optimizing policy on 
nonlinear forward expectations models. The three routines can be shown to yield 
different solutions. A general method for producing a non-cooperative tim e- 
consistent solution is proposed and several possibilities for improving its efficiency 
are presented. The algorithm of Hall (1984, 1986) is found to be a special case of 
this general method with a efficiency gain incorporated which is specific to the 
problem considered. An analogous solution is presented for a cooperative game. 
This algorithm incorporates that of Holly and Zarrop (1983) for the time-consistent 
solution as a special case. However, it is found that the Holly and Zarrop version is 
both numerically problematic and is actually time-inconsistent rather than 
time-consistent as had been claimed. Finally we present a method for finding the 
optimal time— inconsistent solution and note some amendments to existing routines 
which enable us to use the algorithm in a conventional optimization package.
7.2 galcal i tfM  u ad e -offg
In this section we propose the use of control techniques for model analysis. In 
particular we show how control and targeting techniques are used to select solutions 
of interest from the feasible solution space of a model. Within this context we 
discuss the derivation of trade-offs between conflicting objectives. The definition of 
the trade-off must be carefully made in terms of the range of possible outcomes for 
different policies. These trade-offs may then, in principle, be treated as a menu for 
policy choice (although one would be very cautious in such interpretation due to 
possible side-effects on other variables). We therefore start by examining the 
geometry of a model’s solution space and how particular outcomes are achieved by
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different experimental designs. We go on to discuss why certain outcomes are not 
attainable. Finally we demonstrate how trade-offs can be defined in particular 
examples.
We begin by examining the range of possible solutions for a macroeconomic 
model in a particular type of targeting problem. In this problem we choose an 
instrument (set) to target an endogenous variable (set). We may be able to achieve 
the target(s) exactly in every period using equation inversion techniques. This 
solution is compared to a base in which the instrument values are unchanged. 
These two solutions will then define a range of possible outcomes for the 
instruments and target values. We then apply optimal control techniques to the 
same exercise. It will be shown that optimal control can be used as a device for 
selecting a particular solution, or set of solutions, from within the range defined by 
the two simulations. In certain circumstances, addressed below, equation inversion 
techniques fail to produce a solution. In these cases optimal control can be used to 
obtain a solution for the endogenous variable(s) as close to the target values as 
possible.
We begin with a simple two variable, static relationship:
yt  =  a  +  /?xt +  ut , t  =  1.....T, (7.6)
where y  ^is an endogenous variable, xt is exogenous and ut is a normally distributed 
random disturbance term with mean 0 and variance <r^ . We assume that the 
coefficients a, 0  are known. The solution to (7.6) for some base trajectory of x( = 
and setting u( to its expectation of zero is simply:
yt  =  a  +  (7.7)
Let us assume that, ceteris paribus, x( is the desired level for and that there is 
also a desired level for yt  =  yt t  yt - For 0 1 0 we can invert equation (7.7) and thus 
choose yt  =  yt to yield x^:
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xt =  7x/P ~ a /0 , (7.8)
Now SEt and yt represent the desired values for x^, yt  and we can set up the 
optimization problem to minimize the joint loss arising from deviations about these 
desired levels. The optimum choice (x°, y°) will lie between the two outcomes 
obtained above if we assume that the loss function is constant over time, and 
quasi—concave. Then we can write
The outcomes (x^, yt ) and (x( , yt ) represent limiting solutions as the cost of 
deviations from xt relative to those from yt go to zero and infinity respectively. For 
a general class of objective functions we can therefore obtain limiting results by two 
simulations to obtain y^,x^ and x^,y^.
For example, let us assume a simple quadratic objective function to be 
minimized:
y° =  k y , +  ( i-k )  y,
x° = k x i + (l-k ) xt
0 <  k  <  1 (7.9)
m in  J
X
(7.9)
where wx, wy > 0, wy+wx=1.0. Equation (7.9) is minimized subject to the 
equation of the econometric model (7.5). The choice of wy/wx then characterizes 
the control problem and yields a unique solution:
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jr° =  a  + 0 x °  (7.10)
x0 _  wx* l + -  « g »Y _  wx x t / ^  +  » y x ,
‘ (wx +  P* * y) ( • /  +  wy )
» k = wx/(wx +  i 2wy), (1-k) -  wy/(wy +  w,,/^2)
In Figure 7.1a, we show these solutions graphically for the one target — one 
instrument case. In the linear model there are, in general, no bounds to the function 
and the constraint line given by A A is therefore open ended. The preference 
function can be shown as a set of indifference curves around the bliss point (e.g. 
lines BB, CC, DD) and the optimal solution as a tangency between an indifference 
curve and the constraint line i.e. point O j. As the relative weight between target 
and instrument changes, the indifference curves are pulled along the axes e.g. to 
become line EE and a new optimum Oj- The optimal solutions then trace out the 
model solution space as defined by the constraint line.
In practice models are usually nonlinear such as
f(yt , x t ; ff) =  ut , ,t =  1,...,T. (7.11a)
where f(-) is a general nonlinear function and 0 is a (vector of) parameter(s). We 
assume the existence and uniqueness of the implicit functions
7t  = g(»t , u, ; I), x , =  h(jr,, u , ; >). (7-Ub)
The presence of nonlinearities simply alters the shape of the constraint line (AA in 
Figure 7.1a). The boundary points mark limits for x as long as the relationship 
between x^ and yt is concave. Static controllability (see below) is preserved as long 
as d y jd ict i  0 i.e. that h exists along the length of the constraint line. However it 
is possible that nonlinearity will now bound the constraint line at one or both ends
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F i g u r e  7 . 1  T r a d e - o f f  c a l c u l a t i o n s
a )  o n e  ta r g e t ,  o n e  i n s t r u m e n t  b )  tw o  t a r g e t s ,  tw o  in s t r u m e n ts
(unemployment:)
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(e.g. bounds such as y, x>0) or even to rule out some intermediate solutions.
These results hold for all time periods in this static model and for each 
equation in a non—simultaneous (uncoupled) model. Dynamic and simultaneous 
models can be dealt with jointly in the following manner. We stack up the system 
over time and turn to  matrix notation for a simultaneous system as for equation 
(7.3):
DY = GX + BYq +  U. (7.12)
We assume for simplicity that X has as many elements as Y and that all elements of 
Y  and X that are not targets or instruments have been substituted out of the model. 
Now we have the base solution, setting U to its expectation of zero:
Y =  D_1 [GX +  BY,,] (7.13)
and the other limiting solution is given by 
Y =  D-1  [GX +  BYq]
» X =  G_1 [DY -  B Y q ] (7.14)
The optimal control problem is defined by minimization of the objective function 
(7.1) subject to the model (7.12). The solution is given by :
x °  = [n-w yn  + w x]_1 [wxx  + n - w yY -  n 'W yD_1BY0] (7.15») 
where II =  D-1G. Since DY -  B Y q  =  GX we hive
x °  = [n-w yn + w x]-1 [wxx  + n -w ynx] (7.15b)
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Hence X° is a linear combination of the vectors X and X with matrices of weights 
which sum to the identity matrix.
The simultaneous case is demonstrated graphically in Figure 7.1b for a 
single—period, two—target, two—instrument problem. We transform the exogenous 
variable values into endogenous variable space by solving the model. The origin is 
used to indicate the desired combination of the two targets. The base solution is 
assumed to give the desired values for the instruments and this solution (y^, y^) is 
marked as point B. The objective functions can be traced out separately for the 
targets (e.g. line CC) and th e  instruments (e.g. line DD) around their separate bliss 
points. Given a quadratic objective function, the preference functions for the 
targets will be ellipses. For the instruments, they are ellipses mapped into the 
target space via the transformation of the econometric model. The two bliss points 
coincide by assumption w ith the targeting and the base solutions. Optimal 
solutions are given by the tangency of two indifference curves around the two bliss 
points e.g. point O. Different relative weights between targets and instruments will 
trace out a locus of optimal solutions (e.g. line LL).
The effects of changing the target weights relative to each other (and similarly 
for the instrument weights) are shown in Figure 7.1c. The immediate effect is to 
change the shape of the indifference curves thus pulling the optimal locus to one side 
in favour of the variable w ho’s weight has been increased. Hence we can induce two 
types of movement: along the  optimal locus by changing instrument weights relative 
to target weights; shifts in  the optimal locus by changing the relative preference 
within the targets (or w ithin the instruments).
The above analysis holds for systems and objective functions where the 
solutions are feasible (e.g. linear models) and the models are controllable (see below) 
over that space. We next consider the case where the desired values are not feasible 
either through non-controUability or nonlinearity.
A solution embodying a set of targets to  be achieved by a set of instruments 
may be made infeasible either because the model is non-controllable (with respect
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to those targets and instruments) or because it is nonlinear. We observe both these 
effects on a nonlinear model when it fails to solve (e.g. due to invalid arithmetic 
calculations such as taking the log of a non—positive number) or the optimization 
routine fails to find a descent direction. Linking those observed effects formally to 
theoretical causes is no easy task but we consider potential reasons why a particular 
limiting solution may be infeasible.
(i) Controllability
A particular set of n target values yt can be attained using xt if Bq*Cj  has 
rank n . This is the familiar Tinbergen counting ru le  that there must be as many 
independent, effective instruments as there are independent targets. If met, this 
gives us static controllability (see, e.g. Turnovsky, 1977, p.309). The optimal 
control literature also considers dynamic point controllability -  attaining a value y^. 
with instruments xt , t= l,...,T  and dynamic path controllability — attaining a path 
yp ,...,yT , p > l, with instruments x^, t= l,...,T  and conditions for these are given, 
inter alia, in Turnovsky, (1977, p.333) and Buffer and  Gersovitz, (1981, footnote 10, 
p.42) respectively for the discrete time model. The dynamic solution (7.14) requires 
a dynamic path for y starting in period 1. In th is special case the sufficient and 
necessary conditions for dynamic path controllability collapse to those of static 
controllability (see Buffer and Gersovitz’s footnote 10). Indeed the solutions are 
obtained by a recursive sequence which treats each period as a static problem. 
Hence solution (7.14) requires as many independent, effective instruments as there 
are independent targets.
In cases where we do not have static controllability, optimal control can still 
be used to obtain a solution as near as possible to  (7.14). Such a solution may or 
may not possess dynamic path controllability after some point p. In all the cases we 
consider in this Chapter static controllability will be assumed for a local 
linearization of the nonlinear model.
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(ii) Nonlinearity
Nonlinearity can destroy static controllability in a number of ways. Nonlinear 
transformations or logical " if' conditions may place bounds on the solution of both 
endogenous and exogenous variables — potentially reducing the rank of the reduced 
form coefficient matrix at these boundaries e.g. tax rates, nominal interest rates, 
unemployment, prices and output may all be bounded at zero.
Secondly, although a model may be statically controllable in a local 
neighbourhood, this property may be lost gradually as one moves away from th is 
solution, i.e. the multipliers may be state dependent. This is particularly noticeable 
near the end of a dynamic solution where the state is likely to be further away from 
the base state. Thus the multipliers and hence the static controllability property 
may be changing over the time period. The feasible solution space of the model may 
well vanish, e.g. as unemployment tends to zero. This is often observed in practice 
when the instrument trajectories are erratic or unstable and the dynamic solution 
fails.
As long as a base solution exists, optimal control can usually find some 
solution in a local neighbourhood of that base at the expense of not achieving the 
targets. It is often difficult to ascertain the precise cause when a nonlinear model 
fails to solve and sensitivity analysis using optimal control often provides an 
alternative "second best" solution.
The effect of non-controllability or nonlinearity on our graphical 
representation is therefore to place bounds on the feasible solution space. Plausible 
bounds for the case where the two targets are unemployment and inflation are 
shown in Figure 7.Id . One can see that the optimal loci may be truncated and 
hence there is a boundary whose location may be of interest.
The aim of this analysis is to show that for feasible objectives, the solution
space is defined by two simple simulations. The base solution (X, Y) is a 
straightforward model solution as long as X is a feasible input. The other lim it
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(X, Y) may be obtainable by simple algorithms for equation inversion. In the 
linear, model the solution can be obtained directly. For the nonlinear model we use 
iterative methods known as Type 2 fixes (Rampton, 1984). The solution space then 
defines the range of possible optimal outcomes for different relative weights between 
Wy and Wx- In the general simultaneous or static case, the fact that we have 
weighting matrices means that the solution space is is no longer a straight line but a 
hyper-surface. Hence each element of X or Y is no longer bounded by the extreme 
solution and this is implicit in Figures 7.1c,d.
Any one point within this set may be the optimal solution for many sets of 
weights and every point must be an optimal solution for at least one set of weights 
(or some other functional form for the objective function). The choice o f weights is 
therefore simply a question of choosing the solution o f interest from the feasible set.
This section so far has attempted to synthesize a view of the optimization 
problem as a means of choosing any one solution from a  large subset and proposes 
that the limits of the solution space may themselves be of interest. These limits can 
often be ascertained by relatively simple simulation techniques. The shape of the 
feasible set — particularly in the long run for dynamic models — may be of more 
direct interest to the economist than any one specific solution.
Trade-offs are traced out by linking up particular solutions within, or at the 
edge of, the feasible solution space. The solutions are generated following the 
suggestion of Chow and Megdal (1978) by altering the weights within the objective 
function. If we find a point on the edge of the space (e.g. point E in Figure 7. Id) 
then we can trace out the boundary by adjusting the relative weights between the 
targets and adjusting the weights of instruments to targets to ensure that the model 
solves and no further gains are possible (i.e. by finding points F, G in Figure 7.Id).
It should be noted that when a subset of the exogenous variables are used as 
instruments, the boundary will depend on which instruments are chosen. The 
boundary will also depend on the state around which the exercises take place. 
There is therefore no unique boundary to the feasible solution space of a nonlinear 
model: it is defined only for a particular objective function.
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If we begin with a solution within the boundary edge then some normalization 
is needed to  map out a  trade-off. Let us consider the specific example of the 
unemployment—inflation trade-off explored by Chow and Megdal (1978), Henry et 
al (1982), Melliss (1984) and Wallis et al. (1987). We choose two demand-side 
instruments such as government spending and the income tax rate to target the zero 
inflation — zero unemployment bliss point. Under fixed nominal interest rates, 
changes in fiscal policy automatically induce a simultaneous monetary shock. In 
most macroeconomic models there is either an implicit or explicit Phillips Curve 
giving a negative trade-off between inflation and (log) unemployment which ensures 
that the bliss point cannot be obtained. A point on the edge of feasible space is 
determined by gradually reducing the instrument weights to a minimum. 
Eventually, very large changes in the instruments will not achieve any further 
reduction in the objective function. At this point the weights between inflation and 
unemployment can be altered in order to trace out the nearest achievable points to 
the bliss point.
Alternatively a trade-off can be traced out by taking an optimal solution 
within the boundary space and altering the target weights according to some 
external criterion. One way of deciding on the changes in weight is to maintain a 
constant ratio of target to instrument costs. Using the analysis given above this has 
the effect of ensuring that points are traced out by shifts in the locus of feasible 
points rather than by movements along (caused by changing instrument costs 
relative to  target costs). Alternative suggestions include changing the weights such 
that the intervention costs remain the same e.g. an inflation-unemployment 
trade-off evaluated at a constant PSBR.
Finally, trade-offs can be drawn out without the explicit use of optimal 
analysis. We can take the instruments one—by-one and generate repeated solutions 
varying the amount by which they are shocked. We can then derive trade-offs 
between the targets by linking the various combinations available. These solutions 
(and hence the trade-off) will all be optimal for some unspecified objective function.
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One issue in optimal control analysis is to pose reasonable policy problems for 
which it might be appropriate to use a large-scale nonlinear model rather than a 
small linear model. The commonest example in the literature seems to be the 
inflation—unemployment trade-off mentioned briefly in Section 7.3. One possible 
explanation for this is the distinct nonlinearity caused by some formulations of the 
Phillips curve relating inflation inversely to unemployment and the implicit 
restriction of unemployment to be strictly positive. Hence this particular issue may 
be more interesting to examine on a nonlinear model. In what follows we will treat 
the inflation—unemployment trade-off as an unknown model property to be 
elucidated. The use of such a trade-off for policy analysis requires much wider 
considerations such as the examination of all other variables of interest (e.g. GDP 
growth or the current account deficit).
As an optimization algorithm we adopt the time—inconsistent approach (type 
(c) algorithms) which should allow us to achieve the nearest possible points to the 
bliss point. Cooperative methods (type (b) algorithms) would achieve a smaller 
value for the objective function. However, the most important forward expectation 
in the empirical models is that of the exchange rate. It is unlikely tha t foreign 
exchange markets would be willing to undertake an explicit contract with a 
government over economic policy.
For comparison, we also discuss the results of some optimizations using 
time-consistent procedures (type (a) algorithms). Our aim in these exercises is 
then threefold. We wish to evaluate the inflation—unemployment trade-offs in the 
models; the costs of optimization of a forward-expectations model; and we wish to 
examine the different possible solutions from the alternative algorithms.
In a previous exercise (Wallis et aL, 1987) we were concerned only with the 
trade-offs and employed optimal control on only one forward expectations model. 
In this section we summarize that exercise with some additional computational 
information and compare it with results on two further models, one of which gives 
conflicting evidence.
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TABLE 7.1: Spécification of the objective fonction 
(a) Base control exercise
Desired value Weight
Targets
Inflation (% p.a.) 
Unemployment (thousands)
0
500
1.5
2.7« 10-5
Instruments
Central government 
expenditure on 
procurement (1980 £m)
Base trajectory 
(4000 rising to 4600)
2.5« 10-6
Income tax rate Base trajectory 
(0.27 declining to 0.25)
2500
Damping terms
Change in central 
government expenditure 
on procurement
0 2.5« 10- ®
Change in income 
tax rate
0 2500
(b) Weight combinations used for trade-off calculations 
(instrument weights constant)
Relative weight1 Inflation Unemployment
«19 2.85 2.7« 10~®
«3 2.25 1.35« 10-5
Neutral 1.5 2.7.J0-6
43 0.75 4.05« 10"®
419 0.15 5.13«10~®
Note
1Relative weight Wj/w2 in neutral case is multiplied by factor indicated. 
These values leave the relative costs of instruments to targets unaltered.
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(i) LBS model
We use the Autumn 1986 version of the LBS model which is consistent with 
that used by Wallis et aL (1987). The inflation—unemployment trade-off is 
generated using two fiscal policy instruments: government spending and the income 
tax rate. The model has fixed nominal interest rates and bond sales — hence any 
PSBR changes are implicitly financed by changes in the money stock. Details of the 
objective functions employed to generate the trade-off are shown in Table 7.1. 
Each objective function is minimized over the first 20 quarter period of a 32 quarter 
solution. The relative preference between inflation (P) and unemployment (U) is 
then altered by changing the diagonal weights in the Wy matrix in such a way as to 
keep the relative preferences of targets to instruments constant (see Table 7.1). A 
set of 5 results is obtained for a variety of relative preferences. Alternative 
trade-offs are generated using step shocks to the instruments of varying magnitude.
The results for P, U in the last four quarters of the twenty, are averaged and 
plotted in P, U space. The result is shown in Figure 7.2 as the AA curve. The BB 
and CC curves are the results of step change simulations using government 
expenditure and the income tax rate respectively. The slope of the optimized 
trade-off is clearly seen to be a combination of the slopes derived from simulation 
analysis but lies nearer the overall target of zero inflation and zero unemployment. 
The slope and position of this trade-off curve is sensitive to different combinations
of relative preferences for between P and U and hence is not unique. This particular 
trade-off is not designed to trace the edge of the solution space but is quite close to 
it. In general we would expect to be able to predict roughly where that edge will be 
by combining the two simulation trade-offs.
Even though Figure 7.2 illustrates the fifth year of the simulation, the 
trade-off generated is quite horizontal and it does not tend to the vertical over 
time. The results suggest that there is no estimate of the natural rate of 
unemployment available from the LBS model. Furthermore the trade-off does not
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Figure 7 .2  LBS m od e l: op tim ized  In fla tion -u n em ploym en t 
tra d e—o ff .
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appear to be very nonlinear. The nonlinearities only show in restricting the length 
of the trade-off (the model won’t solve for extreme instrument changes and this 
places limits on the BB and CC curves).
The costs of the optimization depend heavily on the particular set-up of the 
objective function and the closeness of the base run to  the optimal solution. In this 
example we have two instruments so there are initial costs of four derivative 
evaluations (upper and lower triangle for each instrument) and one preliminary 
solution. Using simulation analysis it was possible to predict rough optimal values 
for the instruments and so a reasonable preliminary solution was constructed which 
cost a little more than a standard consistent expectations solution as given in Table
3.1 (whichever scheme is used). The derivative evaluations each cost much less 
than a standard solution because they are just impulse shocks. Using incomplete 
inner iterations, each of the four derivatives were obtained for about the same cost 
as a fixed expectations solution (£1000 iterations, per derivative). Each 
optimization for a point on the trade-off then required between 3 and 5 iterations of 
the nonlinear optimization routine, each iteration costing the same as a multiplier 
calculation. The total cost of each optimization exercise (one point on the 
trade-off) including all calculations, lies between 6 and 8 times those of a single 
multiplier rim.
(ii) NIESR model
The same experiment is repeated for the NIESR model retaining the same 
instruments and objective function weights. The NIESR model has much less scope 
for generating a trade-off because suitable instruments all have very similar effects. 
The optimal trade-off shown in Figure 7.3, for income tax rate and government 
expenditure, is therefore some distance from the origin. It is also quite short 
because some of the weight settings caused the model to fail to  solve hence this 
trade-off must be very close to the boundary of the solution space. In other 
respects the results are very similar to the LBS model but the slope is somewhat 
flatter. The trade-off slope is generated as a combination of those generated by the
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two instruments treated separately but the optimal trade-off lies nearer to the 
origin.
The NIESR model, with its near unit root (see Chapter 4) and forty 
expectation terms, is much more difficult to  optimize than the LBS model. The 
model derivatives are much more sensitive to the date that the shocks are 
introduced. For example, the effect of an income tax rate shock in any one quarter 
may change sign if introduced in an adjacent quarter instead. For this reason it was 
found necessary to calculate derivatives in every period. Thus the initial costs are 
46 derivative evaluations (23 for each instrument). Each derivative evaluation is 
used to  construct both the upper and lower triangles of the derivative matrix. In 
this model, each derivative evaluation is relatively more expensive than for the LBS 
model, about 2/5 the costs of a multiplier calculation using incomplete iterations. 
This reflects the sensitivity of the model to a shock in any period. Finally, the costs 
of the optimization iterations were 4 to 8 steps, each costing the same as a 
multiplier rim. Thus the total optimization cost lies between 23 and 27 multiplier 
calculations, considerably more than for the LBS model.
(iii) LPL model
Using the same instruments, targets and objective function weights, The LPL 
model gives a trade-off which completely contradicts the results of the NIESR and 
LBS models for important reasons. The result of optimization is shown in Figure 
7.4 where the trade-off actually has a positive slope bending back at zero inflation 
yielding a minimum unemployment level of 1.5 million. For this model zero 
inflation (and hence a natural rate of unemployment) can therefore be an achievable 
target.
The policy mix to  produce this result is simultaneous tax cuts and government 
expenditure cuts (under balanced financing of the PSBR this implies a decline in 
real monetary growth). Both income tax and government expenditure simulations 
alone indicate strong inflation effects and weak unemployment effects. However the 
income tax rate has potentially strong supply-side effects in this model. In
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Figure 7 .4  LPL m od el: op tim ized  Inflation—unem ploym ent 
t r a d e - o f f .  7
AÆ optimized trade-off; bB government expenditure 
simulation; cC, Income tax rate efmulatlon.
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simulation, these beneficial supply-side effects of a tax cut are offset by inflation 
effects arising from the presence of the tax rate in the money demand equation. 
This term is meant to represent the effects of the black economy. When the tax 
rate cuts are made in association with government expenditure reductions the full 
supply-side effects come through because the inflation rate can be controlled.
In fact the Phillips curve in this model is actually near vertical as indicated by 
the simulation results and the apparent positive slope of the trade-off reveals shifts 
in its position as public sector expenditure becomes a smaller share of total 
expenditure i.e. the supply side effect shifts the Phillips curve.
For the LPL model, the derivatives each have a similar cost to those of a 
multiplier run as do each of the optimization iterations. The optimization took 
between 4 and 11 steps, reflecting the distance travelled towards the origin. Each 
optimization exercise therefore cost between 7 and 14 times a basic multiplier rim.
(iv) Time—consistency
Applying algorithm (a) to the time-inconsistent solutions of the NIESR and 
LBS models (starting from the mid—point of the trade-off) yields convergence in 
one iteration: there is no incentive to  re-optimize in these models for this policy 
problem. In the Kydland-Prescott example, the incentive to re-optimize depended 
on the short-run trade-off being non—vertical whereas the long-run trade-off was 
vertical. This difference rested on the ability of the policy-maker to reduce 
unemployment (increase output) only through surprise policy changes. In Chapter 5 
we found tha t unanticipated and anticipated policy changes in the NIESR and LBS 
models had almost identical output (and hence unemployment) effects. Hence there 
is no ability to reduce unemployment by deceit. Furthermore, the trade-offs in 
these two models do not appear to become vertical in the long-run. To the extent 
that they change at all, they become flatter. Therefore, there is no incentive from 
any source for reneging on optimal policy announcements. This is confirmed 
numerically by the result that re-optimization with fixed expectations reveals no 
further gain.
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This result suggests that the time-inconsistent algorithm is useful to apply 
prior to  the time-consistent algorithm. It also emphasizes that the results of 
studies of time-inconsistency are only valid within the context of the properties of 
the model being used. Simple studies of those properties will reveal, a priori, 
whether there is likely to be a problem of time-inconsistency.
The LPL model is based on the new—classical paradigm. Applying algorithm 
(a) starting from the best solution (P=0.0, U=1500) of the time-inconsistent 
algorithm causes the model to fail to solve. The LPL model has a near-vertical 
trade-off in the short-run and a vertical trade-off in the long-run. Hence there 
would appear to  be little incentive to re—optimize. The positive trade-off observed 
in Figure 7.4 exists because there are two independent and effective instruments for 
both inflation and unemployment. Thus there is no need to indulge in cheating 
behaviour in order to  minimize unemployment and maintain zero inflation. 
However, there is some non-zero reduction in unemployment for a surprise 
expansion of government expenditure. The starting point taken embodies a much 
greater preference for reducing unemployment than inflation (weights from the 
fourth line of Table 7.1b). The preference for unemployment reductions is such that 
any possibility of reducing unemployment is taken, whatever the inflation cost. 
Hence algorithm (a) produces huge increases in government expenditure (and 
therefore inflation) in the first period for which the model cannot solve.
If we commence algorithm (a) from the "worst" of the solutions produced by 
algorithm (c) then we find no incentive to re-optimize for the reasons given above. 
This result shows that the issue of time-inconsistency is not only model dependent 
but objective function dependent. An objective function sufficiently weighted 
towards reducing unemployment is more likely to produce time-inconsistency than 
one weighted to reducing inflation in this model. These results suggests that 
time-inconsistency (and the generation of high inflation rates) might be a function 
of unreasonable preferences given the model structure rather than the process of 
discretionary optimization itself. This conclusion clearly requires further 
investigation to establish generality.
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7.4 Summary wd flad M h ai
In this Chapter we have sought to achieve three objectives. Firstly we have 
developed a general set of algorithms for the optimal control of nonlinear forward 
expectations models. These algorithms cover the optimal time-consistent, 
time-4nconsistent and cooperative solutions. Previous attempts to  design such 
algorithms (e.g. Hall, (1984, 1986), Holly and Zarrop, (1983)) are shown to be 
special cases of our more general approach. Particular attention is paid to 
computational considerations and improving the efficiency of the algorithms.
Secondly we have examined how optimal control can be used as a tool in 
model analysis to choose particular solutions from a model’s solution feasible space. 
In particular, we show how the calculation of trade—offs between competing policy 
targets can be better understood by such an interpretation.
Thirdly we have presented an empirical exercise which obtains the optimal 
inflation—unemployment trade-offs from three large-scale, nonlinear, forward- 
expectations models. These calculations allow us some insight into model 
properties. For example, we find that the NIESR and LBS models have trade-offs 
which are relatively flat and do not tend to the vertical over time. Thus no 
estimate of a natural rate of unemployment emerges. Following this result we find 
no evidence of potential time-inconsistency on these models. For the LPL model 
we find that time-inconsistency only exists for objective functions heavily weighted 
towards reducing unemployment. As the new-classical model predicts, this leads to 
accelerating inflation.
Finally, our calculations also allow us to assess the costs of optimizing such 
models. We find th a t the cost varies across models and that a single optimization 
could cost between 6 and 27 times the cost of a  standard multiplier run i.e. 
expensive but feasible. The time—inconsistent optimization algorithm worked very 
well in producing these solutions without numerical difficulties but benefits from the 
use of good start values and the use of a model with derivatives which are not 
heavily state-dependent.
Chapter 8
CONCLUSIONS
8.1 Summary
In this thesis we have developed a comprehensive set of techniques for 
solving, simulating and analysing large scale, nonlinear, econometric models with 
rational expectations of futtire-dated variables. We have demonstrated these 
techniques on three empirical models of the United Kingdom economy.
For solving the basic consistent expectations, two point boundary value 
problem, we recommend the use of first—order iterative techniques applied to the 
system stacked over time. These techniques can be substantially improved by 
taking advantage of the system’s block structure to create families of solution 
algorithms based on tw o-part algorithms. In comparison with first-order methods, 
we find the penalty function approach (or the Newton’s method equivalent to our 
approach; Holly and Zarrop, 1983) to be feasible but inefficient for the models 
considered here. Finally, we find that shooting techniques (Lipton et al, 1982) are 
an inappropriate formulation of the problem and are unlikely to be feasible on many 
nonlinear model structures.
It is clear from our results that no one first—order strategy will be dominant 
for all models. Different structures may require different variations and our 
methods allow for this possibility.
Each finite-horizon, consistent-expectation solution requires a set of 
terminal values. If the model is constructed with a  saddlepoint property it will have 
a unique stable long-run solution given the future trajectory of the exogenous 
variables. The choice of the terminal value is designed to approximate that solution 
over a finite period. As long as the model clearly possesses the required stability 
properties, we propose the use of endogenously generated values which assume 
constant or zero growth rates. Conditions based on the long-run equilibrium should 
only be used when the model has unstable roots close to the unit circle.
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Sensitivity testing should always be carried out on any model to  ensure tha t 
the solution of interest is insensitive to the terminal date. Any terminal condition 
which meets this requirement is valid. In simulations, one must take care that the 
terminal condition does not artificially yield a solution to an otherwise globally 
unstable model, particularly when policy or control rules are implemented. 
Terminal conditions constructed from long-run equilibrium analysis should be 
avoided in simulation wherever possible as they may restrict the range of 
simulations available.
In a conventional model we perform a variety of simulation experiments: 
static, dynamic, single equation, and these can be linked with alternative model 
forms i.e. structural form, reduced form, final form. We present alternative model 
forms for rational expectation models and derive the analogous solution modes. We 
can then perform all the usual simulations on a rational expectation model as on a 
conventional model. In particular, we can undertake static simulations for historical 
tracking. Our results from such an exercise on six U.K. models over the period 
1978—85, suggest that none has a particularly good tracking performance and that 
tracking the exchange rate is especially difficult. The three models with rational 
expectations in our exercise perform no better than the three without.
We next consider solutions to the model in the face of shocks, deterministic 
and stochastic. In all such simulations one must make explicit assumptions about 
the content of the information set used to  generate the expectations. In particular 
we demonstrate the difference between anticipated and unanticipated, temporary 
and permanent shocks. This analysis leads to a proposed method for stochastic 
simulation of rational expectation models. We undertake a stochastic simulation 
exercise which evaluates the variance of output under alternative financing rules for 
the PSBR. On the quarterly NIESR and LBS models we find that the variance of 
output is higher under bond finance than under money finance, whereas the variance 
of the price level is lower. The annual LPL model gives contradictory results.
Finally, we consider the optimal control of expectations models and its use in 
model analysis. We propose three general approaches for optimal control algorithms
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which are shown to deliver different outcomes. These three approaches correspond 
to different formulations of the policy problem and cover the time-consistent, 
time-inconsistent and cooperative solutions.
We show how optimal control can be used as a solution selection device from 
the feasible solution space of a large-scale model and how trade-offs between 
competing targets can be derived. We then apply our time-inconsistent 
optimization algorithm on the three models to derive inflation—unemployment 
trade-offs using government expenditure and the income tax rate as instruments. 
We find tha t the quarterly models have trade-offs which are relatively flat. We 
also find tha t there is no incentive to re-optimize when the time-consistent 
algorithm is applied and that this is explained by the properties of the models. The 
LPL model generates a horizontal optimized trade-off due to the supply-side effects 
of the income tax rate which shifts the (near-vertical) Phillips curve in the model. 
On this model we find that extreme preference function weights can generate an 
incentive to re-optimize when the time-consistent algorithm is applied.
8.2 PirertlQM for fatarg research
This thesis offers a comprehensive analysis of numerical methods for solving, 
simulating and analysing large-scale, nonlinear models with rational expectations 
terms. Having established the methods, there are obvious extensions in their 
application. Firstly, the stochastic simulation approach could be extended to other 
problems in which higher order moments are of interest. The extension to dynamic 
simulations will probably require the use of more powerful computing facilities to 
generate sensible numbers of replications.
The main direction for future research is the application of these methods for 
policy analysis. In particular the optimal control methods could be applied to a 
wider range of problems. The models used in this exercise do not reveal properties 
which lead to substantial problems of time—inconsistency except for extreme 
preference functions. This relationship between the properties of empirical models, 
preference functions and time-inconsistency requires further investigation.
247
Finally, rational expectations models could be used to investigate issues such 
as uncertainty, sustainability and credibility. These issues have been beyond the 
scope of this thesis since they require models of how agents learn about, and form 
expectations of, policy variables. In the first instance, such topics may be best 
considered with small analytical models and then quantified with the large-scale 
models.
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APPENDIX: MODEL VINTAGES
The models used in this thesis are those supplied by the ESRC Macroeconomic 
Modelling Bureau on its User service over the period Autumn 1984 to Autumn 1989. 
Each chapter used the following vintage of model.
Chapter 3
LPL and LBS models: Autumn 1985.
Chapter 4
LPL model: Autumn 1984 and Autumn 1985.
NIESR and LBS models: Autumn 1985.
Chapter 5
LPL, NIESR and LBS models: Autumn 1985.
Chapter 6
BE, HMT, CUBS, LPL, NIESR and LBS models: Autumn 1987.
Chapter 7
LPL, NIESR and LBS models: Autumn 1986.
T H E  B R IT IS H  L I B R A R Y  DOCUMENT SUPPLY CENTRE
TITLE SIMULATION AND CONTROL TECHNIQUES FOR NONLINEAR 
...........................  RATIONAL EXPECTATION MODELS
AUTHOR Paul Gregory Fisher
INSTITUTION
and DATE UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK /  q c fo
Attention is drawn to the fact that the copyright of 
this thesis rests with its author.
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition 
that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise 
that its copyright rests with its author and that no 
information derived from it may be published without 
the author’s prior written consent.
n TÏ T3-r* r-n rr* i
cms _ _ L _ L
T H E  B R IT IS H  L IB R A R Y
D O C U M E N T  SU P P LY  CEN TRE 
Boston Spa. W etherby 
W est Yorkshire 
United Kingdom
20
R E D U C T IO N  X  :...................

